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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines the rationale and on-going purpose of stabilisation clauses and 
the ways in which the clauses undermine the pursuit of sustainable development in 
developing countries.    
 Two presumptions prevail in the literature on stabilisation clauses. The first is that 
developing countries compete for foreign investment on the basis of political risks. The 
second is that there are higher levels of political risks in developing countries. This thesis 
argues that neither presumption is true as such. The available evidence points to a more 
intense competition among foreign investors backed by their home governments for access 
to the extractive resources in developing countries. The political risks that stabilisation 
clauses are aimed at also exist, at least in equal measure, in developed countries. 
Nevertheless, stabilisation clauses are routinely recommended to developing countries as an 
‘essential’ feature of an attractive investment climate. This recommendation is, however, not 
supported by any reliable evidence pointing to a link between stabilisation clauses and 
foreign investment inflow.  
The literature on the potential adverse impacts of stabilisation clauses has evolved in 
a compartmentalised way, focusing on their impact on the ability of host governments to 
enact environmental and/or human rights laws. This approach and focus are misplaced 
because in practice, stabilisation clauses rarely limit the ability of host governments to enact 
human rights and environmental laws. Rather, they limit their ability to alter their fiscal and 
economic laws and policies in other to integrate such laws and policies with their social and 
environmental objectives. The main implication of this limitation is that such governments 
are unable to mobilise the maximum of available funds to finance their sustainable 
development measures including those specifically directed at eradicating poverty, 
improving the realisation of human rights and protecting the environment.  
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
1.1  BACKGROUND 
  Stabilisation clauses are provisions that protect foreign investors from the adverse 
effect of changes in the laws of host states. They may be found in investment contracts, 
national laws or in ‘stability agreements’ between host states and investors. Whichever 
technique a host state chooses, they achieve exactly the same objective, namely, to insulate 
the investor from the adverse effect of changes in the laws of the host state. This is achieved 
either by exempting the investor from the applicability of the changes or by stipulating that 
the investor will be compensated by the host state for any additional financial burden 
imposed by the changes in the law.   
Concerns over stabilisation clauses began in earnest in 2003 following the 
publication of the legal documents governing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (hereafter ‘BTC’) 
pipeline project, a cross-border project crossing Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.
1
 Amnesty 
international then published a report claiming that the stabilisation clauses in the documents 
had the potential to limit the host states’ ability to implement their human rights obligations 
under international law.
2
 The report generated substantial interest and resulted in several 
academic articles on the potential impacts of stabilisation clauses on host states’ regulatory 
ability. However, these studies have evolved in a compartmentalised way, focusing on the 
impact of the clause on environmental and/or social laws.  
‘Sustainable development’ emerged as a result of the rejection of the ‘unsustainable’ 
approach whereby environmental protection, social development and economic growth are 
compartmentalised and treated as separate and distinct goals. It is based on the realisation 
that these goals are inseparable in terms of their causes and their resolution. The basic 
                                           
1
 The documents were published on the website of BP- a key member of the consortium of the investors 
undertaking the project. BP Caspian, ‘Legal Agreements’ 
<http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9029334&contentId=7053632> accessed 16 April 
2012. 
2
 ‘Human rights’ is used as a surrogate for social and environmental laws in the report. Amnesty International, 
Human Rights on the Line: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project (AI 2003).  
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premise of sustainable development, therefore, is that environmental protection, social 
development and economic growth are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. They must, 
therefore, be integrated in developmental decision-making to ensure a better quality of life 
for both the present and future generations.  
Despite the foregoing, the literature on the impact of stabilisation clauses remains 
compartmentalised and largely silent on the economic pillar. Little effort is made to analyse 
the impact of the clause in an integrated way that includes an examination of its impact on 
host states’ ability to enact and implement fiscal and economic laws and policies and how 
this might affect sustainable development.  
One reason the impact of stabilisation clauses on the enactment of economic and fiscal 
policies is under-studied or considered low priority is because stabilisation clauses are 
widely portrayed as an essential tool that developing countries offer to attract foreign direct 
investment (hereafter ‘FDI’) to facilitate their sustainable development. However, this view 
is based on two presumptions. First, that developing countries compete to attract FDI into 
their extractive industries. Second, that there are higher political risks in developing 
countries. Stabilisation clauses are, therefore, presented in the literature as an ‘essential’ cure 
for these presumptions. Little effort is made to examine whether these presumptions are true. 
Similarly, little or no effort is made to consider the impact of the clause using a holistic 
approach in line with the concept of sustainable development. This is what this thesis seeks 
to do. 
   Although references may be made to stabilisation clauses granted in other sectors, 
especially in the discussion of the legal effect and validity of the clause, the focus of this 
thesis is on stabilisation clauses granted in the extractive sector. Specifically, it deals with 
stabilisation clauses granted in the oil, gas and mining sectors of developing countries. The 
focus on these sectors is reflective of their importance to many developing countries both in 
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terms of their size as a share of FDI and their huge economic, social, environmental, and 
political impacts. This is in addition to the fact that stabilisation clauses are mainly used in 
this sector, and proponents of the clauses usually focus on this sector.
3
    
1.2  AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
This thesis examines stabilisation clauses and the way in which they undermine 
efforts by governments of developing countries to promote sustainable development. It, 
therefore, has two main aims or research questions. The first is to examine the rationale and 
on-going purpose of stabilisation clauses. The second is to examine the impact of the clauses 
on sustainable development in developing countries.    
As indicated earlier, a supposed answer to the rationale and purpose of stabilisation 
clauses already exists in the legal literature. Proponents claim that stabilisation clauses are 
essential to attract FDI into developing countries especially in the extractive industries where 
investments are long term and capital intensive. However, as highlighted above, this view 
has hardly been supported by evidence. Rather, it is based on presumptions that have not had 
their veracity examined.  
It is now over two decades since stabilisation clauses were re-introduced in several 
developing countries. It therefore makes little sense to still rely on presumptions, rather than 
evidence from the real world, to justify their claimed essentiality. It is for this reason that this 
thesis will rethink the rationale and on-going purpose of stabilisation clauses. This will be 
done in the light of the available evidence on current trends and future projections in the 
extractive industry, combined with an examination of whether a link indeed exists between 
stabilisation clauses and the inflow of FDI.  
The second aim of this thesis is to examine the way in which stabilisation clauses 
affect sustainable development in developing countries. The vast literature on the impact of 
                                           
3
 See, for example, UNCTAD, Best Practices in Investment for Development Case Studies in FDI: How to 
attract and Benefit from FDI in Mining - Lessons from Canada and Chile (UNCTAD 2011) 1. 
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the clause is compartmentalised and has focused on their impact on environmental and/or 
social laws. There is little or no published work that looks at the impact of stabilisation 
clauses in an integrated way in line with the concept of sustainable development. In 
particular, there is little or no published work that examines the impact of the clause on the 
ability of host governments to alter their fiscal and economic policies and how this affects 
their ability to eradicate poverty and improve human rights and environmental standards. 
This thesis seeks to fill this gap.  
  Analysing the impact of stabilisation clauses through this integrated approach is 
crucial, because in the real world, economic growth, environmental protection and social 
development are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. As a result, for an analysis of the 
impact of stabilisation clauses to have any semblance to reality, it must adopt the integrated 
approach promoted by the principle of sustainable development.   
This thesis thus contributes to the on-going debate on what impact, if any, stabilisation 
clauses have on sustainable development, including on human rights and the environment.  
However, it does so from a different angle by first rethinking the rationale and purpose of 
stabilisation clauses rather than relying on presumptions. It also differs by rejecting the 
compartmentalised approach in favour of the integrated approach encapsulated in the 
concept of sustainable development.  Finally, it does so with an explicit focus on developing 
countries where these clauses are used.  
Such an approach helps to put stabilisation clauses in their proper context and deals 
holistically with the issues concerning the clauses thereby enhancing the understanding of 
their practical, rather than their potential, impact. In addition, it ensures that the 
recommendations that arise from the analysis are formulated with a solid understanding of 
the specific and different situation in developing countries. This in turn ensures that such 
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recommendations are aimed at the real life, rather than theoretical constraints posed by the 
clause. 
1.3  OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY  
 This thesis is partly interdisciplinary but primarily doctrinal. Interdisciplinary 
research may be defined as research that combines research, concepts and theories from two 
or more disciplines to advance fundamental understanding or to solve problems whose 
solutions are beyond the scope of a single discipline.
4
 The interdisciplinary research in this 
thesis draws mainly from research, concepts and theories from the social sciences. The 
interdisciplinary analysis is particularly beneficial to this thesis as the legal literature lacks 
some key information needed to properly answer the core research questions. For example, 
to properly examine the rationale and purpose of stabilisation clauses requires an 
understanding of the determinants of FDI and an application of the economic principle of 
demand and supply.  
The doctrinal analysis in this thesis comprises of the use of interpretative methods 
mainly to discover and construct the legal protection offered by stabilisation clauses. The 
analysis identifies relevant legal provisions on stabilisation clauses, explains their current 
interpretation, and explores their potential interpretation. It is also used to clarify the legal 
status of the principle of sustainable development as there had been some debate about 
whether or not the principle has attained the status of a binding norm of customary 
international law. The doctrinal analysis in this regard relies particularly on primary 
international law sources and the academic literature to trace the evolution and legal status of 
the principle of sustainable development in international law. 
                                           
4
 Committee on Facilitating Interdisciplinary Research and ors, Facilitating Interdisciplinary Research (NAP 
2005) 188. 
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A purely doctrinal method, however, tends to separate law from society and as a 
result may ignore the reality of the law.
5
 Accordingly, applying a purely doctrinal method to 
this research will reduce the scope for a contextual analysis of the rationale and purpose of 
stabilisation clauses and their impact on sustainable development in developing countries. 
Consequently, the doctrinal analysis is complemented by a socio-legal approach.  
In broad terms, the socio-legal approach refers to the study of law in context i.e. how 
the law works in the real world.
6
 The socio-legal approach in this thesis means that the 
analysis in the thesis is undertaken through the lens of the peculiar sustainable development 
challenges in developing countries.
7
 In doing so, significant reliance is placed on documents 
that help put the analysis in context including, local press statements, local media reports, 
reports by local NGOs and civil societies, parliamentary hearings, political party manifestoes 
and national policy documents.  
The socio-legal approach also includes the deliberate use of a significant number of 
real life examples in addition to two more detailed case studies showing how stabilisation 
clauses constrain sustainable development in Tanzania and Nigeria. While the two case 
studies may be not enough to establish the reliability and generality of the findings, it is 
possible for statistical inferences to be derived from their variables especially because they 
are supported by several other examples throughout the thesis. It is, therefore, a useful way 
to supplement the doctrinal analysis. 
The choice of the selected case studies is motivated by several considerations. The 
stabilisation clauses are still in effect and the constraints that they impose still on-going. At 
the same time, enough time has passed since they were granted.
8
 These, therefore, provide an 
                                           
5
 Maria Fox and Christine Bell, Learning Legal Skills (Blackstone 1999) 21 
6
 Sally Wheeler and Phil Thomas, ‘Socio-Legal Studies’ in David  Hayton (ed) Law’s Future(s) (Hart 2002) 
271; Reza Banakar and Max Travers, ‘Law, Sociology and Method’ in Reza Banakar and Max Travers (eds), 
Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 2005) xii.   
7
 On the importance of context in legal research, see, Phillip C Kissam, ‘The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship’ 
(1988) 63 Washington Law Review 221, 225. 
8
 The clauses were granted in the 1990s. 
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opportunity to re-assess the rationale that led to their introduction in the first place and relate 
them to their on-going purpose and the on-going constraints that they impose. Furthermore, 
the laws and relevant documents are either publicly available or easily obtainable. Finally, 
the laws and measures that the stabilisation clauses constrain highlight the relationship 
between economic growth, social development and environmental protection and how a 
constraint imposed by stabilisation clauses on one affects the others.  
This thesis does not attempt to conduct a comprehensive comparative study, at least 
in the traditional sense, of stabilisation practices in developing countries. However, much of 
the analysis is not possible without an element of comparison. For example, it reviews 
stabilisation practices in several developing countries to search for commonalities and 
differences in order to properly examine the rationale and purpose of stabilisation clauses. 
Furthermore, in order to develop alternative approaches to maintaining regulatory stability 
without undermining host governments’ sustainable development goals, the experiences of 
some developing countries are used as a reference point where relevant, as they may provide 
useful lessons for other countries. This inevitably assumes a certain degree of 
‘transferability’ which is a key assumption of comparative law.  
Finally, it must be emphasised that this thesis was not designed to review in detail the 
stabilisation practices of all developing countries. Such a study would have been impractical 
given the limited time and budget available to undertake a Ph.D. Furthermore, both the 
contractual processes and eventual contract terms in many developing countries continue to 
be shrouded in secrecy. This is in addition to the fact that not all investor-state contract 
disputes presented to international arbitration are published. This makes it difficult to 
ascertain whether they involve stabilisation clauses.  
Consequently, in addition to a literature review, the examination of stabilisation 
practices in this thesis is based on the availability or relative ease of access to the contracts, 
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laws, arbitral awards and other information required to undertake the relevant analysis.
9
 For 
this reason, this thesis makes no attempt to quantify some of the conclusions reached. 
However, despite these limitations, a significant number of stabilisation clauses have now 
either been published or leaked. The resultant increase in the availability of information 
sheds light on stabilisation practices and is useful in putting the doctrinal analysis in context 
and aid the answering of the core research questions. 
1.4  OVERVIEW OF OUTLINE 
This thesis is made up of 7 chapters. This chapter 1 provides a background to the 
research and explains the aims and objectives of the research. It also provides brief 
overviews of the methodology and   structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of stabilisation clauses. It examines the various 
techniques used to grant stabilisation clauses and the various types and scope of stabilisation 
clauses. The chapter concludes with an examination of the legal validity, effect and 
functional value of stabilisation clauses. 
Chapters 3 and 4 rethink the context in which stabilisation clauses are negotiated and 
granted. Chapter 3 examines the presumptions upon which stabilisation clauses are 
rationalised in the legal literature. It uses evidence from previous empirical studies, data 
from other disciplines and an analysis of current stabilisation practices to challenge these 
presumptions and the view that stabilisation clauses are an essential requirement for 
developing countries.  
Chapter 4 goes further to provide an alternative view of why stabilisation clauses are 
still popular in several developing countries despite the fact that the justifications for them 
are based on presumptions that can easily be rebutted by evidence from the real world. The 
chapter is divided into two sections. The first section examines the role of the World Bank in 
                                           
9
 A list of these countries is provided in Appendix 3.   
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the re-introduction of stabilisation clauses into developing countries from the late 1980s. The 
second section examines the role of corruption and lack of transparency in determining 
whether a country grants stabilisation clauses, and the scope of the clauses so granted. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are focused on the ‘second part’ of the research question i.e. the 
impact of stabilisation clauses on sustainable development in developing countries. Chapter 
5 examines the concept of sustainable development and the effectiveness or otherwise of 
compartmentalising the debate on the impact of stabilisation clauses. It traces the evolution 
of sustainable development in international law and policy and examines its meaning and 
core elements. The legal relevance and implication of the concept is then examined. Finally, 
the chapter examines the focus on human rights and/or environmental laws in the literature 
dealing with the impact of stabilisation clauses and the possible reasons for this 
compartmentalisation.  
  Chapter 6 identifies the ways in which stabilisation clauses affect the ability of host 
states to pursue their legitimate sustainable development objectives. It highlights the actual, 
rather than potential, impact of stabilisation clauses on sustainable development in 
developing countries by identifying the real-life rather than mere theoretical constraints. In 
addition to relying on several examples where relevant, it will also rely on two more detailed 
cases studies to highlight the effect of stabilisation clauses on sustainable development. 
  Chapter 7, which is the concluding chapter, summarises the key findings of this 
thesis and some of their implications for current policies. After that, the chapter presents the 
recommendations of the thesis flowing from the findings in the previous chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2 - STABILISATION CLAUSES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an overview of stabilisation clauses in order to set the scene for 
the analysis in subsequent chapters. The origin and evolution of stabilisation clauses will be 
traced. This is followed by a discussion of what a stabilisation clause is for purposes of this 
thesis. The various types of stabilisation clauses are then examined. The chapter will 
conclude with an examination of the legal validity, effect and functional value of 
stabilisation clauses. 
2.2 THE ORIGIN OF STABILISATION CLAUSES 
There is considerable agreement amongst commentators that stabilisation clauses can 
be traced to the period between the first and second world wars.
1
 In his Separate Opinion in 
Kuwait v Aminoil, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice pointed out that, during this period, there were 
increasing instances where foreign investors with concessionary contracts had their 
investments taken over by host governments, especially in Latin America.
2 
He therefore 
explained:  
 
It was specifically in the light of those occurrences that stabilisation clauses 
began to be introduced into concessionary contracts, particularly by American 
companies in view of their Latin American experiences, and for the express 
purpose of ensuring that concessions would run their full term, except where the 
case was one for which the concession itself gave a right of earlier termination.
3
  
                                           
1
 See, as examples, Kuwait v American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil), Ad hoc Arbitration, Award of 24 
March 1982 (Separate Opinion by Sir G Fitzmaurice) fn 7 to [25]; Peter D Cameron, ‘Stabilisation in 
investment Contracts and Changes of Rules in Host Countries: Tools for Oil & Gas Investors’ (05 July 2006) 
15 <http://lba.legis.state.ak.us/sga/doc_log/2006-07-05_aipn_stabilization-cameron_final.pdf> accessed 01 
August 2011.  
2
 Ibid.  
3
 Ibid.  
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Stabilisation clauses, however, became popular from the late 1960s following several 
high profile international arbitrations triggered, in particular, by various acts of 
nationalisation and expropriation of petroleum industry assets by some oil producing nations 
who wanted to benefit from the rise in oil prices.
4
 Subsequently, interest in the use of 
stabilisation clauses appeared to diminish substantially, with some commentators attributing 
this to a shift in attention towards investment treaties.
5
 However, the more likely view is that 
given by other commentators that developing countries were influenced by some UN 
resolutions and scholarly writings in the 1970s that highlighted a possible conflict between 
stabilisation clauses and the principle of permanent sovereignty of states over their natural 
resources (PSNR).
6
  
The principle of PSNR is a principle of international law that emerged in the 1950s 
mainly in response to the perception that during colonial rule, inequitable concessions were 
imposed on vulnerable host states.
7
 Newly independent developing countries thus sought to 
obtain international recognition of their right to restructure these inequitable concessions and 
re-establish their sovereignty over their natural resources through nationalisation or similar 
means.
8
 After several attempts to formulate the principle within the context of the UN, a 
compromise was finally agreed by the UN General Assembly in 1962.
9
 The resolution 
recognised the right of states to ‘permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
                                           
4
 Some of these cases are discussed in section 2.6.1. 
5
 See, for example, Lorenzo Cotula, ‘Reconciling Regulatory Stability and Evolution of Environmental 
Standards in Investment Contracts: Towards a Rethink of Stabilization Clauses’ (2008) 1 JWELB 158, 159 – 
160. 
6
 See, for example, Thomas W Wälde and George Ndi, ‘Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: 
International Law Versus Contract Interpretation’ (1966) 31 Texas Intl LJ 215, 217 and 261. Note however that 
the claim of a conflict between stabilisation clauses and PSNR was subsequently overwhelmingly dismissed by 
several arbitral tribunals. See, for example, Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil 
Company (TOPCO) v Libyan Arab Republic, Ad hoc Arbitration, Award of 19 January 1977 [73] – [74]  
7
 For an overview, see, Kamal Hossain, ‘Introduction’ in Kamal Hossain and Subrata Roy Chowdhury (eds) 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in International Law: Principle and Practice (Francis Pinter 
1984). 
8
 Ibid. 
9
  Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 14 December 1962, UN Doc A/Res/5217.   
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resources’, which ‘must be exercised in the interest of their national development’ and well-
being of their people.
10
  
Having secured international recognition of their sovereign right over their natural 
resources, developing countries became reluctant to accept stabilisation clauses as that would 
impose a limitation on the exercise of this right.
11
 Furthermore, several developing countries 
including Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Indonesia considered it unnecessary to grant 
stabilisation clauses as they also believed their huge reserves offered sufficient incentives for 
foreign investors to bear the political risks associated with their investments.
12
 In addition, 
the UN resolution also endorsed the right of states to nationalise and expropriate on grounds 
of ‘public utility, security or the national interest’ subject to the payment of ‘appropriate 
compensation.’13 As stabilisation clauses were originally developed to protect against these 
acts, the clauses became less relevant.  
In the light of the above sentiments, predictions were made that even if stabilisation 
clauses were to be included in contracts, hosts states would no longer accept them.
14
 These 
predictions were however short-lived. Following the mid-1980s catastrophic fall in mineral 
prices that significantly reduced the revenue developing countries received from their 
extractive industries, their governments were encouraged to enact policies to attract FDI as a 
means of obtaining more revenue.
15
 Consequently, stabilisation clauses made an ‘unexpected 
comeback’ as they formed part of the new fiscal regime that several developing countries 
enacted with the support of the World Bank to attract FDI into their extractive industries.
16
  
                                           
10
 Ibid [1]. 
11
 Wälde and Ndi (n 6) 217, 261. 
12
 Cameron (n 1) 17 
13
 PSNR (n 9) para 4. 
14
 See, as examples, Thomas Wälde, ‘Revision of Transnational Investment Agreements in the Natural 
Resources Sector: Contractual Flexibility in Natural Resource Development (1978) 10 Lawyer of the Americas, 
265; Juha Kuusi, The Host State and the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of Legal Relationship’ 
(Saxon 1979) 59 – 60. 
15
 For an in-depth analysis of this point, see, Alfred Maizels, Commodities in Crisis: The Commodity Crisis of 
the 1980s and the Political Economy of International Commodity Policies (Clarendon 1992) 5 – 38. 
16
 This issue is discussed in greater detail in section 4.2.  
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However, whilst the original clauses had been developed to guard against acts of 
nationalisation and expropriation at the time, the re-introduced stabilisation clauses were 
drafted to protect investors from the adverse effects of changes in the laws of the host state 
even if such changes fell short of expropriation or nationalisation. In other word, modern day 
stabilisation clauses may be drafted to allocate all the political risks associated with a project 
to the host states. For example, the scope of the stabilisation clause in the Host Government 
Agreement (HGA) covering the Azerbaijan part of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline 
project covers the following issues:   
 
The interpretation or application of Azerbaijan Law (whether by the courts, the 
executive or legislative authorities, or administrative or regulatory bodies), the 
decisions, policies or other similar actions of judicial bodies, tribunals and courts, 
the State Authorities, jurisdictional alterations, and the failure or refusal of judicial 
bodies, tribunals and courts, and/or the State Authorities to take action, exercise 
authority or enforce Azerbaijan Law.
17
 
2.3 WHAT IS A STABILISATION CLAUSE? 
Stabilisation clauses can encompass all mechanisms aimed at insulating a foreign 
investor from the effect of laws enacted subsequent to a contract. The scope of protection 
that it offers may be full, covering changes made to all laws, or limited, covering changes 
made to particular laws.
18
 However, regardless of the scope of guarantee the host state may 
wish to give, several legal techniques are used to achieve stability. In most cases, this is in 
the form of a clause in the contract between the host state and the investor.
19
 In other cases, 
                                           
17
 BTC HGA between and among the Government of the Azerbaijan Republic and State Oil Company of the 
Azerbaijan Republic and BP Exploration (Azerbaijan) Limited & ors (2002) art 7(Vi)(X)  
<Http://Subsites.Bp.Com/Caspian/Sha/Eng/Hga/Host%20government%20agreement%20azerbaijan%20%28en
glish%29.Pdf > accessed 28 July 2011. 
18
 Cameron (n 1) 16. 
19
 For example, the BTC HGA (n 17). 
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the host state may enact a separate national law which contains stability guarantees for the 
specified investor(s).
20
  
Another legal technique is for the host state to enter into a separate agreement with 
the investor whereby it guarantees the stability of some or all aspects of its laws for a 
specified period or for the entire duration of the contract.
21
 Such agreements are usually 
entered into with specific investors who meet the eligibility criteria laid down in the national 
legislation authorising the government to enter into such agreements.
22
 These so-called 
‘Legal Stability Agreements’ (LSAs) are popular in several Latin American countries 
including, Chile, Colombia and Peru.  
Although different countries lay down different eligibility requirements for such 
agreements, once such agreements are entered into, they achieve the same objective as other 
stabilisation techniques.
23
 As such, references to stabilisation clauses in this thesis, include 
LSAs. Accordingly, for the purposes of this thesis a stabilisation clause includes any 
provision contained in an investment contract, national legislation or in a separate agreement 
between the state and an investor which is aimed at insulating the investor from the effect of 
changes in the laws of the host state.
24
 This could be by making the new laws inapplicable to 
the investor or by stipulating that the investor will be compensated for the additional 
financial burden imposed by the new law.  
2.4 TYPES OF STABILISATION CLAUSES 
The point needs to be made that stabilisation clauses may not fit into strict categories 
because, in practice, a particular clause may be drafted to ensure stability in different ways. 
                                           
20
 See, for example, Nigeria LNG (Fiscal incentives, Guarantee and Assurances) (Amendment) Act 1993. 
21
 For a useful overview of stability agreements, see, DE Vielleville and BS Vasani ‘Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources Versus Rights under Investment Contracts: Which One Prevails?’(2008) 5 TDM 1, 13 - 21; 
UNCTAD, Investment Policy Review: Peru (UNCTAD 2000) 20 – 21.  
22
 See, as examples, Minerals Law of Mongolia 2006, art 21; Mines and Minerals Law 2006 (Ghana), art 48.   
23
 See decision in Sergei Paushok and ors v Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability of 
April 28 2011) [97] 
24
 See also definition in UNCTAD, State Contracts (UNCTAD 2004) 26. 
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That said, some commentators have found it useful to divide stabilisation clauses into 
different categories according to the way in which they aim to achieve stability.
25
 This thesis 
adopts a similar approach and divides stabilisation clauses into three broad categories: 
freezing clauses, economic equilibrium clauses and hybrid clauses. However, a distinction 
first needs to be made between earlier stabilisation clauses (also referred to in the literature 
as ‘intangibility clauses’) and modern day stabilisation clauses which are the main focus of 
this thesis.   
Intangibility clauses are generally aimed at preventing host states from unilaterally 
amending or modifying the terms of the contract.
26
 They are therefore mainly concerned 
with preventing host governments from unilaterally changing the terms of a contract in order 
to expropriate or nationalise the investment.
27
 An example of an intangibility clause can be 
cited from a Production Sharing Contract (PSC) that provides: ‘This Contract shall not be 
annulled, amended or modified in any respect except by the mutual consent in writing of the 
Parties hereto.’28 
 Intangibility clauses were the earliest form of stabilisation clauses. As a result, 
virtually all the claims brought against host governments’ acts of nationalisation and 
expropriation around the 1970s, largely relied on breaches of intangibility clauses.
29
 The 
resulting awards in these cases raised doubts about their effectiveness in limiting the power 
of states to expropriate or nationalise the assets of investors.
30
 However, despite these 
                                           
25
 See, for example, Bertrand Montembault, `The Stabilisation of State Contracts using the Example of 
Petroleum Contracts: A Return to the Gods of Olympia?’ (2003) 7 RDAI/IBLJ 593, 599 – 600; Cameron (n 1) 
28 – 35. 
26
 Prosper Weil, ‘Les Clauses De Stabilisation Ou D’intangibilité Insérées Dans Les Accords De 
Développement Économique’ In Melanges Oferts a Charles Rousseau (1974)307. Relevant text translated and 
cited in Az El Chiati, Protection of Investment in the Context of Petroleum Agreements in (Recueil Des Course 
vol 204, Martinus Nijhoff 1987) 115. 
27
 Some formulations of intangibility clauses do explicitly prohibit expropriation and nationalisation. See, for 
example, Ertsberg Agreement Between Indonesia And Freeport Indonesia Inc (07 April 1967) art 14 (c).  
28
 Production Sharing Contract (PSC) between Pertamina and AGIP Spa (10 October 1968) art xvi 1.2. 
29
 Although the Revere’s award was based on a tax stabilisation clause, the amount of tax was so high that the 
tribunal held that it amounted to expropriation. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc v Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC), American Arbitration Association, Award of 24 August 1978 [25] 
30
 See discussion on legal validity of stabilisation clauses at section 2.6 below. 
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questions, intangibility clauses are still in use today either alone or in combination with other 
types of stabilisation clauses.
31
    
   Notwithstanding the continued use of such intangibility clauses, the phase of outright 
nationalisations has generally passed, while direct expropriations targeted at individual 
properties and enterprises have become a ‘rare phenomenon.’32 Of course, there have been 
some recent acts of nationalisation, especially in several Latin America countries and in 
Russia.
33
 For example, in the last decade, Venezuela enacted a new hydrocarbon law, which 
brought several major private oil projects under state control while Bolivia and Ecuador 
carried out similar acts.
34
 However, prior to these, the Libyan nationalisation of US oil 
companies in 1973 was the last major example. In any event, even if it is accepted that large 
scale nationalisations may reoccur in the future, such acts are now widely accepted under 
international law provided it is based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the 
national interest, and appropriate compensation is paid.
35 
Indeed, in practice, even when 
parties purport to prohibit nationalisation or expropriation, they often end up recognising the 
power of the host government to do so.
36
 The on-going use of intangibility clauses thus 
appears to be an attempt to reinforce the conditions stipulated by general international law. 
Based on the foregoing, it is argued that intangibility clauses are now generally less 
significant, at least for the purposes of this thesis. Indeed, strictly speaking, intangibility 
clauses do not qualify as stabilisation clauses even if they are so called. This is because such 
clauses merely seek to preserve the duration and terms of the contract rather than insulate the 
                                           
31
 See, as examples, Model Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) of East Timor 2007, art 22.5; Model PSA of 
Bangladesh 2008, art 35.2. 
32
 UNCTAD, Taking of Property (UNCTAD 2000) 5-6.  
33
 For an up to date review, see Sergei Guriev, Anton Kolotilin & Konstantin Sonin, ‘Determinants of 
Nationalization in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data’ (2010) 1 J of L, Economics and 
Organization 1. 
34
 Vlado Vivoda, ‘Resource Nationalism, Bargaining and International Oil Companies: Challenges and Change 
in the New Millennium’ (2009) 14 New Political Economy 517, 520 -521. 
35
 UNGA, Permanent Sovereignty (n 9) para 4.  
36
 See, for example, Azerbaijan’s BTC HGA (n15) art 1(e) of Appendix V. 
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investors from changes in the law.
37
 Thus, a contract can contain an intangibility clause and 
still provide that the investor shall comply with any law in force.
38
 Where this is the case, the 
intangibility clause cannot insulate the contract from adverse changes in the law of the state 
in the way a stabilisation clause is intended to operate. 
Accordingly, while references may be made to the principles established in the legal 
interpretation of intangibility clauses, such references are made simply for the purposes of 
analogy. The focus of this thesis is on those types of stabilisation clauses that make new laws 
(or amendments to existing laws) inapplicable to the investor or ensure that they are 
compensated for the additional costs imposed by the changes even where such laws fall short 
of expropriation or nationalisation. These clauses, which can be divided into three broad 
categories, are considered next.   
2.4.1 Freezing Clauses 
Freezing clauses are also known as stabilisation clauses stricto sensu in the literature. 
They are so named because they ‘freeze’ the laws of the host state as they stood at the time 
of entering into the contract thereby making new laws inapplicable to the contract.
39
 They 
are thus primarily aimed at limiting the legislative competence of the state to prevent it from 
enacting laws and regulations to the detriment of the investor.  
In practice, different drafting techniques are employed to ensure stability through 
freezing clauses even if the clauses are not so named. One technique is to use the choice of 
law provisions in the contract. Although such provisions are primarily used to specify the 
applicable or governing law of the contract, they can also be used to freeze the laws of the 
                                           
37
 This distinction between stabilisation clauses and intangibility clauses has long been proposed by Prosper 
Weil (n 26). 
38
 See, for example, Bangladesh PSA (n 31) art 35.2 (Intangibility Clause), arts 10.3 and 19.3 (investor to 
comply with law in force from time to time). 
39
 Andrea Shemberg, ‘Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights (2009) Report, paras 23 – 25 
<http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/content/publications_lessonslearned> accessed 16 April 2013; 
Christopher T Curtis, ‘The Legal Security of Economic Development Agreements’ (1988) 29 Harvard Intl LJ 
346 – 347. 
  
18 
 
host state. This is achieved by simply stating that the law applicable to the contract shall be 
the laws of the host state on the date the contract is executed or on a specified date. This 
effectively makes laws enacted subsequent to the contract to be inapplicable to the contract.  
For example, a ‘governing law’ clause in a Model PSC provides as follows:  
 
This Contract is executed between the Parties in accordance with the laws and 
regulations in force at the date of its signing and on the basis of the provisions of 
said laws and regulations, as regards, inter alia, the economic, fiscal and financial 
provisions of this Contract.
40
  
 
Although, like most governing law clauses, the above provision did not explicitly make new 
laws inapplicable, it does exempt the investor from complying with new laws by stipulating 
that the governing law shall be the laws and regulations ‘in force at the date of its signing.’   
 Another technique of freezing the laws of the host state is through the inconsistency 
rule. This is achieved by stipulating that any inconsistent or contrary legislation enacted by 
the host government after the agreement has been entered into shall not apply to the contract. 
For example, a 1989 Model PSC provides as follows:  
 
The Contractor shall be subject to the provisions of this Contract as well as to all 
laws and regulations duly enacted by the Granting Authority and which are not 
incompatible or conflicting with the Convention and/or this Agreement. It is also 
agreed that no new regulations, modifications or interpretation which could be 
conflicting or incompatible with the provisions of this Agreement and/or the 
Convention shall be applicable
41
  
                                           
40
 Model PSC of Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic 2005, art 36. 
41
 Model PSC of Tunisia 1989, art 24.1.  
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While the above clause appears at first sight to merely prevent the application of 
inconsistent legislation, any subsequent law having an adverse effect on the economic 
position of the investor is likely to qualify as being inconsistent with the contract thus 
making the investor exempt from complying with it. For example, where a contract specifies 
the rate payable as tax by the investor, any subsequent amendment of the tax laws of the host 
state that has the effect of increasing the tax burden of the investor, would be deemed to be 
inconsistent with the provisions of the contract thereby activating the protection offered by 
the clause.  
However, the most common way of freezing the laws of the host state is to explicitly 
‘freeze’ the laws as they apply to the investors. Such a clause can be full or limited 
(comprehensive or partial).
42
 A full freezing clause purports to freeze all laws of the host 
state by making all subsequent laws inapplicable to the investors, either for the entire 
duration of the contract or a specified period. This is regardless of whether such laws are 
fiscal (such as tax laws) or non-fiscal (such as environmental laws). An example of a full 
freezing clause can be cited from a 2008 PSA providing that:  
 
...the “DRC” guaranties to the “Contracting Party” throughout the duration of this 
Contract the stability of the general legal, financial, petroleum, tax, customs and 
economic conditions under which each entity exercises its activities, as such 
condition results from the legislation and regulation in force at the date of the 
signature of the Contract.
43
 
  
                                           
42
 Shemberg (n 39) paras 23 - 24; Cameron (n 1) 28 - 30.  
43
 PSA with respect of Block 1 of the DRC Albert Graben between the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Divine Inspiration Consortium Group (Pty) Ltd (21 January 2008) art 28. 
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A limited or partial freezing clause, on the other hand, aims to insulate the investment 
from a limited range of legislative action by the host state.
44
 This could be because the host 
government agrees to provide stabilisation guarantees only for certain aspects of the 
agreement. In practice, a limited freezing clause is usually used to insulate the investment 
from a change in the laws that directly affect the fiscal regime, such as tax laws. In such a 
case, the stabilisation clause may be drafted to freeze the targeted regime either by listing the 
aspects of the host government’s laws or the taxes that are stabilised or by referring directly 
to such legislation. An example can be cited from a recent Mineral Development Agreement 
(MDA) from Liberia which provides:  
 
For the avoidance of doubt, any amendments, additions, revisions, modifications 
or other changes to the Revenue Code (or any similar Law) made after the 
Effective Date shall not be applicable to the Concessionaire except as this 
Agreement specifically provides for the matter to be governed by applicable Law. 
Furthermore, any future amendment, additions, revisions, modifications or other 
changes to any Law (other than the Revenue Code or any similar Law) applicable 
to the Concessionaire or the Operations that would have the effect of imposing an 
additional or higher tax, duty, custom, royalty or similar charge on the 
Concessionaire shall not apply to the Concessionaire to the extent it would 
require the Concessionaire to pay such additional tax, duty, royalty or charge.
45
 
 
Limited freezing clauses are also used where parties intend to freeze the entire 
regulatory framework but agree that certain laws be excluded from the ambit of the clause. 
                                           
44
 Shemberg (n 39) paras 23 - 24; Cameron (n 1) 28 – 30. 
45
 MDA between Liberia and China Union Investment (19 January 2009). See also Investment Agreement 
between Mongolia, Ivanhoe Mines Inc LLC, Ivanhoe mines Ltd and Rio Tinto International Holdings Limited 
(06 October 2009) arts 2.1 – 2.4.  
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In other words, the investor would be exempt from all new laws that adversely affect its 
economic position except those laws that have been specifically excluded from the ambit of 
the clause. For example, an Azerbaijan investment legislation exempts investors from new 
laws enacted within 10 years of their investment but excludes legislative changes 
‘concerning defense, national security and public order, environmental protection, credits 
and finances, public morals and public health.’46  
2.4.2 Economic Equilibrium Clauses  
Unlike freezing clauses, an economic equilibrium clause does not aim to freeze the 
law but aims to maintain the economic equilibrium of the project.
47
  Thus, where the 
government enacts a new law, the investor would comply with the law. However, the 
investor would receive compensation from the government to defray the cost of complying 
with the law in order to maintain the economic equilibrium of the contract. In other words, 
the cost of complying with the change in the law is borne by the host state.  
An economic equilibrium clause can also be full or limited. A full economic 
equilibrium clause entitles the investor to be compensated for the cost of complying with 
changes in all types of laws by the host government. An example can be cited from the 
Model Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) of Angola 2004 which provides:  
 
Without prejudice to other rights and obligations of the Parties under the 
Agreement, in the event that any change in the provisions of any Law, decree or 
regulation in force in the Republic of Angola occurs subsequent to the signing of 
this Agreement which adversely affects the obligations, rights and benefits 
hereunder, then the Parties shall agree on amendments to the Agreement to be 
                                           
46
 Law of the Azerbaijan Republic about Protection of Foreign Investments 1993, art 10. 
47
 Mohamed Al Faruque, ‘Typologies, Efficacy and Political Economy of Stabilization Clauses: A Critical 
Appraisal’ (2007) 4 OGEL 1; Shemberg (n 39) para 22. 
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submitted to the competent authorities for approval, so as to restore such rights, 
obligations and forecasted benefits.
48
  
 
Under a limited economic equilibrium clause, the host government is only obliged to 
restore the equilibrium of the contract where the investor incurs additional costs due to the 
application of specific laws as nominated in the contract.
49
 An example of such a clause, 
here limited to laws that modify the tax system, provides:  
 
In the event of a modification to the tax system or the creation or elimination of 
new taxes not foreseen in this Contract or of the employment contribution, in 
force at the time of the execution of this Contract and as set out in this Clause, 
which have an impact on the economy of this Contract, a correction factor will be 
included in the production sharing percentages to absorb the impact of the 
increase or decrease in the tax or in the employment contribution burden.
50
 
 
An examination of the literature and samples of economic equilibrium clauses 
reveals that while their aim is to protect the economic position of the investor in the event of 
a change in the law, many variations are found and different formulae employed to achieve 
the economic equilibrium. While practice varies from country to country and sector to 
sector, these clauses can be categorised according to their provisions governing the 
restoration of equilibrium.
51
 
                                           
48
 Article 37 (2). 
49
 The study by Shemberg found that limited economic equilibrium clauses are mainly used in the few OECD 
countries that grant stabilisation clauses. Shemberg (n 39) paras, 26 – 28, 72 - 73. 
50
 PSA for Block 7 between Burlington Resources Inc and Ecuador, art 11.12 as translated by the tribunal in 
Burlington Resources Inc v Ecuador, ICSID No ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability of 14 December 2012) [22] 
51
 For a detailed discussion of this point, see generally AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘International Energy Contracts 
and Cross-Border Pipeline Projects: Stabilization, Renegotiation and Economic Balancing in Changed 
Circumstances - Some Recent Trends (2006) 4 OGEL, 1.  
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In a few cases, an economic equilibrium clause may be drafted to require the parties 
to negotiate in good faith towards restoring the economic equilibrium of the original 
agreement in the event of an adverse change in the law. An example is contained in the 
Model PSC of Nigeria/Sao Tome JDA which provides: 
 
If at any time or from time to time, there is a change in legislation or regulations 
which materially affect the commercial benefit afforded the Contractor under this 
Contract, the parties will consult each other and shall agree to such amendments to 
this contract as are necessary to restore as near as practicable such commercial 
benefits which existed under the contract as of the effective date.
52
 
 
Such formulations do not automatically entitle the investor to compensation in the event of 
an adverse change in the law.
53
 However, they impose a duty on the parties to negotiate in 
good faith and readjust the contract in a way that restores its economic equilibrium and thus 
puts the investor in the position that he was in prior to changes in the law.
54
  
Other formulations of economic equilibrium clauses directly stipulate that the host 
government will compensate the investor if it subsequently adopts regulatory measures 
which have the effect of reducing the investor’s economic benefits from the project. Such a 
clause may or may not specify how the compensation should be calculated and what form it 
should take. In practice, however, notable forms of compensation include, tax rebates, 
monetary compensation, adjusted tariffs, and an extension of the concession.  
For example, the clause in the PSA between Burlington and Ecuador stipulates that, 
in the event of a change in the tax law, a ‘correction factor will be included in the production 
sharing percentages to absorb the impact of the increase or decrease in the tax on the 
                                           
52
 Model PSC of the Nigeria/Sao Tome and Principe Joint Development Authority 2004, art 26(3). 
53
 Burlington Award (n 50) [321] – [334] 
54
 Ibid.  
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employment contribution burden.’55 Where, as in this example, the clause explicitly 
stipulates the procedure or method for adjusting the economic equilibrium of the contract, 
such a contract is to be automatically amended in line with that procedure to maintain the 
economic equilibrium in the event of an adverse change in the law.
56
  
In a few cases, economic equilibrium clauses may stipulate a threshold that must be 
crossed before an investor will be compensated and may provide guidance to be used in 
determining this threshold.
57
 While this practice is to be welcomed, doubts remain as to its 
practical usefulness. This is because, in most of these clauses, the threshold is framed in 
general terms. For example, the clause may simply provide that the economic equilibrium is 
deemed to have been affected where the change in the law has a ‘material’ or ‘significant’ 
adverse effect on the investor.
58
 As argued by AFM Maniruzzaman, the simple use of such 
words is open to conflicting interpretations in different contexts, especially where the matter 
is left to the discretion of the tribunal concerned.
59
 Accordingly, in the absence of detailed or 
specific contractual provisions to ascertain the point at which the economic equilibrium of 
the contract has been affected, its practical benefit to the host state remains unclear.
60
 What 
is, however, clear is that even where a threshold is set, the level at which it is set is usually 
significantly lower than that established by the ‘regulatory takings doctrine’ in general 
international law.
61
  
   Before moving on to the next type of stabilisation clause, it is useful to mention that 
there is agreement among commentators and practitioners that trends in contractual practice 
                                           
55
 PSA (Burlington) (n 50) art 11.12. 
56
 Burlington Award  (n 50) [321] – [322] 
57
 See AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘The Pursuit of Stability in International Energy Contracts: A Critical Appraisal of 
the Emerging Trends’ (2008) 1 JWELB 121, 129 – 132.  
58
 See, as examples, Development Agreement between Zambia and Konkola Copper Mines Plc (31 March 
2000) art 13.1.2 (‘material adverse economic effect’); Indian Model PSC 2007, art 16.7 (‘significantly affect’).  
59
 Maniruzzaman, Pursuit (n 57) 121 – 132. 
60
 From the clauses reviewed, only the India Model National Highway Authority Concession Agreements and 
the resulting contracts stipulate a specific amount of 10 million Rupees beyond which the economic 
equilibrium would be deemed to have been affected. See, for example National Highway Authority Concession 
Agreements, Jaipur–Kishangarh Highway, (11 October 2010) art 36 <Http://Www.Nhai.Org/Fvb.Pdf> 
accessed 01 August 2011. 
61
 This point is discussed in greater detail in section 2.7.2. 
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show a shift away from freezing clauses towards a greater use of economic equilibrium 
clauses.
62
 A few commentators have attributed this to the advent of privately financed 
infrastructure/public–private partnership projects.63 According to this view, it is relatively 
straightforward to negotiate economic equilibrium clauses in this sector as the costs of 
changes in the law can easily be passed on to the host state or, in some cases, the end users 
through tariff increases.
64
 However, as this thesis deals with the extractive industry, the 
following reason given by other commentators is more relevant.  
  Several other commentators have attributed the rise in the use of economic 
equilibrium clauses to questions about the legality and enforceability of freezing clauses.
65
 
They argue that under many domestic laws, freezing clauses would be unconstitutional and 
thus difficult to enforce in the event of a breach.
66
 Economic equilibrium clauses are 
therefore most likely to be enforceable because they are perceived to be the least obstructive 
to host states’ legislative powers.67 For this reason, it has been suggested that economic 
equilibrium clauses should be used in place of freezing clauses.
68
 Those who make these 
suggestions argue that economic equilibrium clauses provide a ‘win-win’ situation by 
preserving the sovereign power of the host state to change its laws while still protecting the 
investor from the adverse effects of these changes.
69
 However, such claims will be 
deconstructed later in this thesis.
70
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 See, as examples, Cameron (n 1) 4; Waelde and Ndi (n 6) 218 – 219; Shemberg (n 39) para 25; Al Faruque 
(n 47) 31 – 33.    
63
 For example, Audley Sheppard and Antony Crockett, ‘Are Stabilization Clauses a Threat to Sustainable 
Development?’ in Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Markus W Gehring and Andrew Newcombe (eds), 
Sustainable Development in World Investment Law  (Kluwer Law 2011) 341 – 342. 
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 Shemberg (n 39) para 5; Cameron (n 1) 4; Herbert Smith, ‘Stabilisation Clauses - Issues and Trends’ (2010) 
36 Infrastructure and Mining Newsletter, 1-2. 
66
 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
68
 Talal AQ Al-Emadi, ‘Stabilization Clauses in International Joint Venture Agreements’ (2010) 3 Intl Energy 
L Rev 54, 57; Cotula, Reconciling (n 5) 178 
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2.4.3 Hybrid Clauses 
Hybrid clauses are so named because they combine some characteristics of freezing 
and economic equilibrium clauses.
71
 Thus, a freezing clause becomes a hybrid clause if it 
goes further to provide that in the event that the changes in the law are made applicable to 
investors, the investors will be restored to the same economic position that they were prior to 
the changes. Similarly, an economic equilibrium clause becomes a hybrid clause if it 
includes exemption from the changes in the law (freezing technique) as one of the options 
that may be applied to restore the economic equilibrium.  
An example of this type of hybrid clause can be cited from the BTC HGAs where the 
host government committed to ‘restore the Economic Equilibrium’ of the project in the event 
of changes in the law and further agreed that the obligation to restore the economic 
equilibrium ‘shall include the obligation to take all appropriate measures to resolve promptly 
by whatever means may be necessary, including by way of exemption....’72 Such a clause, 
therefore, gives the investor the opportunity to either request that it is exempted from 
complying with the new law or demand that adjustments are made to the contract to 
accommodate the cost of complying with the law. 
2.5 STABILISATION CLAUSES AS A ONE-EDGED SWORD 
Before concluding the discussion on the types of stabilisation clauses, it is useful to 
comment briefly on the kind of stability most stabilisation clauses aim to achieve as this may 
be relevant in an examination of the impact they might have on sustainable development. 
First, it is acknowledged that it is possible to draft stabilisation clauses, and in particular 
economic equilibrium clauses, in a way that protects the interest of both the investor and the 
host government in the event of a change in the law. For example, the 1999 infrastructure 
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 Shemberg (n 39) paras 6 - 8. 
72
 Azerbaijan, BTC HGA (n 16) art 7 (x). 
  
27 
 
concession in India also contains this corresponding provision in favour of the host 
government:  
 
If as a result of Change in Law, the Concessionaire enjoys a reduction in costs or 
increase in net after tax return or other financial benefit, the aggregate financial 
effect of which exceeds Rs.10 million (Rupees ten million) in any Accounting 
Year, NHAI may so notify the Concessionaire and propose amendments to this 
Agreement so as to put the Concessionaire in the same financial position as it 
would have occupied had there been no such Change in Law resulting in such 
decreased cost, increase in return or other financial benefit as aforesaid....
73
 
 
However such an approach is rare especially in the extractive industry.
74
 In the 
majority of cases, stabilisation clauses are drafted to insulate the investor from adverse 
effects of a change in the law without a corresponding benefit to the government where the 
law has a positive effect on the investor.
75
 Some formulations even explicitly entitle the 
investor to claim any benefit that accrues from favourable changes in law. For example, the 
stabilisation clause in the PSA from DRC that was cited earlier went further to provide: ‘it 
has been understood however that each entity making up the “Contracting Party” could 
benefit from any favourable measure with respect to the regime defined above.’76   
Some formulations go even further to give investors the choice to switch back and 
forth between current laws and the stabilised laws according to the regime that they consider 
to be more beneficial. In other words, investors can elect to be bound by new laws where 
such laws are beneficial. However, where such laws are later amended and are no longer 
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 Highway Agreement (n 60) art 36.2. 
74
 The few examples include Model PSC of India 2007, art 16.7 and the Law Concerning PSA 2005 
(Kazakhstan) art 25.2. 
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 For recommendations on how host states can grant mutually beneficial stabilisation clauses, see section 7.3.3.  
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beneficial, they can switch back to the stabilised legal regime. For example, a 1995 
Azerbaijan investment law exempts foreign investors from adverse changes in its laws but 
went further to provide that investors may:  
 
at any time elect to be governed by the legal and regulatory provisions resulting 
from changes made at any time in the Law as in effect on the Effective Date. 
Provided further legislation of the Azerbaijan Republic deteriorates conditions of 
investment depositing, the legislation in force at the moment of investment is 
applied for the period, specified in the contract about investment activity.
77
 
 
The practice of allowing investors to benefit from favourable laws, and in some cases 
being able to switch back and forth between legal regimes, raises questions about the true 
purpose of stabilisation clauses. In theory, stabilisation clauses are intended to ensure a 
stable regulatory framework in order to maintain the economic equilibrium of the contract. If 
this is true, then it is reasonable to assume that if an unexpected event, such as an unexpected 
geological breakthrough or rise in oil prices, affects the economic equilibrium of the project 
in a significantly positive way, the government should be entitled to benefit from the 
unexpected additional profits. However, from the way most stabilisation clauses are drafted 
as shown above, this is not the case. Indeed, as will be seen in later chapters, several 
‘windfall profit’ taxes have been challenged on the basis of stabilisation clauses.78   
Furthermore, in the case of changes in the law, it is also reasonable to expect that 
where an investor benefits from a freezing clause, then the investor should also be exempt 
from benefiting from favourable changes in the host states’ laws. Similarly, where the 
investor benefits from an economic equilibrium clause, there should also be adjustments to 
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 Azerbaijan Law about Investment Activity 1995, art 18 (2). See also Ivanhoe Agreement (n 45) art 15.24(1) 
(2). 
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 See especially discussion in section 6.3.2.     
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the contract to rebalance the economic equilibrium where a change in the law improves the 
financial position of the investor. However, the findings of this thesis are that stabilisation 
clauses are rarely drafted or applied in this way. Rather, they are generally drafted to insulate 
the investor from adverse changes without any corresponding benefit for the host state where 
the changes are favourable to the investor.  
In this sense, stabilisation clauses appear to be a one-edged sword, used to allocate 
the risks of changes in law to the host state while also allocating the benefits that may accrue 
to the investors. This raises the question as to whether governments of developing countries 
are acting rationally when they accept these clauses. However, before going into that, it is 
useful to first understand the legal implication and value of stabilisation clauses.  
2.6  LEGAL VALIDITY AND EFFECT OF STABILISATION CLAUSES 
The legal validity and effect of stabilisation clauses had been the subject of debate in 
scholarly writings especially in the light of the claimed conflict between the clause and the 
principle of permanent sovereignty of states over their natural resources.
79
 In addition, until 
very recently, arbitral jurisprudence on stabilisation clauses was mainly based on 
intangibility clauses. As such, the views of commentators on the validity and legality of 
modern day stabilisation clauses were largely speculative. This was because they reviewed 
the awards on intangibility clauses and then proceeded by way of analogy.
80
  
However, in recent years, several arbitral tribunals have provided further guidance on 
the legal status and effect of stabilisation clauses. Accordingly, for the purposes of clarity, 
the discussion of the arbitral jurisprudence on stabilisation clauses is divided, rather crudely, 
into three categories. The first category covers the arbitral awards in the 1970s and 1980s 
which mainly dealt with intangibility clauses. While as noted above, these cases were based 
                                           
79
  For a useful summary of the debate, see Wälde and Ndi (n 6) 243 -246.  
80
 See, as examples, Cameron, (n 6) 58; Cotula, Reconciling (n 5) 162 – 164; Maniruzzaman, Pursuit (n 57) 
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on acts of nationalisation and expropriation, the principles applied in these cases still serve 
as a useful guide to the legal effect of stabilisation clauses.  
 The second category covers some cases based on alleged expropriations and breach 
of host states’ obligations to provide fair and equitable treatment standard. These cases are 
based on Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) rather than on contracts. However, they are 
relevant to the present discussion because the arbitrators made comments on the possible 
effect of stabilisation clauses on the cases had they been included in the contracts between 
the parties. The last category covers the few, recently reported, cases that deal extensively 
with stabilisation clauses.  
2.6.1 Arbitral Jurisprudence on ‘Intangibility’ Clauses  
As already noted, stabilisation clauses were made popular from the 1960s by several 
high profile arbitrations based on acts of nationalisation and expropriation by host states.
81
 In 
determining these cases, arbitral tribunals had to resolve the question of whether a state 
could lawfully nationalise or expropriate assets of a foreign investor contrary to the 
provisions of a stabilisation clause. This meant that they also had to determine the legal 
validity and effect of stabilisation clauses especially in the light of the sovereign right of 
states over their natural resources. The dominant view from the resulting (and rather 
conflicting) awards was that stabilisation clauses were valid and are legally binding on host 
states. However, they did not invalidate acts of nationalisation and expropriation. Rather, 
they ensured that the affected investor was compensated.  
In AGIP Co v Peoples’ Republic of Congo, the Concession contained a provision that 
the government would not apply ‘any other subsequent law or decree that aims to alter the 
Company’s status as a limited liability corporation in private law.’82 The subsequent 
nationalisation of the Company was held to have ‘represented a repudiation’ of the 
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82
 ICSID Case No ARB/77/1, Award of 30 November 1979 [69] – [70]   
  
31 
 
stabilisation clause and made the government liable to pay compensation.
83
 Similarly, in the 
Revere award the tribunal noted that the stabilisation clause in the contract between the 
parties was ‘internationally binding’ and any action contrary to it constituted a breach.84  
 Other tribunals were, however, reluctant to uphold stabilisation clauses over acts of 
nationalisation and expropriation. For example, in Libyan American Oil Co (LIAMCO) v 
Libyan Arab Republic, the sole arbitrator held that acts of nationalisation which are in line 
with public policy and are non-discriminatory do not constitute a breach of the stabilisation 
clause.
85
  Rather, they constituted a ‘source of liability to compensate’ the investor.86 
However, before arriving at this conclusion, the arbitrator confirmed the legal validity of 
stabilisation clauses by stating that a state has a binding obligation to respect all of its 
contractual undertakings, including stabilisation clauses.
87
 Similarly, in Liberian Eastern 
Timber Corporation (LETCO) v Liberia, the tribunal, while emphasising that stabilisation 
clauses ‘must be respected’, held that a breach of a stabilisation clauses clause ‘could only be 
justified by nationalization.’88 
The above cases reveal a lack of a clear consensus amongst arbitrators on the 
question of whether nationalisation and expropriation constitute a breach of stabilisation 
clauses. While some arbitral tribunals agreed that nationalisation amounts to a breach of a 
stabilisation clause, others held that the right of a state to nationalise is absolute and prevails 
over stabilisation clauses. However, the dominant view arising from these awards is that 
stabilisation clauses are valid and legally binding under international law. This is because 
even in the cases where the arbitrators upheld nationalisation over stabilisation clauses, they 
acknowledged the binding nature of the clause. Their decision to uphold the acts of 
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nationalisation was based on the fact that international law recognises nationalisation and 
expropriation provided certain conditions are met, including the payment of compensation.
89
 
Thus although they held that the stabilisation clauses could not prevent lawful 
nationalisation or expropriation, they agreed that they imposed an obligation on the host state 
to compensate the investor.   
It is therefore safe to assume that if the principles established in these cases are 
applied to legislative acts falling short of nationalisation or expropriation, such acts would be 
held to constitute a breach of stabilisation clauses. This is especially true in the light of the 
statement by the tribunal in LETCO v Liberia that legislative action in breach of stabilisation 
clauses ‘could only be justified by nationalisation.’90  
2.6.2 Arbitral Jurisprudence arising from Treaty-Based Claims     
 Until the mid-2000s, there appeared to be no published arbitral award dealing with 
breaches of stabilisation clauses arising from enactments of new laws that adversely affected 
investor’s economic positions but which fell short of expropriation and nationalisation. 
However, from the mid-2000s, stabilisation clauses began to appear in arbitral jurisprudence 
in claims arising out of alleged breach of investor protection standards in treaties. The main 
claims in these cases were that the regulatory measures by the host governments were in 
breach of their obligations to provide fair and equitable treatment thereby frustrating the 
investors’ legitimate expectations of a stable legal framework. While these claims were 
based on treaty obligations of the host states, the arbitrators made very useful comments on 
the legal validity and effect of stabilisation clauses. 
  In Methanex Corporation v USA, 
 
the tribunal had to resolve the question of whether 
a regulatory measure by the State of California amounted to expropriation under the North 
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
91
 It concluded that ‘from the standpoint of 
international law, it was lawful regulation and not expropriation.’92 To reach this conclusion, 
the tribunal made the following comments which help explain the legal effect of stabilisation 
clauses:  
 
But as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a 
public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which 
affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory 
and compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating 
government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the 
government would refrain from such regulation.
93
  
 
Similarly, in EnCana v Ecuador, the arbitrators unanimously rejected the investor’s 
claim for indirect expropriation.
94
  According to the tribunal, the investor had ‘neither the 
right nor any legitimate expectation’ that tax laws will not change during the period of the 
investment ‘in the absence of a specific commitment from the host state.’95  
Although both the Methanex and Encana tribunals did not directly mention stabilisation 
clauses, the clause must be assumed to be a ‘specific commitment’ within the contemplation 
of the tribunal. This is because stabilisation clauses are specific commitments by host states 
that all or some of the laws governing an investment will not be altered to the detriment of 
the investor for the duration of the investment or a specified period.
96
 As a confirmation of 
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this view, later tribunals faced with similar issues went further to mention stabilisation 
clauses as being one of such specific commitments.  
For example, in AES Summit Generation Ltd v Hungary, the tribunal observed that 
Hungary did not give any ‘specific commitments...that could limit its sovereign right to 
change its law (such as a stability clause) or that could legitimately have made the investor 
believe that no change in the law would occur.’97 In Parkerings–Compagniet AS v Lithuania, 
the tribunal had to resolve the question of whether Parkerings had any legitimate expectation 
of a stable legal system and whether that expectation has been frustrated.
98
 In resolving these 
questions, the tribunal held that ‘save for the existence of an agreement, in the form of a 
stabilisation clause or otherwise, there is nothing objectionable about the amendment 
brought to the regulatory framework existing at the time an investor made its investment.’99   
 Similar conclusions were also reached in the more recent Paushok award where the 
investors’ claimed that Mongolia’s 2006 windfall profit tax on gold frustrated its legitimate 
expectation of a stable tax environment.
100
 In rejecting the claim, the tribunal noted that, in 
the absence of a stability agreement, the investor has failed to establish that they had 
‘legitimate expectations that they would not be exposed to significant tax increases in the 
future.’101 According to the tribunal, the ‘proper way’ for an investor to protect itself against 
the adverse effects of changes in law is through a stability agreement.
102
 
In the above cases, stabilisation clauses were not present in the contracts between the 
parties.
103
 However, the arbitrators made it clear that stabilisation clauses were legally valid, 
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binding and would have been effective in protecting the investors from the adverse effect of 
the regulatory measures by the host states if they had been obtained by the investors. 
2.6.3 Arbitral Jurisprudence on Stabilisation Clauses 
 The opportunity for arbitrators to examine stabilisation clauses in greater detail and 
to pronounce on their legal validity and effect finally arrived in claims brought against Peru 
and Ecuador.
104
 In Aguaytía Energy LLC v Peru, the investor claimed that Peru had breached 
the obligation to guarantee the stability of the right to non-discrimination contained in the 
Legal Stability Agreement (LSA) between the parties.
105
 The investor had argued that the 
clause not only included stability of the right to non-discrimination but also a substantive 
right to non-discrimination. This interpretation was rejected by the tribunal, and the claim 
was dismissed in the absence of any change in the stabilised legal framework. 
 
However, 
before dismissing the claim, the tribunal pronounced on the legal effect of the stabilisation 
clause:  
 
It freezes the laws, rules and regulations applicable to it, as they were in existence at 
the time the Agreement was concluded. This means that no new law may be passed 
which would state that certain rules regarding non-discrimination would no longer 
apply to the Claimant 
106
 
 
However, the most far-reaching pronouncement on freezing clauses comes from Duke 
Energy International Peru Investments No. 1, Ltd v Peru.
107
 A key issue in this case was 
whether the interpretation of existing legislation by the Peruvian tax authorities was in 
breach of the LSA which guaranteed the stability of the country’s tax laws. The tribunal 
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while upholding the validity of the stabilisation clause explained that the effect of the clause 
was that: 
 
(a) laws or regulations that form part of the tax regime at the time the LSA is 
executed will not be amended or modified to the detriment of the investor, (b) a 
stable interpretation or application that is in place at the time the LSA is executed 
will not be changed to the detriment of the investor, and (c) even in the absence 
of (a) and (b), stabilized laws will not be interpreted or applied in a patently 
unreasonable or arbitrary manner.
108
 
 
An important aspect of this decision is the expansion of the scope of stabilisation 
clauses to cover not only the formal text of the laws but also their interpretation or 
application. Thus by the interpretation of the tribunal, a stabilisation clause also commits the 
host government not to change its interpretation of the law where a foreign investor had 
relied on a prior interpretation to invest in the country.
109
 Thus where a new interpretation or 
application of an existing law is so unreasonable that it violates the very stability that was 
granted, it would be a breach of the clause.
110
 
In the more recent Burlington award, the arbitral tribunal also clarified the legal 
effect and binding nature of a tax economic equilibrium clause.
111
 In determining the 
question whether a windfall profit tax imposed by Ecuador without taking steps to restore the 
economic equilibrium of the contract was expropriatory, the tribunal first had to determine 
the legal effect of the economic equilibrium clause in the PSC between the parties. The 
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tribunal decided that the clause imposes a duty on Ecuador to apply a ‘correction factor’ to 
the PSCs when a new tax affects the economy of the PSCs.
112
 In the words of the tribunal, 
‘the correction factor must be of such extent as to wipe out the effects of the tax on the 
economy of the PSC. Otherwise stated, the correction factor must restore the economy of the 
PSC to its pre-tax level.’113 It should be added that the tribunal emphasised that the clause 
imposed a mandatory, as opposed to an optional duty on Ecuador to restore the economy of 
the PSC once there is a modification to the tax system which impacts on the economy of the 
contract.
114
  
 
2.7 LEGAL AND FUNCTIONAL VALUE OF STABILISATION CLAUSES 
 2.7.1 Stabilisation Clauses and Compensation  
The previous sections concluded that based on arbitral jurisprudence, stabilisation 
clauses are legally valid and binding irrespective of the sovereign power of states to change 
their laws. Clearly, however, the existence of such disputes  indicate that  host states have 
enacted laws and enforced them on the investors contrary to the clause. Thus, most 
commentators agree that the mere inclusion of a stabilisation clause in a contract is not a 
guarantee that the host state would indeed ‘stabilise’ its laws in favour of the investor.115  
Furthermore, although arbitrators do have the power to order specific performance, 
 
it 
is rarely granted with regards to stabilisation clauses largely because it is hard to conceive 
how such laws will be enforced against an unwilling state. The only relevant case where 
specific performance was ordered is in the TOPCO award.
116
 However, the order was 
difficult to enforce in the face of opposition from the government.
117
 Thus even where an 
investor successfully brings a claim for a breach of stabilisation clause, it is unlikely that an 
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arbitral tribunal can prevent a state from applying the changes in its law to the investor. 
However, this does not mean that stabilisation clauses, especially the freezing types, are 
legally ineffective, useless and unable to prevent a host state from doing as it pleases, as 
some commentators have suggested.
118
 They have a legal and functional value.   
 
 
Drawing on the arbitral jurisprudence on intangibility clauses, most commentators 
agree that the main legal consequence of a breach of a stabilisation clause is the payment of 
compensation.
119
 This approach was followed by the tribunal in Duke v Peru as it did not 
order Peru to revert to the prior interpretation of the law.
120
 Rather, it ordered Peru to pay 
compensation to the investor for the financial loss suffered as a result of the change in the 
‘stable’ interpretation of the law.121 The investor was thus restored to the same financial 
position it would have been in if the change had not occurred.  
Thus, the value of a stabilisation clause to the investor is not that it will be 
specifically enforced. Rather it is that it serves as an important factor to ensure that 
compensation would be awarded, and in some cases, a higher amount of compensation.
122
 In 
the Duke award, for example, the tribunal accepted the computation made by the investor’s 
expert witness and awarded the entire amount as compensation for damages.
123
 For an 
investor concerned with the adverse financial implications of a change in the law, this is a 
fair outcome. It is, therefore, immaterial that the clause did not guarantee the inapplicability 
of the law.  
However, the point needs to be made that although a stabilisation clause may not 
practically prevent a host state from changing its law if it so wishes, in most cases, it does 
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serve its purpose of making changes in the law inapplicable to the investor. This is because 
the threat of paying huge compensation and the negative impact of international arbitration 
may have on the host state’s reputation, serve as a deterrent.124 Thus in practice, investors 
frequently rely on stabilisation clauses to avoid complying with new laws.
125
  In other cases, 
the clause becomes a valuable tool which an investor uses to obtain a lower level of 
compliance or to delay the new law’s applicability to it.126  
It is, therefore, surely incorrect to refer to stabilisation clauses as ‘useless’ and 
ineffective to stop a host state from ‘doing as it pleases.’ The availability of only a few 
arbitral awards arising from stabilisation clauses, and the decisions of arbitral panels in 
awarding compensation for breaches indicate that the clause must be achieving at least some 
of its objective in protecting investors against the effects of changes in laws of host states. 
As James Otto and John Cordes aptly note, the effect of stabilisation clauses ‘may be more a 
psychological deterrent than a legal one.’127  
2.7.2 Stabilisation Clauses, ‘Regulatory Takings’ and Legitimate Expectations   
 Another legal and functional value of stabilisation clauses is the role that they play  
in determining whether regulatory acts of  host states amount to ‘regulatory taking’ and 
whether they breach the legitimate expectations of investors. This finding is especially 
important in treaty-based claims as they help determine whether investors should be entitled 
to compensation for the adverse effect of the regulatory measure.   
Under the ‘police powers’ doctrine of general international law, a state is not liable to 
pay compensation to foreign investors for bona fide regulatory measures enacted for a public 
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purpose in a non-discriminatory manner.
128
 However, where the regulatory measures are 
arbitrary and discriminatory, the ‘regulatory takings’ doctrine requires host states to 
compensate foreign investors as such measures are deemed to  constitute a ‘taking’ under 
international law. 
129
 
The question of whether a regulatory measure falls within the ‘‘police powers’ of the 
state or whether they constitute ‘regulatory taking’ depends on the circumstance of each 
case. Arbitrators thus have to examine the circumstance of each case, including the effect of 
the law and the political, socio-economic, cultural and historical conditions leading to the 
regulatory measures.
130
 As there is yet no ‘bright and easily distinguishable line’ between 
regulations that fall within the police powers of a state and those that constitute regulatory 
takings, it is left to an arbitral tribunal to determine whether a regulatory measure has 
crossed the line.
131
   
Several tribunals have laid down certain conditions that the regulatory measure must 
meet in order for it to constitute a regulatory taking. In CMS Gas Transmission Co v 
Argentina, the arbitral tribunal held that the measures must lead to ‘substantial deprivation’ 
of the investor’s fundamental rights of ownership.132 In the EnCana award, the tribunal held 
that a tax law can only constitute regulatory taking if it is ‘extraordinary, punitive in amount 
or arbitrary in its incidence.’ 133  
 However, the arbitral jurisprudence suggests that where a state gives a specific 
commitment in the form of a stabilisation clause, it cannot successfully argue that the 
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regulatory measure falls within its police powers and hence is not compensable.
134
 Equally, 
an investor is more likely to succeed in a treaty-based claim for indirect expropriation or 
regulatory taking where the regulatory measure is contrary to a stabilisation clause.
135
 This is 
because a breach of a freezing clause requires payment of compensation for regulatory 
change regardless of its impact while a breach of an economic equilibrium clause requires 
payment of compensation as long as the equilibrium of the investment has been affected.
136
   
Accordingly, except where the particular stabilisation clause specifies otherwise, the 
impact of the measure on the investor and whether it is discriminatory becomes insignificant 
to the tribunal. In other words, the tribunal is only concerned with whether the regulatory 
measure was in breach of the stabilization clause. An indication of this approach was given 
by the tribunal in the Duke award when the arbitrators stated that they were not concerned 
with the correctness of the interpretation of the law ‘but only determines’ whether the 
interpretation ‘represents a change from’ the interpretation prior to the LSA.137 
A closely related value of stabilisation clauses arising from arbitral jurisprudence is 
that they could also be used to support a treaty-based claim by an investor that the host state 
has frustrated its legitimate expectation of a stable legal framework.
138
  The concept of 
legitimate expectation is usually treated as part of a host state’s obligation to provide fair and 
equitable treatment under an investment treaty.
139
  In other words, the fair and equitable 
treatment standard is violated when the investor is deprived of its legitimate expectation that 
the conditions existing at the time of the contract will remain unchanged for the duration of 
the contract. 
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However, the dominant view arising from arbitral jurisprudence is that, under general 
international law, an investor cannot legitimately expect that the legal framework will not 
change, perhaps to their detriment for the duration of the investment.
140
  However, going by 
the comments of several arbitral tribunals, an investor can legitimately expect a stable legal 
framework if there is a specific commitment in the form of a stabilisation clause or otherwise 
in the contract between the parties.
141
  
These comments by arbitrators suggest that stabilisation clauses create a legitimate 
expectation, recognisable under international law that the laws of the host state will not 
change to the detriment of the investor. As such, an investor’s claim that the host state 
frustrated its legitimate expectation of a stable legal regime under an applicable treaty is 
likely to be successful where the investor benefits from a stabilisation clause. More 
importantly, the comments of arbitrators indicate that this legitimate expectation is to be 
protected regardless of any other circumstances surrounding the enactment of the law.
142
 
2.8 CONCLUSIONS  
Stabilisation clauses can encompass all mechanisms aimed at insulating a foreign 
investor from the effect of laws enacted subsequent to a contract. They were originally 
developed as a tool to protect investors against acts of nationalisation and expropriation, but 
their scope has now broadened and they may be drafted to mitigate the adverse effect of any 
type of changes in the laws of host states.  
A freezing clause exempts investors from the applicability of changes in the law, 
while an economic equilibrium clause entitles the investors to be compensated for the cost of 
complying with the new laws. The presence of a stabilisation clause in the legal regime 
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governing an investment may not guarantee that the host government would indeed 
‘stabilise’ its laws in favour of the investor. However, the fact that the clauses have been 
held to be legally valid and binding by arbitral tribunals and compensation usually awarded 
for their breach serve as a financial disincentive for governments to act contrary to the 
clause.  
The fact that there are arbitral awards over breaches of stabilisation clauses suggest 
that the clauses may be preventing at least some host governments from enacting and 
implementing certain laws that they desired. The question that, therefore, arises is why were 
the clauses granted in the first place? In other words, on what basis have stabilisation clauses 
been justified? This is the question that the next chapter attempts to answer.  
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CHAPTER 3 -  STABILISATION CLAUSES AND FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT:  PERCEPTIONS VERSUS REALITIES 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
Stabilisation clauses are widely portrayed as an essential tool which developing 
countries use to attract FDI. This claim is, however, mainly based on two presumptions 
promoted in the legal literature, by the extractive industry and some international 
organisations.
1
 The first is that there is a competition among developing countries to attract 
FDI. The second is that there are higher levels of political risks in developing countries. This 
chapter challenges this view. It examines both presumptions and argues that neither 
presumption is true as such. The chapter concludes by examining the claim that stabilisation 
clauses are an essential investment attraction tool. It will argue that the evidence that does 
exist indicate that stabilisation clauses do not significantly influence investment decisions.  
3.2 THE PRESUMPTION TO COMPETE FOR FDI   
3.2.1 Rationale for FDI  
Before proceeding to discuss the presumption of the need to compete for FDI, it is 
important to first restate the rationale for FDI. This is because proponents of stabilisation 
clauses often base their arguments on the assumption that foreign investors invest in 
developing countries to aid the latter’s economic development. This assumption is 
particularly common with those writing from a legal perspective.
2
 For example, Christopher 
Curtis justified the use of stabilisation clauses on the basis that ‘investing in the economic 
future of developing countries involves many uncertainties.’3 Similarly, Paul Comeaux and 
Stephan Kinsella were of the view that ‘Western investors seek to benefit themselves and the 
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populace of developing countries by investing needed capital to finance production and 
economic growth.’4  
The available evidence in the economic literature and analyses by economists show 
that, in reality, FDI is driven not only by the interest of host governments, but also by the 
interests of foreign investors and their home governments.
5
 For home governments, the 
outflow of FDI helps to increase their own productivity and competitiveness.
6
 For example, 
the subsequent inflow of repatriated profits can drive re-investment in the home country. It is 
for this reason that most developed countries, and in recent times some emerging countries, 
actively pursue ‘home country measures’ (HCMs) to encourage outward FDI.7  
On the other hand, countries seek to attract FDI based on the belief that in addition to 
the inflow of financial resources, the often superior knowledge and technology of foreign 
firms will have a positive spill-over effect on domestic firms.
8
 This spill-over is then 
expected to lead to increased productivity and output, and improve the international 
competitiveness of domestic firms and the general economic performance of the host 
country.
9
 These benefits apply regardless of the level of development of the host country.
10
 It 
is for these reasons that policies and strategies to attract FDI have become a standard feature 
in many developing, as well as developed, countries.
11
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The desire of home countries to encourage outward investment and of host countries 
to attract FDI is matched by the desire of foreign firms to invest abroad. The reason behind 
this desire is aptly summed up by the Economic Intelligence Unit (hereafter ‘EIU’):  
 
All firms are subject to the pressures of globalisation. As a result of the 
liberalisation of international economic transactions in recent decades and 
improved communication technologies, global competition has intensified. 
This puts considerable pressure on firms to internationalise, including 
through FDI. MNCs are motivated to establish a portfolio of locational 
assets to secure competitive advantage. They are driven to invest abroad to 
have better access to resources (including skills and technology) and to be 
close to their markets.
12
 
 
It is therefore submitted that foreign firms’ rationale for investing abroad is to obtain 
the highest return on their investment. As aptly summarised by UNCTAD: ‘corporate 
objectives have remained unchanged: to maximize profits, minimize risk and recover 
investments as early as possible.’13 It is therefore incorrect to suggest that foreign investors 
invest in developing countries because they are concerned about the host country’s 
‘economic future’ or are desirous of benefiting the local populace. While this may be an 
outcome of their investment, it is not an objective of the foreign investor. Rather it is an 
objective of the host government. This point was finely made by Rainer Geiger some 
decades ago when he stated as follows:  
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Undoubtedly the interests of the foreign investor and the host government 
coincide as to the success and profitability of the undertaking. In other 
aspects the interests of the parties may be opposite. The company naturally 
tries to obtain a maximum of return and security of its investment and as 
much freedom from government interference as possible. The host 
government, on the other hand may wish to induce the integration of the 
foreign enterprise into the national economy, control its future operations 
and share its profits.
14
 
 
This distinction between the seemingly conflicting objectives of the host state and 
foreign investors is particularly relevant to this thesis. This is because it means that if FDI is 
to bring the expected benefits, hosts states must balance the profit-making objectives of 
foreign investors with their own development objectives. Investors should be able to earn 
profits commensurate with the risks while host states should be able to benefit in terms of 
long-term sustainable development objectives.
15
 The crucial question therefore is whether 
stabilisation clauses facilitate or undermine this balance. This question is considered in 
chapter 6. For now, having clarified the rationale for FDI, the next section examines the view 
that developing countries grant stabilisation clauses because of a need to compete for FDI.   
3.2.2 The Presumption to Compete: Rhetoric v Reality in the Extractive Sector 
It is important to initially acknowledge that the extent to which FDI impacts upon 
many developing countries may be higher than that of developed countries. This is because 
the financial and technological constraints in many developing countries mean they may 
need to rely more on FDI to stimulate their economic growth. Furthermore, many developing 
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countries are in general net importers of FDI.
16
 Thus, in the context of FDI, their primary 
focus is on issues relating to their ability to attract inward FDI and to benefit from it.
17
   
That said, it is also true, as noted previously, that strategies and policies to attract 
FDI is standard in most countries, irrespective of their level of development, geographical 
location, or industrial structure.
18
 In fact, each member of the OECD now maintains an 
investment promotion agency to attract FDI.
19
 Thus, if there is competition to attract FDI, 
the competitors include developing and developed nations. Accordingly, if this claimed 
competition for FDI is by itself a justification for the use of stabilisation clauses, then the 
clause should also be a standard feature of FDI attraction policies in developed countries. 
However, this does not appear to be the case.
20
 In fact, most proponents of the clause 
recommend it for ‘policy-makers in mineral–rich developing countries.’21 This suggests that 
the competition for FDI is more intense in the extractive industry of developing countries. 
However, as the following analysis will show, such a view diverges dramatically from 
reality.  
Much has been written on the current trends and future projections in the extractive 
industry.
22
 However, for the purposes of this thesis, it is useful to briefly restate them here, 
especially as the information is found mainly in literature external to the legal discipline.  
All available evidence points to an increasing competition for oil, gas, and other 
minerals in developing countries.
23
 The reason for this is simple. First, continuous 
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industrialisation in developed countries and economic growth in many developing countries 
(particularly China and India), has led to an increasing global demand for oil, gas and other 
mineral resources thereby putting considerable strain on limited supplies.
24
 Second, while 
reserves in most developed countries are declining and operating costs remain high, reserves 
in developing countries remain, in principle, ‘large enough’ and development costs ‘low 
enough.’25 As such, developing countries continue to play an ever-increasing role in energy 
supply and their investment decisions are of ‘crucial importance’ to global energy security.26 
For example, it is estimated that almost two-thirds of the $38 trillion investment required to 
meet global energy demand over the period 2011 to 2035 is needed in developing 
countries.
27
 
Consequently, there is a ‘scramble’ among developed countries and the countries 
from the former BRIC economic group of developing countries (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China) for oil, gas and other mineral resources in developing countries.
28
 Many of these 
countries have therefore put in place policies to secure control over supplies, preferably 
through investments by their own firms.
29
 For example, in the US, the promotion of 
investment by American energy firms is a ‘core element’ of the country’s engagement with 
‘major oil producers.’30  Similarly, one of the objectives of the Energy Charter Treaty was to 
                                           
24
 For detailed analysis, see the following: John Deutch, ‘Future United States Energy Security 
Concerns’(2004) MIt Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change Report 115 
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 IEA, World Energy Outlook Factsheet’ (IEA 2011) 4. 
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make Russia adopt the EU’s principles of competition and to further open its energy sector 
to outside investors, preferably from the EU.
31
 Other strategies include strengthening 
political relations and increasing investment in both production capacities and energy transit 
infrastructure in the EU’s main supplier and transit countries.32  
The strategy by China deserves a special mention as it is peculiar in terms of how it 
is devised, and significant in terms of how it affects the competition for the earth’s remaining 
natural resources.
33
 China’s abundant coal resources have been insufficient to sustain all 
aspects of its rapid growth.
34
 As a result, the country relies heavily on natural resources in 
other developing countries, particularly in Africa, to meet its demand. Chinese companies 
are state-owned and therefore operate as an arm of the government. With this status, they are 
able to offer ‘no-strings attached’ assistance to developing countries.35 Such assistance is, 
however, linked to its strategic and economic objectives including, expanding access to 
natural resources and building of infrastructure that supports the transportation of these 
resources to China.
36
 Although China does not generally release details of the amount of its 
aid, estimates show that it has increased dramatically in the last decade.
37
  The Financial 
Times reported that in 2009 and 2010, China lent more money to developing countries than 
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the World Bank, a finding which the paper sees as ‘a stark indication of the scale of 
Beijing’s economic reach and its drive to secure natural resources.’38 
In the light of the foregoing, it is argued that the competition among foreign 
investors, backed by their home governments, for access to natural resources in developing 
countries is more acute than any competition which is claimed to exist among developing 
countries to attract FDI. The ‘global bidding war’ that clearly exists is among foreign 
investors, backed by their own governments for the natural resources in developing 
countries.
39
 This is especially the case for Africa. In the words of one African leader: ‘Since 
we discovered oil, agents of foreign interests have been running up and down urging us to 
produce as quickly as possible so that we export it to sustain the good life of outsiders.’40 His 
view is supported by Michael Klare and Daniel Volman when they argued as follows:  
 
The African continent has now become a vital arena of strategic and 
geopolitical competition for not only the United States, but also for China, 
India, and other new emerging powers. The main reason for this is quite 
simple: Africa is the final frontier as far as the world's supplies of energy are 
concerned with global competition for both oil and natural gas (particularly 
the latter) becoming just as intense - if not even more so - than the former.
41
 
 
It is conceded that many developing countries lack the financial and technical 
capacity to exploit these resources and may therefore need to create an investment climate 
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that attracts FDI. However, the fact that there is also a scramble for these resources by 
foreign investors for the reasons given above means that the benefits of any investment 
accrue not only to the host countries, but also to the foreign investors and their home 
governments. It is thus difficult to see why a stabilisation clause, which is not available in 
the home countries of the investors, is required to create a ‘welcoming’ environment for 
them in developing countries. It is even more difficult to understand why the broadest 
forms of the clauses are found in the extractive industry in Africa, which is also the ‘final 
frontier’ for the global competition for energy.42 One is therefore not convinced that 
developing countries accept stabilisation clauses out of a need to compete for FDI. This 
leaves the other justification for the clause: the presumption that political risks are higher in 
developing countries. This presumption is considered next. 
3.3 PRESUMPTION OF HIGHER POLITICAL RISKS IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
3.3.1 What are Political Risks 
A review of the literature on political risks indicates that there are as yet, no strict 
boundaries to what constitutes the political risks of an investment.
43
 Events that have been 
considered as a ‘political risk’ include breach of contract by governments, adverse regulatory 
changes, restrictions on currency transfer and convertibility, expropriation, war, insurrection 
and terrorism.
44
   
Some authors have sought to distinguish the different types of political risks.
45
 Daniel 
Wagner makes a distinction of particular relevance.
46
 First, he makes a distinction between 
                                           
42
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‘firm-specific’ political risks and ‘country-specific’ political risks.47 He describes firm-
specific political risks as those risks directed at a particular company and are, by nature, 
discriminatory while country-specific political risks are those whose effect is countrywide.
48
 
Secondly, he makes a distinction between ‘government risks’ and ‘instability risks.’49 He 
described government risks as those risks that arise from the actions of governmental 
authorities such as tax hikes, regulatory changes and breach of contracts.
50
 Instability risks, 
on the other hand, are those risks that arise from political power struggles or insecurity.
51
 
Included in this list are civil wars, urban riots, kidnappings, sabotage, and mass labour 
strikes.
52
 
The second distinction is particularly relevant to this thesis as it provides some clarity 
on what constitutes the political risks that stabilisation clauses are intended to mitigate. The 
discussion in the previous chapter shows that stabilisation clauses are directed at 
‘government risks’, i.e. the risks that arise from the actions of government such as 
detrimental changes in the law of host states. Accordingly, as this thesis deals with 
stabilisation clauses, a political risk is defined as the risk that the laws of the host state will 
change to the detriment of a foreign investor.  
It is also important to make the point that most analyses on the level of political risk 
in a country are based on perceived, rather than, actual risk. Political risk analyses are thus 
largely subjective and are hardly reached based on realistic criteria.
53
 As one commentator 
noted three decades ago ‘political investment risks do not lend themselves to easy 
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quantification based on objective data.’54 As such ‘the political risk analyses which some 
institutions in the United States sell at a rather high price hardly offer more than a "best 
guess."’55  
Recent studies have confirmed that this view remains true. For example, Mirela Iluo 
and Sorin Ilou reviewed several empirical studies on political risk and concluded that 
investors’ understandings of the concept of political risk in developing countries were 
‘subjective and superficial’ and based on ‘generalization and impressionistic knowledge of a 
developing nation.’56 This view is also supported by a recent survey by the firm Ernst and 
Young which summarised investors’ perceptions of political risks in Africa as follows:  
 
Unsurprisingly, perceptions of attractiveness are heavily influenced by the 
country of origin of the survey respondent, and often cultural or historical 
affinity. So for example, Morocco is regarded positively by many French 
respondents; South Africans tend to be more positive about Anglophone 
Africa countries (including, interestingly, being the most positive of all 
respondent about the attractiveness of Nigeria): Indians are positive about 
South Africa and Kenya, both of which have sizeable Indian minority 
populations and strong historical ties.
57
 
 
Accordingly, if the argument that stabilisation clauses are required in developing 
countries due to high level of political risks is true, it assumes that the investment decisions 
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of foreign investors are significantly influenced by perceived political risks. If this is found 
not to be the case, then it assumes that the political risk levels are actually higher in 
developing countries. Whether these assumptions reflect reality then deserves some 
attention.   
 
3.3.2 Investors’ Perception of Risks and Investment Decisions 
Investors everywhere (whether in developed or developing countries) want to 
minimise risks in order to maximise profit. However, this should not be interpreted as 
meaning that investors are influenced by perceived political risks when making actual 
investment decisions. On the contrary, the available empirical evidence suggests that 
investors’ perceptions of political risks in developing countries have little or no influence in 
their actual investment decisions. Before highlighting the findings of some of these studies, 
it is important to briefly examine a contrary opinion expressed by the World Bank.
58
  
According to the World Bank, ‘there is little dispute that risk perceptions influence 
foreign investment.’59 However, nowhere in the report was the basis for this view revealed. 
Rather, the report severally stated that ‘the link between FDI and political risk is not 
straightforward.’60 If this is so, then one is left to wonder how the report was able to draw a 
‘little disputed’ line between FDI and risk perception. This is more so because the report 
admits that despite the high perception of political risks, investors in developing countries 
‘appear particularly bullish in their investment intentions.’61 One must, therefore, dismiss 
this view of the World Bank, as expressed in the report, as incorrect and unreliable. 
On the other hand, a significant number of studies confirm that there is a 
disconnection between investors’ perception of risks and their actual investment decisions. 
This is particularly true in the extractive industry. For example, a survey by EIU found that 
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investors’ perceive that political risks in developing countries and emerging markets will 
increase over the next 5 years.
62
 However, the majority of the responding investors remained 
bullish about the investment outlook in these countries and planned to invest more over the 
same period.
63
 The report, therefore, concluded that perceptions of political risks ‘do not 
appear to have a significant impact on decision-making.’64  
The Ernst and Young report also arrived at a similar conclusion.
65
 The report 
compared the attractiveness of African countries with the actual distribution of FDI projects 
in Africa in 2010 and found a clear disconnect.
66
 Furthermore, when the report analysed FDI 
inflow into Africa between 2003 and 2010, it also found that over 70% of the investment 
into Africa went to 10 countries that do not necessarily have the lowest perception of 
political risks.
67
  
An examination of global distribution of FDI in recent years also fails to highlight a 
significant link between investors’ perception of political risks and their investment 
decisions. In the last five years, the perception of political risk in developing countries has 
heightened due to so called ‘resource nationalism.’ However, developing countries 
experienced an increase in FDI within the same period such that by 2012, for the first time, 
developing countries attracted more FDI than developed countries, accounting for 52 per 
cent of global FDI flows.
68
   
Several commentators and the empirical studies cited earlier have suggested reasons 
for the apparent disconnect between investors’ perception of political risks and their actual 
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investment decisions.
69
 The summary of their suggestions is that while investors may have 
certain perceptions of political risks about countries, their decisions to invest in particular 
countries are is driven by economic reality, rather than political risk perception. It, therefore, 
does appear that political risks tend to concern lawyers more than the investors themselves. 
As Howard Mann and Konrad von Moltke argues, ‘while lawyers focus their advice on risk 
and remedies, this does not make it the principal focus of the business investor itself.’70 
Other factors including, availability of resources, market potential, political stability, and 
physical infrastructure ‘play a much larger role in these decisions.’71  Similarly, the EIU 
explained this disconnect as follows:   
 
Contrary to popular belief, businesspeople and investors have traditionally paid 
little attention in their decision-making to most forms of political risk, 
compared with most other important drivers of investment decisions. 
Macroeconomic conditions, labour availability and costs, and the overall 
business and policy environment in a country have been far more important 
issues.
72 
  
 
Based on the foregoing, coupled with the discussion on the global competition for 
oil, gas and other mineral resources, it is argued that resource–seeking investors in 
developing countries are largely driven by economic factors, and in particular by the 
resource potential of the host country. Yet, proponents of stabilisation clauses argue that the 
clauses should be granted to these sorts of investors. This, they say, is because of the long 
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term and capital intensive nature of the investments. If this is true, then the question that 
arises is why are stabilisation clauses not also used in the extractive industries of resource-
rich developed countries? The usual answer in the literature is that the political risk in 
developed countries is lower. Whether this is true is the focus of the next section. 
 
3.3.3 Challenging the Myth of Higher Political Risks in Developing Countries    
The view that there are higher levels of political risks in developing countries has 
always been met with some criticism.
73
 This view has come under further challenge in recent 
times. As one commentator puts it, ‘all countries are risky. Emerging markets are those 
where this risk is priced in. Developed countries are where investors do not perceive their 
own risk.’74 Similarly, Thomas Wälde and George Ndi argue that although investors’ 
concerns for political risks in developed countries may be less acute, this ‘may be wrong’ 
and is ‘perhaps due to cultural prejudices.’75 They went on to suggest that ‘a realistic 
analysis’ in developed countries will usually reveal increases in taxation and changes in tax 
and environmental legislation to the detriment of investors.
76
  
In 2008, a ‘realistic analysis’ was carried out by Peter Cameron and Graham Kellas 
on significant changes to fiscal terms in petroleum regimes around the world between 2002 
and 2008.
77
 Their findings show that these changes occurred not only in developing 
countries but also in developed countries including, Australia, Canada, UK and the US.
78
 
They therefore concluded that investors in the petroleum industry of developed countries are 
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‘particularly vulnerable’ to adverse changes as governments  of developed countries ‘appear 
just as likely to change fiscal terms as those in the developing world.’79 The question that 
therefore arises is: what has been the basis for the view by some that developing countries 
have higher political risks?  
Most commentators trace the basis for this view to the historical instances of 
nationalisation and expropriation in some developing countries especially between the 1960s 
and 1970s.
80
 However, those who hold this view tend to overlook the fact, and often do not 
mention, that developed countries with significant extractive industry activity also carried 
out similar actions during that period.
81
  
For example, several acts of nationalisation and expropriation by Canada in the 
1970s culminated in the announcement of the National Energy Program in 1980. The stated 
aim of the program was to increase Canadian ownership and control of oil and gas 
production to a minimum of 50 per cent by 1990.
82
 Pursuant to this program, the government 
enacted the Canadian Oil and Gas Act in 1981. The Act authorised inter alia; the government 
to acquire 25 per cent ‘Crown share’ in certain development, exploration and production 
interests in Canada.
83
  
Similar acts of expropriation and nationalisation were also carried out by the UK 
during that period. For example, the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975 made 
major changes to the terms of existing production licenses, created a new form of petroleum 
taxation and gave shares to a newly established state oil company in all North Sea field 
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developments.
84
 However, unlike most developing countries, the licence terms contained 
neither stabilisation nor intangibility clauses and perhaps for this reason did not lead to any 
major legal challenge. Based on the foregoing, any claim that investors’ perception of risk in 
developing countries is due to historical instances of expropriation and nationalisation must 
surely be incorrect.  
A realistic analysis of political risks in developed countries can be taken further into 
the area of windfall profit taxes and increases in royalty rates. This is because the recent 
heightened perception of political risks in developing countries is often attributed to the 
attempts by their governments to seek a greater share of the profits of investors in the wake 
of rising commodity prices.
85
 However, contrary to the perception created in most of the 
legal literature, these measures have not been the exclusive preserve of developing countries. 
They have also been undertaken by developed countries.
86
  
For example, since 1973, the UK has imposed fiscal changes in the North Sea for an 
average of once every two years in a ‘glistening example of fiscal volatility.’87 More 
recently, since 2002, the fiscal regime governing the North Sea has been altered several 
times to impose or increase ‘windfall profit’ taxes on investors.88 In 2002, a 10 per cent 
‘supplementary charge’ was introduced on top of the standard corporation tax. The tax was 
doubled to 20 per cent in 2005 and further increased to 32 per cent in 2011.
89
  
All the changes were justified by the need for the government to benefit from the 
steep rise in oil prices, and were introduced suddenly without any significant consultation 
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with the industry.
90
 As observed by the industry representative in its response to the 2011 
changes, the increase followed ‘a similar pattern’ and was ‘wholly unexpected.’91 It therefore 
called for ‘constructive discussions’ between the government and the industry aimed at 
‘finding a cure for the chronic fiscal instability of the UK regime.’92 It is however unlikely 
that this call will be heeded as the UK ‘makes no pretensions about stability.’93 As such, it 
has been argued that in terms of fiscal instability, ‘the worst place to produce oil is not 
Russia or Venezuela, but Britain which is constantly tinkering with its tax rates.’94  
  Consequently, it is submitted that historical instances of nationalisation and 
expropriation, and modern day examples of changes in fiscal regimes to the detriment of 
investors can be found in developing countries, as well as developed countries. Investors 
therefore face similar political risks in all countries. However, that is not the end of the 
matter. Investors in developed countries also face a higher risk of protectionism, often 
disguised by governments as environmental regulation to avoid being ordered by arbitral 
tribunals to compensate the investors.
95
 As Thomas Wälde and Abba Kolo argue: 
 
Given the political legitimacy of environmental causes, regulation that is in 
substance protectionist will be politically more acceptable if it appears on the 
scene clothed in environmental dress. All of the current batch of pertinent 
NAFTA awards and much of the discriminatory national regulation struck by 
enforcement of EU law involve acts of protectionism or mistreatment of unwary 
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foreign investors, often blatant, but camouflaged in the much more palatable 
clothes of sacred environmental causes.
96
 
 
Indeed, one can cite several cases to support the above views including, Pope & Talbot Inc 
vs Canada,
97
 SD Myers v Canada,
98
  ADF v US,
99
 Methanex v the US,
100
 and Glamis Gold 
Ltd v US.
101
 
In the Glamis case, the investors had claimed, inter alia, that certain measures and 
actions by the federal government actions and the State of California resulted in the 
expropriation of their investments in violation of Article 1110 of NAFTA.
102
 The tribunal 
however dismissed Glamis’ claims because with the high price for gold, among other 
factors, the economic impact of the regulations was not high enough to constitute an indirect 
expropriation.
103
 However, as Thomas Wälde argues, California imposed an ‘intentionally 
prohibitive, novel and unexpected reclamation requirement’ mainly ‘with the express 
purpose of preventing the mine’ but justified it as an ‘environmental measures.’104  He 
therefore concludes that: 
 
Developed economies cannot therefore necessarily claim to offer greater 
protection of acquired rights. To the contrary, they may offer a model of how to 
undo acquired rights by stealth through the deployment of regulation and tax rules, 
but also in the even better camouflaged ways of enforcement. Such regulatory and 
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administrative practices can, at face value, be made to appear innocuous and 
legitimate but achieve the same effect than the cruder instruments of confiscation, 
expropriation and nationalization used in the past primarily in developing 
countries.
105
  
 
It is important to point out that in the majority of these cases; the investors’ claims 
were dismissed. However, this was not because the investors did not suffer the adverse 
effects of the regulatory changes. Rather, it was largely because the investors had no specific 
commitment in the form of a stabilisation clause that could have protected them.
106
 Thus as 
William Arnold puts it:  
  
  It is ironic that countries such as Canada and the United States of America, where 
a request for a stability agreement would be regarded as a joke, have in fact been 
more unstable to the mining industry than many developing countries due to 
regulatory changes concerning the environment and health and safety issues.
107
  
 
To conclude this section, the political risks that stabilisation clauses aim to minimise 
also exist in developed countries, especially those with significant extractive industry 
activity. However, while developing countries offer stabilisation clauses to minimise these 
risks, developed countries do not. Yet both developed and developing countries actively seek 
to attract FDI. The question that therefore arises is: are investors influenced, in a significant 
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way, by stabilisation clauses when making investment decisions? In other words, do 
stabilisation clauses attract FDI into developing countries? This question is examined next. 
3.4 ARE STABILISATION CLAUSES EFFECTIVE IN ATTRACTING FDI? 
Before proceeding to discuss whether stabilisation clauses influence investors’ 
investment decisions, it is important to state that undertaking such an analysis poses several 
constraints. First, in most countries where stabilisation clauses are used, contracts containing 
the clause are classified as confidential and kept secretly. And since stabilisation practice 
varies from country to country, and sometimes even within a country, it becomes difficult to 
draw a general conclusion on the effectiveness of stabilisation clauses as a whole.  
Second, although there is the option of surveying investors to discover to what extent 
they were or would be influenced by stabilisation clauses, this is not thought to be a viable 
option. This is because the disconnection between investors’ perception and their investment 
decisions highlighted previously suggests that investors do not base their investment 
decisions on what is ideal.
108
 Rather, investment decisions are based on economic reality. 
Furthermore, as will be discussed in more detail later, investors usually ask for stability 
guarantees, especially if they believe they can get it without much cost.
109
 As such, while 
most investors may readily respond in a survey or interview that they consider stabilisation 
clauses as essential, they may still go ahead to invest without the clause where they are 
unable to get one.
110
 In other words, what matters are the actions of the investors rather than 
what they say.  
In any event, it is already established that investors’ perceptions of political risks 
differ even in a particular country.
111
 Thus while some investors may refrain from investing 
in a country due to the absence of stabilisation clauses, others may choose to invest without 
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the clause. Since the interest here is whether stabilisation clauses influence the overall inflow 
of FDI into a country, the divergent views of investors may therefore offer little clarity. This 
thesis thus seeks to answer the question whether stabilisation clauses influence the inflow of 
FDI to developing countries in a way that better reflects the actual investments decisions by 
investors. This will be done in three ways: First, an analogy will be drawn from the practice 
of using BITs and incentives and their effectiveness in attracting FDI. Second, the relevant 
findings of previous empirical studies on stabilisation clauses will be examined to see if any 
link can be drawn between stabilisation clauses and FDI inflow. This will then be followed 
by a review of recent trends in stabilisation practice amongst countries to see if any 
significant link can be found between stabilisation clauses and FDI inflow.  
3.4.1 Lessons from Bilateral Investment Treaties and Investment Incentives  
Stabilisation clauses share similar characteristics with bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) and incentives. Like stabilisation clauses, BITs are portrayed as a tool which 
developing countries can use to create a favourable investment climate to attract FDI.
112
 
From an investors’ perspective, BITs also share similar characteristics with stabilisation 
clauses as they can be relied upon by investors to mitigate, to a significant extent, the 
political risks that stabilisation clauses are aimed at. Incentives are also touted as tools that 
countries can use to attract FDI.
113
 In this sense, a stabilisation clause may be seen as a 
regulatory incentive.  
BITs and incentives also share another characteristic with stabilisation clauses. Like 
stabilisation clauses, they were routinely advocated for use, in primarily developing 
countries, without a proper examination of their effectiveness as an investment attraction 
tool.
114
 This is despite the fact that, like stabilisation clauses, BITs and incentives impose 
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significant obligations on host states while conferring strong rights on investors.
115
 Thus for 
years their effectiveness and usefulness remained a subject of debate.  
In the past decade however, several empirical studies have been undertaken on the 
issue.
116
 The dominant view from these studies is that, at best, incentives and BITs play a 
minor role in attracting FDI to developing countries. For example, with regards incentives, 
Stefan van Parys and Sebastian James surveyed tax holidays granted by countries in the CFA 
Franc Zone between 1994 and 2006 and found ‘no convincing evidence of the effectiveness 
of tax holidays on investment.’117 Similarly Louis Wells and Nancy Allen, after finding no 
significant change in investment inflow to Indonesia after the country removed tax holidays 
in 1984, concluded that tax incentives do not determine location of FDI.
118
   
In the case of BITs, Jason Yackee conducted a survey of in-house lawyers in large 
US corporations and found that majority do not view BITs as playing a major role in their 
companies’ foreign investment decisions.119 He therefore concluded that BITs are ‘unlikely 
to significantly drive foreign investment.’120 Similarly, Mary Hallward–Driemeier reviewed 
bilateral FDI outflows from 20 OECD countries to 31 developing countries between 1980 
and 2000 and found ‘little evidence that BITs have stimulated additional investment.’121  
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Although some debate still remains,
122
 the view that BITs and incentives are largely 
insignificant in investment decisions appears more attractive. Indeed, as UNCTAD admits, 
‘there are many examples of countries with large FDI inflow and few, if any BITs.’123 
Similarly, unless key economic determinants are favourable, incentives (financial, fiscal, 
regulatory or otherwise) may only be ‘an icing on the cake’, especially for natural resource 
or market seeking investors.
124
 
The above findings on BITs and incentives suggest that their continuous use is not by 
itself evidence of their effectiveness in attracting FDI. These findings can be applied by way 
of analogy to an analysis of the effectiveness of stabilisation clauses in attracting FDI 
(assuming stabilisation clauses to be a regulatory incentive). If this is done, the argument can 
be made that the grant of stabilisation clauses, and their continuous use by several 
developing countries, is not by itself evidence of their effectiveness in attracting FDI, 
contrary to the claims by some commentators.
125
 For this to be so, it has to be shown that the 
investors were indeed swayed by the offer of stabilisation clauses to invest. This is more so 
because all the empirical studies on BITs and incentives affirm that the traditional factors, 
such as large market size, availability of natural resources, good infrastructural development, 
high skills level, and relative wealth and labour costs, remain more important determinants 
of FDI inflows.
126
 Perhaps the empirical studies on stabilisation clauses themselves may 
offer some clarity.   
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3.4.2 Lessons from Empirical Studies on Stabilisation Clauses 
The study by Andrea Shemberg is a good starting point in an analysis of whether 
stabilisation clauses attract FDI to developing countries as it remains the largest study of its 
kind.
127
 The following comment in the report is particularly relevant as it is the closest the 
report came to explaining a possible link between stabilisation clauses and FDI:  
 
Investors and lawyers (including those representing states and investors) observe 
that states sometimes accept sweeping stabilization clauses, along with other terms 
that appear to tilt the project in favor of the investor, as a way of securing a large 
investment project and enticing further investment in the country.
128
  
 
        While the above views may be true, they provide no indication whether the investors’ 
decision to invest were actually influenced by the stabilisation clauses or by the ‘other terms’ 
or by none of these. Indeed, other empirical studies have found that requests for stabilisation 
clauses are largely reflective of rent–seeking behaviours by investors.129 In other words, 
regardless of whether or not stabilisation clauses are important to investors, they would 
request for them if they feel they can get them especially as ‘it does no harm to have it.’130  
         The view that requests for stabilisation clauses are largely reflective of rent-seeking 
behaviours by investors is supported by the findings of several studies that not all developing 
countries accept requests for stabilisation clauses and investors do not always insist on the 
clause.
131
 For example, Peter Cameron found that a ‘striking feature’ of petroleum regimes 
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in the world is that not all regimes offer stabilisation clauses and investors ‘appear to have no 
difficulty in living with this.’132 According to him, one of the reasons for this is that while 
the perception of risks may be high, the geological risk may be low enough for investors to 
accept a contract without stabilisation provisions.
133
 He therefore concluded that countries 
with significant proven reserves do not see any need to grant stabilisation clauses.
134
  
       Accordingly, the only conclusion to be drawn in this thesis, based on the findings from 
empirical studies of stabilisation clauses, is that stabilisation clauses do not significantly 
influence investment decisions in the extractive industries of developing countries. 
Consequently, they play an insignificant role in attracting FDI to developing countries. 
However, it is important, before leaving this discussion, to examine a contrary finding in a 
recent publication by UNCTAD.
135
 Relying on the findings from case studies of Chile and 
Canada, the study claimed that stability contracts can be used to attract FDI and therefore 
recommended ‘tax and regulatory stability contracts’ to ‘mineral-rich developing 
countries.’136 This study is significant as it appears to be the only publicly available 
empirical study which claims that stabilisation clauses help attract FDI. It is therefore 
important to examine the validity of this claim, especially as it contradicts the conclusion 
already reached in this thesis.  
The first problem with the claim is that the study also covered Canada.
137
  Canada, as 
aptly stated by William Arnold, is ‘in fact been more unstable to the mining industry than 
many developing countries.’138 Yet, according to this UNCTAD study, Canada has been able 
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to attract and benefit from FDI in its mining sector.
138
 This is despite the fact that Canada 
does not grant stabilisation clauses. This crucial fact may have been overlooked by the study 
because the authors were influenced by the myth that developed countries such as Canada 
have lower political risks which make stabilisation clauses less important.
139
 However, when 
the focus is turned to Chile, the facts on Chile, as presented in the study, suggest that 
stability contracts do not play any significant role in the inflow of FDI to the Chilean mining 
sector. Rather, they make a strong case for the view that Chile had been able to attract FDI 
into its mining sector because it possesses the traditional determinants of FDI location.  
Chile has around a third of the world's copper reserves and significant reserves of 
other minerals.
140
 As the study acknowledges, this is one of the two major reasons for the 
extensive exploration in Chile in the past decades.
141
 In addition to its favourable geological 
potential, Chile also ranks high in terms of political stability. As noted in the study, the 
return of democracy in the early 1990s led to political stability without undermining the 
market-oriented institutions created in the previous decades.
142
 
 
The study also found that Chile ranks high in terms of quality of governance,
143
 
while its corruption levels are minimal.
144
 It is therefore not surprising that in 2010 Chile 
became a member of the OECD, the first South American country to join.
145
 The study also 
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scored Chile high on regulatory certainty and fiscal regime.
146
 It even scored Chile well 
above most developed countries in terms of regulatory uncertainty especially as concerns 
native land claims and environmental regulations.
147
 Furthermore, it found that Chile has 
‘traditionally been one of the lowest taxed mining jurisdictions.’148 Indeed, until 2006, 
mining companies did not pay any special tax or royalty but were only subject to Chile’s 
general income tax regime, which is the lowest in Latin America.
149
  
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Chile already possesses the key determinants 
of FDI in the mining sector and even without stabilisation clauses is already every mining 
investor’s dream. Indeed, a recent analysis of FDI inflow into Latin America and the 
Caribbean up to 2011 shows that the levels of FDI into individual countries continue to 
reflect the ranking of the country in terms of key determinants.
150
 For example, Brazil 
continues to attract the highest FDI in the region even though it is not known to grant 
stabilisation clauses. As such, it is argued that stability contracts have been largely 
insignificant in the inflow of FDI to the Chilean mining sector for the above reasons in 
addition to the following. 
First, as admitted by the report, stability contracts have been available in Chile since 
1974.
151 
Yet, it was only from the 1990s, following the return of democracy, that Chilean 
mining began to attract substantial FDI.
152
 Second, in Chile, as is in some other countries, 
stability contracts are optional and investors with stabilisation clauses are subject to a higher 
tax rate. For this reason, as the report itself admits, not all foreign investors benefit from 
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stabilisation clauses as some opted not to apply for one.
153
 Third, as already stated, Chile was 
admitted into the OECD in 2010. This is significant because OECD countries are not known 
to grant stabilisation clauses that offer exemptions from new laws.
154
 Chile is thus now part 
of an organisation whose members are able to attract FDI without the aid of stabilisation 
clauses. In this sense, one can argue that Chile, like other OECD members already possesses 
the ability to attract FDI into its mining sector without offering stability guarantees.  
Indeed, an examination of the data in the same study, showing FDI inflow into the 
Chilean mining sector between 1978 and 2008, shows no relationship stability contracts and 
FDI inflow.
155
 The data shows that during the 1990s, the Chilean mining sector saw a 
significant increase in FDI reaching a peak in 1998 but since then FDI inflows have been 
volatile and below the 1998 levels despite the continued availability of stability contracts.
156
 
Accordingly, it is submitted that the conclusions reached by UNCTAD, based on ‘lessons’ 
from Chile, that stability contracts help attract FDI, must surely be incorrect.    
3.4.3 Lessons from Recent Trends in Stabilisation Practice  
In the past decade, investor-state disputes have brought to the fore the practice of 
including stabilisation provisions in the contractual arrangement between host states and 
foreign investors. In the majority of cases, the disputes have arisen as a result of legislative 
actions taken by host states to capture a greater share of the windfall from rises in the prices 
of commodities. The success or failure of these actions has largely depended on how the 
respective stabilisation clauses are handled. These events may therefore provide some 
insights as to the role of stabilisation clauses in attracting FDI to developing countries 
especially by looking at the effect the changes later had on investments decisions. A review 
of these events reveals two relevant findings. First, it confirms that even in countries where 
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stabilisation clauses are used, not every investor is protected by it, yet they continue to 
invest. Secondly, it reinforces the argument that there is no robust link between stabilisation 
practices and the inflow of FDI. These findings are discussed below.   
3.4.3.1  Stabilisation Clauses Not Generally Available to All Investors  
Earlier empirical studies have already confirmed that not all developing countries 
offer stabilisation clauses.
157
 What is now becoming increasingly clear is that even in 
countries where stabilisation clauses are offered, not all investors are protected by the clause. 
In some cases, the investor has no choice in the matter as stability guarantees are only 
available to specific projects or sectors. For example, the Petroleum Development of Timor 
Sea (Tax Stability) Act 2003 established stability agreements only for projects relating to the 
development of the ‘Bayu-Undan field’ in Timor-Leste.158  Similarly, the Nigeria LNG 
(Fiscal Incentives Guarantees and Assurances) (Amendment) Act 1993 grants stabilisation 
clauses only to the Nigeria LNG Limited.  
In some other cases, entitlement to stabilisation clauses is based on fulfilling certain 
conditions which may include a minimum threshold of investment by the potential investor. 
For example, under the Foreign Investment Law of Mongolia (as amended in 2003), an 
investor must be ‘intending to undertake an investment project of not less than US$2 
million’ before it can apply for a stability agreement.159 In such a case, any investor whose 
investment falls below this amount cannot get a stability agreement. 
However, there are countries, especially in Latin America, where the investor has the 
choice whether or not to apply for a stability agreement. In such cases, the government 
simply creates two fiscal regimes. One is for investors with stability contracts and the other 
is for investors without stability contracts. Usually, the main difference between the two 
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regimes is an elevated tax rate in the fiscal regime for investors with stability contracts. The 
higher rate is thus the ‘premium’ the investor pays to access the protection offered by 
stabilisation clauses.
160
 What is however striking is that a significant number of investors 
who are qualified to apply for stability agreements in these countries choose not to apply for 
it.  
For example, in Ghana, the process for applying for stability agreements was made 
transparent through the Mineral and Mining Act 2006.
161
 However, since the Act was 
enacted, no stability agreement has been entered into by the government. Furthermore, the 
evidence from media reports and press releases indicate that only two of the major mining 
companies have stability agreements with the government.
162
 Thus as many as 20 large-scale 
mining companies operating in Ghana, including Gold Fields – the fourth largest producer of 
gold - do not have stability agreements.
163
 However, they have continued to invest in 
Ghana.
164
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review-1-.html> accessed 26 March 2012.  
163
 See, Ed Stoddard, ‘Ghana to Review All Mining Stability Agreements’ Reuters (Cape Town, 09 February 
2012) <http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE81806B20120209> accessed 26 March 2012 ; 
EIU, Country Report: Ghana March 2012 (EIU 2012); Ghana News Agency ‘Mining Stability Agreement to 
Renew Tension in the Mining Sector-EIU’ (Accra 05 March 2012) 
http://www.ghananewsagency.org/details/Economics/Mining-stability-agreement-to-renew-tension-in-mining-
sector-EIU/?ci=3&ai=40151 accessed 26 March 2012. 
164
 Similarly in Peru, Buenaventura, the country’s top precious metal miner does not have a stability agreement 
while another major mining company, XStrata has stability agreements only for their ‘principal’ projects. 
Teresa Cespedes, ‘Peru in talks over two mining royalty rates-sources’ Reuters (29 August 2011) 
<http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFN1E77S1K120110829> accessed 26 March 2012; Marco 
Aquino and Teresa Cespedes, ‘Peru Govt. Approves New Mining Royalty Scheme’ Mineweb, (14 September 
2011) <http://www.mineweb.com/mineweb/view/mineweb/en/page504?oid=135420&sn=Detail>  accessed 26 
March 2012. 
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The example of Colombia is also worth highlighting. Stability contracts are routinely 
touted as an incentive designed to attract FDI into Colombia.
165
  However, since it was 
introduced in 2005, the majority of those that have entered into a stability contract with the 
government are domestic firms.
166
 This is despite the fact that most of the foreign firms in 
the country are eligible to apply.
167
 What is even more striking is that most of the projects 
backed by the IFC, which is a member of the World Bank Group that advocates for the use 
of stabilisation clauses, are not covered by stability contracts.
168
 As one commentator notes, 
if stability contracts indeed ‘ensure future income streams, at an affordable premium a 
knowledgeable and powerful investor like IFC would show an appetite for them at least out 
of concern for changes rules that are not limited to specific projects.’169  
The lesson that can be drawn from the above examples is that while investors may 
wish to have stabilisation clauses wherever possible, they appear reluctant to pay a premium 
for them where required. As a result, in such instances, they voluntarily elect to be exposed 
to adverse changes in the law by going ahead to invest without the clause. Accordingly, it is 
difficult to argue that stabilisation clauses significantly influence investment decisions and 
help attract FDI to developing countries. To further explore this point, the next section 
reviews a selection of countries where significant changes have occurred in their stabilisation 
practice to see whether the changes affected the inflow of FDI.     
                                           
165
 Proexport, ‘Investment Booklet December 2010 (Proexport 2010) 
<http://www.investincolombia.com.co/Adjuntos/094_Incentives%20for%20Investors-December2010.pdf> 
accessed 26 March 2012. 
166
 As of June 2009, only 16 out of 46 LSAs involved foreign firms. Colombia Law and Business Post, 
‘Foreign Investors Have Signed 16 of 46 Legal Stability Contracts’ (02 October2009) 
<http://colombialawbiz.com/2009/10/02/foreign-investors-have-signed-16-of-46-legal-stability-contracts/> 
accessed 26 March 2012. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Colombia Law and Business Post, ‘Legal Stability Contracts III: Why Do IFC-Backed Projects and Firms 
Not Use Legal Stability Contracts?’ (05 August 2009) <http://colombialawbiz.com/2009/08/05/legal-stability-
contracts-iii-why-do-ifc-backed-projects-and-firms-not-use-legal-stability-contracts/> accessed 26 March 2012.  
169
 Ibid.  
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3.4.3.2  Effect of Changes in Stabilisation Practice on the Inflow of FDI 
First, it is important to point out that in the majority of countries that enacted 
legislation to introduce stabilisation clauses, the legislation were part of broader reforms to 
promote and attract FDI. As such, it has to be acknowledged that it is difficult to establish a 
clear link between stabilisation clauses and FDI merely by looking at the event or legislation 
that substantially altered the stabilisation practice. That said, it is also difficult to find any 
robust link between stabilisation clauses and FDI inflow to a country following a change in 
policy limiting the availability of stabilisation clauses. In other words, the introduction of 
stabilisation clauses does not necessarily lead to an increase in FDI into a country and their 
withdrawal does not automatically lead to a decrease. 
In all the countries where sufficient information on stabilisation clauses is publicly 
available, one is unable to find any example where the mere introduction of stabilisation 
clauses or stability agreements led to an increase in FDI inflow. In addition to the example of 
Chile already highlighted above, the experience of Colombia again offers a good 
illustration.
170
  
Colombia enacted legislation providing for stability agreements in 2005 while the 
first stability agreement was signed in 2006.
171
 However, this did not lead to any significant 
change in the trend of FDI inflow into the country. On the contrary, as shown in Figure I, 
with the exception of 2008, the inflow of FDI into Colombia in the past decade was highest 
in 2005, before the first stability contract was signed.   
 
 
 
 
                                           
170
 See section 3.4.2 which discussed how Chile introduced stability contracts in 1974 but only began to 
experience an upsurge in the inflow of FDI in the 1990s. 
171
 Investment Stability Law 963 of 2005. 
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FIGURE I: Annual FDI inflow into Colombia (2000- 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Balance of Payments, Banco de la República.
172
 
 
Another relevant point from the figure 1 is that FDI inflow to Colombia started 
increasing from 2003 and since then has been volatile. This is significant because in 2002, a 
US–backed security crackdown began in many parts of Colombia to combat drugs and 
suppress anti-government guerrilla movements.
173
 This military action led to an 
improvement in the security situation in Colombia and the improved security situation is 
largely cited as the reason for the increase of FDI into Colombia from 2003.
174
 The inability 
of the country to sustain or surpass the peak levels of FDI reached in 2005 despite the 
introduction of stability agreements, supports this view and shows that improved security is 
a much more significant determinant of FDI than stabilisation clauses. This is particularly 
because Colombia had granted tax stability contracts in the past.
175
 Yet despite the fact that 
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 As reproduced in ProExport Colombia, ‘Report on Foreign Direct Investment in Colombia’ (May 2011) 
<http://www.investincolombia.com.co/Adjuntos/209_Reporte%20de%20Inversion%20en%20ingles.pdf> 
accessed 26 March 2012. 
173
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2003). 
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 See, for example, Helen Murphy and Carlos Vargas, ‘Colombia sees $16 bln in FDI this Year’ Reuters (09 
February 2012) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/09/colombia-economy-idUSL2E8D9B9C20120209> 
accessed 26 March 2012. 
175
 Article 169 of Law 223 of 1995 on Tax Stability Agreements introduced stability agreements, which, 
according to the Colombian authorities, served the same function as the 2005 stability agreements. Juan Jose 
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these contracts were ‘respected by the government with very good returns for taxpayers’, it 
did not lead to any significant increase in FDI inflow to Colombia.
176
  
Doubts whether stabilisation clauses play any significant role in attracting FDI is 
further heightened by the wide inconsistency over the past decade. On the one hand, there 
are countries that enacted legislation providing for stabilisation clauses.
177
 Yet, on the other 
hand, many other countries repealed, significantly undermined or reduced stability 
guarantees granted to investors.
178
 If stabilisation clauses play any significant role in 
attracting FDI as proponents argue, it is safe to assume that the countries that enacted the 
clause experienced an increase in the inflow of FDI at the expense of the countries that have 
repealed or significantly undermined the clause. However, it has already been argued that 
there was no significant increase in FDI in the countries that introduced the clause.
179
 
Attention will now turn to the countries that either repealed or significantly undermined the 
clause to see if they lost ‘their share’ of FDI as a result.180  
With the exception of Venezuela, and to a lesser extent, Ecuador and Bolivia, there 
appears to be no effect on the inflow of FDI into the countries reviewed in this thesis where 
stabilisation clauses were either repealed or undermined in the past decade. It is however 
important to mention that the cases of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador can rightly be treated 
as exceptions to a general trend. This is because in these countries, the elimination or 
undermining of stabilisation guarantees were part of broader national policies involving 
                                                                                                                                  
Echavarria and George R Zodrow, ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Tax Structure in Colombia’ (2003) Inter- 
American Development Bank Technical Note 
<http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1856942> accessed 26 March 2012. 
176
 Ernst and Young, ‘Colombia Enacts Law Protecting Investors through Legal Stability Contracts (Law 963 
of 2005)’ (2005) Ernst and Young International Tax Alerts No 2005/65, 2 
<http://www.evatassurance.com/NR/rdonlyres/ecqbcdslju3kclmmfytvjhvotsqdnthkn7um4t5qtdhsn3as2bk23p6i
xh3zee6jsdb2qvbcjbeyncbn5d7dg7k73tg/International+Alert+131.pdf> accessed 26 March 2012. See also the 
example of Ghana where FDI inflow into the mining sector was highest in 2005 - a year before stabilisation 
clauses became specifically authorised in 2006. For details, see, Peter Arroja Eshun and Steve Aido Jellicoe, 
‘The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on the Development of the Ghanaian Mineral Industry’ (2011) 1 
Asian J of B and Management Sciences 148, 158.  
177
 Such countries include: Colombia, Madagascar and East Timor.  
178
 Such countries include Kazakhstan, Peru, Zambia, Algeria, Tanzania and Ghana.  
179
 See section 3.4.3.1. 
180
 A selected list of these countries and the changes that occurred is listed in Appendix I.  
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nationalisation.
181
 In other words, there was a deliberate policy in each of these countries to 
restrict foreign participation, and consequently, FDI inflows.  
For example, while explaining the drop in FDI to Venezuela, the UN Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UNECLAC) observed that Venezuela 
‘focuses on the nationalization of foreign assets rather than on foreign direct investment as a 
core development objective.’182 As such despite ‘several major investment projects’ still 
going into the country, the compensation paid for acts of nationalisation ensures that the net 
FDI inflow into the country remained low for several years.
183
 Even at that, by the first half 
of 2011, the country recorded substantial inflow of FDI garnering $1.18 billion after 
suffering a net withdrawal in 2010.
184
  
Excluding the countries mentioned above, the research for this thesis did not find any 
instance where the elimination or undermining of stabilisation clauses in a country resulted 
in a significant adverse effect on the inflow of FDI. The experience of Kazakhstan best 
illustrates this point as the country has substantially eliminated stabilisation clauses for a 
decade now.  
In 2003, Kazakhstan adopted a Law on Investments and new Tax Codes to replace its 
1994 Law on Foreign Investment. The repealed Law on Foreign Investment had provided for 
stability guarantees covering the legal and regulatory regime for foreign investors.
185
 
Although the new law contained a general commitment by the country that it ‘shall 
guarantee the stability of the conditions of contracts’,186 it also stipulated that this guarantee 
                                           
181
 The acts of nationalisation in these countries are well known so one does not find it useful to repeat them 
here. However see Roberto Chang, Constantino Hevia and Norman Loayza, ‘Privatization and Nationalization 
Cycles’ (2009) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5029, 47 
<http://library1.nida.ac.th/worldbankf/fulltext/wps05029.pdf > accessed 26 March 2012. 
182
 UNECLAC, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean’ (2010) UNECLAC Briefing 
paper, 47 <http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/0/43290/2011-138-LIEI_2010-WEB_INGLES.pdf> 
accessed 26 March 2012.  
183
 Ibid.  
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 UNECLAC, Latin America (n 150).  
185
 The law also replaced the Law on State Support for Direct Investments 1997. 
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did not apply to changes in the laws of Kazakhstan.
187
 In other words, investors are now 
subject to all new laws. Production sharing contracts (PSCs) and subsurface contracts 
specifically approved by the President were not affected. However, other changes made to 
the tax code substantially weakened the stabilisation protections in existing subsurface oil 
and gas contracts.
188
  
Unsurprisingly, these changes were condemned by foreign investors, their lawyers 
and analysts.
189
 The new law was described as a law that ‘institutionalizes the uncertainty of 
the business environment’ in Kazakhstan.190 Predictions were therefore made that without a 
‘significant policy shift’, FDI is ‘unlikely to be forthcoming into Kazakhstan.’191 However, 
rather than a policy shift, Kazakhstan continued with its policy of reducing the legal 
protections and financial incentives available to foreign investors with the following legal 
and regulatory changes.  
In 2007, the Law on Subsoil and Subsoil Use was amended to empower the country 
to amend or annul any natural resources contracts that threatened its national or economic 
interests.
192
 This law was further amended in 2010
193
 after a new Tax Code (Law No 100 of 
2008) had been adopted in 2008. The combination of these changes ensured that tax stability 
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 Article 4.3 (1 and 2). 
188
 For a discussion of these changes, see Kenneth E Mack, ‘Protection of the Oil and Gas Investor’s Rights in 
Kazakhstan’ (2006) 1 IELTR, 91.  
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 Ibid 91. See also UNESCAP, ‘Investment Climate In Kazakhstan: Country Report’ (Report presented at 
Regional Roundtable on FDI for Central Asia, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 03 – 04 April 2003) 7 - 8 
<http://www.unescap.org/tid/mtg/rrtpaper_kazakh.pdf> accessed 26 March 2012;  Robert M Cutler, 
‘Kazakhstan's New Foreign Investment Law’ (Caci Analyst, 26 February 2003) 
<http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/368> 26 March 2012; Sabrina Tavernise and Christopher Pala, ‘Energy-
Rich Kazakhstan Is Suffering Growing Pains’ New York Times, (New York, 04 January 2003)  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/04/business/international-business-energy-rich-kazakhstan-is-suffering-
growing-pains.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm> accessed 26 March 2012.  
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 UNESCAP, Investment (n 189) 7 – 8. 
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 See particularly the new art 45 added to the law. For a summary of the effect of the amendments, see, 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, ‘New Law Endangers Oil and Gas Contracts in Kazakhstan: What Are 
Foreign Investors’ Rights?’ (November 2007) 
<http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2007/nov14/20635.pdf> accessed 26 March 2012.  
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provisions were removed from existing subsoil contracts and new taxes imposed.
194
 The 
stabilisation clauses in PSCs were also significantly narrowed as changes in laws relating to 
tax, custom, national security, defence, environment and healthcare were explicitly 
exempted.
195
 
However, despite these changes and contrary to predictions, available data have yet 
to reflect any significant adverse effect on the inflow of FDI into Kazakhstan. Rather, data 
from the Kazakhstan’s government, as shown in Figure II below, reveals that FDI inflow 
into Kazakhstan has been growing consistently since then. This is supported by data from the 
OECD which estimates that between 2004 and 2009, FDI inflows into Kazakhstan grew at 
almost 25 per cent a year.
196
 Significantly, the majority of the FDI still goes to the extractive 
industries, the same sector that was mainly affected the changes to stabilisation practice in 
Kazakhstan.
197
   
FIGURE II - FDI inflow into Kazakhstan (2005 - 2012) 
 
Source: National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
198
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 For example, a mineral extraction tax ranging from 7% - 20% replaced the existing Royalty of 0.5% - 2% 
while Excess Profit Tax was also imposed.   
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 For a summary of these changes, see, Kuanysh (n 193).  
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Strategy) (OECD 2011) 19 -20.  
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The disconnection between the removal of stabilisation clauses in Kazakhstan and 
FDI inflows into the country is further confirmed by a recent survey of investors.
199
 
According to the authors of the survey, the removal of fiscal stability from petroleum 
contracts sent a ‘negative signal’ to investors.200 The majority of respondents agreed with 
this view as 53 percent felt that the level of legal and regulatory transparency and stability in 
Kazakhstan remained ‘unattractive.’201 However, despite this view, 56 per cent of 
respondents still felt that Kazakhstan’s overall investment attractiveness had not changed 
over recent years while only 16 percent felt it had deteriorated.
202
 in fact, 27 per cent actually 
felt the investment climate had improved.
122
 Furthermore, when asked whether they were 
satisfied with their investment decisions, the majority of investors answered in the 
affirmative stating that the business environment is ‘challenging but rewarding.’203 When 
asked what they would do if they had a chance to reconsider their investment decision with 
the knowledge that the government will make the regulatory changes, a massive 81 per cent 
of respondents said they would still have invested.
204
 In other words, the presence or absence 
of stabilisation clauses makes no difference to the investment decision of 81 per cent of the 
investors surveyed.  
A final example can be taken from Zambia. In 2008, the government enacted a new 
Mines and Minerals Act, which abolished the Mineral Development Agreements (MDAs) 
containing stabilisation clauses and removed the possibility of granting stabilisation clauses 
from Zambia’s laws.205 Importantly, despite the withdrawal of stabilisation clauses, a 
subsequent survey of investors found that no individual factor was a particular deterrent to 
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future investment.
206
 Rather the factors got a rating of ‘not a deterrent to investment’ or 
‘mild deterrent.’207 The positive response of investors is reinforced in the latest FDI figures 
into Zambia. Between January and November 2011, Zambia received pledged investment of 
$4.6 billion, which is above the government’s 2011 full year target of $3 billion.208  
3.5  CONCLUSIONS. 
Two presumptions prevail, and are promoted in the legal literature, by the extractive 
industry and by some international organisations. The first is that developing countries 
compete with each other to attract FDI on the basis of their political risks. The second is that 
there are higher levels of political risks in developing countries. Neither of these 
presumptions is true as such. Nevertheless, stabilisation clauses have been presented to 
developing countries as an ‘essential’ medicine that is needed to cure these presumptions and 
attract FDI. 
The available evidence on current trends and future projections in the extractive 
industry fail to point to a global bidding war among resource-rich developing countries. 
Rather, it points to an intense competition among foreign investors, backed by their home 
governments, to gain access to natural resources in developing countries. The review of 
significant changes in fiscal terms in the extractive industry in resource-rich developed 
countries shows that their governments are just as likely as those in developing countries to 
alter the fiscal terms in their extractive industries. In other words, the political risks that 
stabilisation clauses aim to minimise in developing countries exists, at least in equal 
measure, in the extractive industry of developed countries. Yet, developed countries do not 
offer or grant stabilisation clauses to investors.  
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The fact that developed countries do not offer stabilisation clauses therefore raises 
doubts about the essentiality of stabilisation clauses in attracting FDI. Indeed, drawing from 
lessons learnt from the use of BITs and investment incentives, previous empirical studies on 
stabilisation clauses, current stabilisation practices, as well as the effect of changes to these 
practices, the conclusion drawn is that no robust link exists between stabilisation clauses and 
the inflow of FDI. This conclusion is reinforced by the absence of any reliable empirical 
evidence to support the contrary view that stabilisation clauses attract FDI to developing 
countries. The question that then arises is why some developing countries still accept the 
clause. Possible answers to this question are considered in the next chapter. 
  
  
85 
 
CHAPTER 4 –   RETHINKING THE CONTEXT OF STABILISATION   CLAUSES   
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The last chapter highlighted a wide inconsistency in stabilisation practices among 
developing countries. This chapter explores possible reasons for this inconsistency and why 
stabilisation clauses were accepted in the first place when their rationale was based on 
presumptions that diverge from reality. 
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first examines the role of the World Bank. 
It will argue that the re-introduction of stabilisation clauses into several developing countries 
from the 1990s had more to do with the role played by the World Bank than with the 
economic justifications for the clause. The second part examines the role of corruption and 
lack of transparency. It will argue that the grant of stabilisation clauses by a country, and the 
scope of the clauses so granted, is influenced to a significant extent by corruption and lack of 
transparency in the contracting process.    
4.2 REFORMING UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE WORLD BANK 
4.2.1 Background to the Reforms 
Much has already been written on the World Bank-led reforms in the mineral sector 
of developing countries which started in the late 1980s.
1 
One does not therefore find it useful 
to repeat the fuller details here, other than to provide a brief background on the events 
leading to the reform in order to place the subsequent legal and regulatory changes in proper 
perspective.
2
  
During the period between the 1960s and the 1970s, developing countries’ emphasis 
on the principle of permanent sovereignty over their natural resources (PSNR) led to 
                                           
1
 For a detailed discussion of the reform process, see, Gary McMahon, The World Bank’s Evolutionary 
Approach to Mining Sector Reform (World Bank 2010); William Torrence Onorato, Peter Fox and John 
Strongman, World Bank Group Assistance for Minerals Sector Development and Reform in Member Countries 
(IBRD/World Bank 1998). 
2
 For a background to the reform, see, UNCTAD, State Participation and Privatization in the Minerals Sector 
(UNCTAD 1995); World Bank and IFC, Mining Reform and the World Bank: Providing a Policy Framework 
for Development (IFC 2003) 6- 8; UNECA, Minerals and Africa’s Development: The International Study 
Group Report on Africa’s Mineral Regimes (UNECA 2011) 9 – 20. 
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increased state participation in natural resource projects. However, the mid-1980s 
catastrophic fall in mineral prices significantly reduced the revenue that they derived from 
their minerals.
3
 As the economy of many resource-rich developing countries depended 
heavily on their income from natural resources, they struggled to repay the expensive loans 
they had accumulated during the boom period.
4
 As these countries turned to the World Bank 
and other international financial institutions for help, they were told that regulatory reform 
was the way out of their financial crisis.
5
 Such reform, they were told, should focus on 
policies to promote and attract FDI in order to earn the foreign exchange required to finance 
their developmental measures and repay their debts.
6
  
Having presented the countries with the option of reform, the World Bank and the 
donor community faced two choices. The first was to ‘sit back’ and ‘wait to see’ whether the 
governments would implement the recommended reforms.
7
 The second was to ‘take the 
initiative’ and make the governments implement the reforms.8 The latter option was 
eventually chosen as the World Bank subsequently took the lead, not only in determining the 
focus and orientation of the reforms, but also in making governments implement the reforms.  
The regulatory framework governing FDI in these countries was a key component of 
the reforms proposed by the World Bank.
9
 This was because in the wake of the emphasis on 
PSNR, developing countries enacted laws to curtail FDI. The implementation of the reforms 
proposed by the World Bank thus depended upon the reversal of these laws in favour of new 
laws which promote, rather than curtail, FDI. To facilitate the reform, the Bank led other 
international financial institutions to provide financial and technical assistance, together with 
                                           
3
 Alfred Maizels, Commodities in Crisis: The Commodity Crisis of the 1980s and the Political Economy of 
International Commodity Policies (Clarendon Press 1992) 5 – 38. 
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 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2007:  Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries and 
Development (UNCTAD 2007) 161 – 162. 
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 World Bank/IFC, Mining Reform (n 2) 6- 8. 
6
 UNCTAD, WIR 2007 (n 4) 161 - 162; Bonnie Campbell ‘Revisiting the Reform Process of African Mining 
Regimes’ (2010) 20 Canadian Journal of Development Studies 197 – 217. 
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 World Bank, Strategy for African Mining (World Bank 1992) 54.  
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a variety of instruments, to enable these countries to undertake the reforms.
10
 By 1998, the 
Bank was involved in over 20 developing countries in Africa, Asia, Central Europe and 
Latin America, reviewing and revising laws affecting mineral resources.
11
  
The Bank’s involvement varied significantly according to the capacity of each 
country. However, in all cases it went beyond the mere provision of loans or grants to 
finance the reforms. In the mining sector, for example, and in countries with capacity to 
carry out the legal reforms independently, the Bank still actively participated in the 
process.
12
 In some of these countries, this was done by providing opinions at the initial 
stages on the objectives and key aspects of proposed laws.
13
 In others, it was done by 
providing initial diagnostic and technical support through the appointment of legal advisers 
to participate in key meetings and provide comments at different stages of drafting.
14
 In 
countries with relatively less capacity to undertake the reform, the Bank’s staff and its 
appointed consultants worked directly with local ‘experts’ to draft the  laws.15 This was 
particularly how the Bank worked in reviewing mining laws in African countries.
16
   
Regardless of the extent of the Bank’s involvement in developing countries, all the 
laws enacted as part of the reforms share certain key features. They were specifically 
designed to provide greater incentives and better conditions for foreign investors and eased 
or abolished restrictions on foreign ownership of mining projects.
17
 Of particular relevance, 
they also re-introduced stabilisation clauses into the investment regime of these countries to 
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Fernando Sánchez Albavera, Georgina Ortiz and Nicole Moussa, Mining in Latin America in the 1990s 
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legal reforms in the oil and gas sector see William T Onorato, ‘Legislative Framework used to Foster 
Petroleum Development’ (1995) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1420, 
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lock up these policy changes. What follows is a discussion of how stabilisation clauses 
became re-introduced as a result of the reforms.    
4.2.2 Stabilisation Clauses as a Direct Outcome of the Reforms   
Prior to, and in the course of the reforms, stabilisation clauses were heavily promoted 
by the World Bank as an ‘essential’ requirement of an investment regime that is attractive to 
foreign investors.
18
 It was therefore a key component of the legislative reforms it proposed to 
developing countries. For example, the reforms proposed by the Bank for the mining sector 
in African countries were published by the Bank in Strategy for African Mining.
19
 In it, the 
Bank argued that investors require competitive terms and conditions, together with ‘iron clad 
assurances that the investment environment will be stable and that the “rules of the game” 
will not change.’20 It therefore recommended for itself and donors to give ‘specific 
assistance’ to African governments to update their mining, investment and tax legislation 
and regulations and to privatise the mining sector.
21
  
In line with this recommendation, the World Bank variously advanced Mining Sector 
Technical Assistance Credits to several African countries to reform their mining sector in 
accordance with the proposal contained in the document.
22
 In other words, receiving the 
technical assistance from the World Bank, and indeed other forms of support was based 
upon accepting to implement reforms as proposed by the Bank. For example, one condition 
attached to the technical assistance to Tanzania to reform its mining sector was for it to 
establish a ‘legal, regulatory and fiscal framework conducive to private mining 
investment.’23 Given that the Bank had already determined that a stabilisation clause is an 
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‘essential’ feature of a conducive investment climate, the implication was that Tanzania must 
include it in their laws if they were to continue to receive assistance from the Bank.     
A similar approach was taken in the mining sector in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.
24
 Here, a ‘stable and equitable’ tax regime that gave investors assurances that 
taxes will not change was emphasised as a key outcome of the legal reforms to be supported 
by the Bank.
25
 This, the document argued, was because investors needed to be assured that 
the taxes upon which they based their economic evaluation would not change significantly in 
the course of the project.
26
 ‘Stabilization agreements’ were therefore recommended as a 
‘priority requirement’ to grant ‘explicit guarantees’ to investors.27 The use of stabilisation 
agreements by the early ‘reformers’ (Chile and Peru) was cited as examples of good 
practice.
28
 Thus, similar to its approach in Africa, the ‘reforming’ countries in the region 
were supported with loans and technical assistance by the Bank to enact new mining laws or 
amend existing ones.
29
 The use of Legal Stability Agreements in several Latin America 
countries is a direct outcome of this process.
30
 
The World Bank also followed a similar approach to actively influence the re-
introduction of stabilisation clauses in the oil and gas sectors of developing countries in the 
1990s. In articulating its proposal for reform in this sector, the Bank identified stabilisation 
clauses as one of the ‘essential elements of legislative frameworks to attract FDI.’31 It 
therefore recommended that stabilisation clauses be included in legislation and model 
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contracts so that the investor should be ‘secured where possible from the adverse economic 
effects of certain new statutes, regulations and laws.’32 As a result, the laws and model 
contracts drafted with the loans and technical assistance provided or executed by the Bank 
re-introduced stabilisation clauses into the oil and gas sector in developing countries.  
For example, the introduction of stabilisation clauses in Vietnam’s oil industry was 
facilitated through an Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme.
33
 The project 
involved a review of the country’s petroleum laws by the World Bank. In line with the 
already articulated position of the Bank, ‘Fiscal stabilization’ was recommended as an 
essential element to be included in the law.
34
 Consequently, a full economic equilibrium 
clause was added to the country’s petroleum law.35  
It is important to mention that the language used to justify and recommend the clause 
to Vietnam was copied almost verbatim from a World Bank document produced five years 
earlier.
36
 In other words, a one-size-fits-all approach was taken. This suggests that an 
analysis of whether or not the specific circumstances of Vietnam makes stabilisation clauses 
necessary, and the potential adverse effect the clause may have on the country’s 
development objectives may not have been undertaken.  
The active role played by the World Bank in the comeback of stabilisation clauses is 
also illustrated in the model Production Sharing Agreements(PSAs) developed by the Bank 
for use in post-Soviet states in the 1990s.  As pointed out by several commentators, these 
breeds of PSAs were first used in the 1980s.
37
 However, they were strongly pushed by the 
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World Bank for use in the former Soviet states during the 1990s as part of the reforms.
38
 
Consequently, these breeds of PSAs are now commonly referred to as the ‘World Bank 
model.’39 A key feature of the ‘World Bank model’ PSA is the inclusion of stabilisation 
clauses locking in the terms for the duration of the contract.
40
 For example, in Azerbaijan, a 
total of 21 PSAs were signed under a 1995 Petroleum Technical Assistance Project by the 
World Bank to assist the Azeri government in restructuring the State owned oil company.
41
 
Several of these PSAs are now publicly available and they all contain stringent stabilisation 
clauses.
42
  
The foregoing discussion highlights the key role played by the World Bank in the 
comeback of stabilisation clauses in developing countries from the 1990s. The context in 
which the clauses were re-introduced has, however, received little attention amongst 
commentators writing from a legal perspective. Yet as Charles Calomiris argues:  
 
Throughout history, financial collapses have been defining moments for public 
policy. Crises promote action, embodied in new financial institutions or policy 
doctrines. The motives that underlie such policies are sometimes short-sighted - 
driven by short-run pressures rather than long-run principles - and it is easier to 
                                                                                                                                  
Companies and the Contract Dispute over Kashagan, The World’s Largest Undeveloped Oilfield (PLATFORM 
2007) 4. 
38
 Kennedy and Nurmakov (n 37) 5; Muttitt (n 37) 4. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Kennedy and Nurmakov (n 37) 5; Mutitt (n 37) 12 and 17. 
41
 World Bank, ‘Implementation Completion Report on a Credit in the Amount Of Sdr 14.3 Million (Us$20.8 
Million Equivalent) to the Azerbaijan Republic for a Petroleum Technical Assistance Project (31 May 2001) 3 
<http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/07/06/000094946_01062604045124/
Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf> accessed 13 September 2012. 
42
 Some of the PSAs were subsequently published by BP. See BP Caspian ‘Legal Agreements’ 
<http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9029334&contentId=7053632> accessed 13 
September 2012. 
  
92 
 
enact unwise policy in the midst of crises than to reverse course after the crisis 
has passed, after policies become embodied in institutions or statutes.
43
 
 
The next section examines the economic rationale used to recommend the re-introduction of 
stabilisation clauses to developing countries to determine whether it can be regarded as valid, 
or whether, as argued by Calomiris, it was just a ‘short-sighted’ policy recommendation that 
easily found its way again into the statute books because of the financial crisis and due to 
pressure from the World Bank.          
4.2.3 The Economic Case for the Re-introduction of Stabilisation Clauses 
For several reasons, the World Bank’s Strategy for Mining in Africa provides a good 
case study for an inquiry into what, if any, was the economic rationale underlying the re-
introduction and acceptance of stabilisation clauses into developing countries.
44
 First, 
stabilisation clauses were re-introduced in all the Mining Codes or model agreements in 
Africa that were enacted or developed as part of the World Bank reforms. Furthermore, 
several empirical studies have confirmed that stabilisation clauses are prevalent, and in their 
broadest forms, in the mining sector of sub-Saharan Africa.
45
 Second, it is in this document 
that the World Bank articulated the rationale for, and its approach to, mining regime reform 
in Africa. This is why the Bank specifically addressed it to ‘government officials, donors, 
academics, the development community at large and the investors themselves.’46  
In addition, the report claims to outline regulatory and fiscal arrangements designed 
to reconcile the profitability objectives of investors and the revenue objectives of 
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government.
47
 It also acknowledged that the major benefits most developing countries will 
derive from their mineral resources are tax revenues and foreign exchange receipts.
48
 For this 
reason, it notes: ‘successful integration of mining policy with overall economic policy is 
important.’49 With this knowledge, the document recommended that stabilisation clauses 
should be used to protect investors from changes in host states’ laws, and in particular, fiscal 
laws. This implies that the link between the clause and the ‘overall economic policy’ of the 
countries including their tax revenues was given due consideration in the report. For the 
above reasons, the enquiry into the economic rationale underlying the push for stabilisation 
clauses by the World Bank will focus on this document.   
The closest economic justification for the clause found in the document was the link 
between the clause and the rate of risk premiums.
50
  According to the Bank, investors pay 
higher risk premiums for investment projects in developing countries due to perceived higher 
political risks.
51
 Specifically, it noted that the average return on equity required or targeted is 
25 to 30 per cent with a payback of two to four years for developing countries, while that of 
developed countries is a lower rate of 20 per cent for a longer payback period of five to six 
years.
52
 For this reason, the Bank argued that governments of developing countries can 
increase their share of rents by making their investment environment less risky, thereby 
lowering risk premiums.
53
 
It is admitted that there is some merit in this argument. However, for stabilisation 
clauses to be useful to developing countries in this sense, the cost to the government in terms 
of foregone future tax revenue must be less than the cost to the government in terms of the 
higher risk premiums paid by investors. Yet, there is nowhere in the report where the Bank 
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made any attempt to undertake this analysis. Also, the report did not state or explain that 
granting stabilisation clauses was the only way to make the investment environment less 
risky. On the contrary, it noted that governments can make the investment environment less 
risky by establishing ‘clear mining development strategies and sound institutional structures 
and capabilities and by emphasizing earnings – related taxes rather than royalties.’54 The 
question therefore is: How then did the report end up recommending stabilisation clauses for 
every African country? Thankfully, the answer to this question is provided in the report 
itself. 
Prior to determining the content of its mining reform agenda in the 1980s, the World 
Bank conducted a survey among potential investors to better understand their ‘concerns and 
prerequisites.’55 In particular, the survey sought to discover the factors that influence their 
investment decisions in developing countries. It is worth mentioning that this survey was 
sent to 80 international mining companies, but only 46 responded to at least some of the 
survey questions.
56
 Investors that responded overwhelmingly agreed that the primary criteria 
influencing their investment decisions are mineral potential and infrastructure.
57
 In 
particular, two–thirds of respondents were ‘willing to be among the first foreign companies’ 
to invest in developing countries if there are good prospects in terms of mineral potential.
58
 
The next essential pre-condition mentioned by respondents is ‘a guarantee of mining rights 
before starting exploration.’59 A ‘well established mining code, contractual stability, a 
guaranteed fiscal regime, profit repatriation and access to foreign exchange’ then appear as 
‘critical factors.’60  
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While potential investors reached consensus on the above issues, they differed on the 
degree of importance of certain factors. On the issue of stability, there were important 
differences according to the size and nationality of the companies that responded to the 
survey. The responses of medium-sized companies, which were mostly American and 
Canadian, were most varied. However, in general, large mining companies preferred to 
operate under an established mining code rather than negotiate special provisions.
61
 On the 
other hand, small companies were more particularly concerned with fiscal stability and 
preferred the involvement of multilateral organisations such as the World Bank.
62
 This 
concern for fiscal stability was found to be particularly acute among European companies 
and they were also the most prepared to negotiate one-off contracts.
63
  
When the above responses are read together, a conclusion that can be drawn is that 
stabilisation clauses were more of a concern to small companies from European countries. 
Conversely, medium and large-sized companies especially those outside of Europe were 
relatively less concerned about stability guarantees. As such, they were willing to invest in 
developing countries once the geological potential and infrastructure were in place. In this 
scenario, it is difficult to see how the Bank could conclude in the report that stabilisation 
clauses were essential to attract FDI into the mining sector in Africa. The responses to the 
Bank’s survey do not support such sweeping conclusion even if one were to ignore the fact 
that just over half of international mining companies bothered to respond to the survey.    
The survey was however not the only plank upon which the Bank’s recommendation 
was based. Reliance was also placed on case studies from five developing countries, namely 
Botswana, Chile, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and Ghana.
64
 According to the World Bank, 
these countries demonstrate the ‘characteristics of an environment conducive to 
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investment.’65 A review of the case studies showed that the stabilisation practices of each of 
these countries varied significantly at the time.  
Papua New Guinea did not offer any stability guarantees.
66
 In Chile, the 1974 
Foreign Investment Law DL 600 allowed investors to opt for a stability agreement fixing the 
fiscal regime applicable to the investment for a period of ten years in exchange for paying a 
higher tax rate.
67
 In Indonesia, the Contracts of Work (CoW) entered between the 
government and investors contained stabilisation clauses protecting investors from adverse 
changes in the fiscal laws.
68
 In Ghana and Botswana, earlier mining laws gave the Ministers 
responsible for mining wide discretion to negotiate terms to be included in major mining 
projects.
69
 The agreements so negotiated were not published at that time. However, the 
respective Ministers were known to have used their wide discretionary powers to grant 
stabilisation clauses.
70
  
The report noted that all five countries had been successful in attracting FDI to their 
mining sector commensurate with their perceived geological potential and on terms and 
conditions that were generally favourable to them.
71
 Chile and Papua New Guinea were 
referred to as ‘outstanding successes.’72 The document did not go further to explain what 
role, if any, stabilisation clauses may have played in these successes. What is however 
known is that the ‘outstanding’ success of Papua New Guinea has nothing to do with 
stabilisation clauses as the country did not offer the clauses at the time. For the other 
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countries, subsequent World Bank documents suggest that the role, if any, that stabilisation 
clauses played is secondary. 
 For example, in Chile, a subsequent World Bank report admitted that an increasing 
number of mining investments in Chile were already being made without stability 
agreements from the mid-1990s – the same period the Strategy for Africa Mining was 
published.
73
 In the case of Indonesia, Ghana and Botswana, another World Bank document 
noted that they were successful ‘primarily’ because all three had ‘very attractive  geology,  
implemented  sound macroeconomic  policies,  and  their  respective mining  laws  were  
reasonably  administered.’74  
Contrary to these findings and the varied responses of investors to the World Bank’s 
survey, stabilisation clauses were eventually presented in the report as a key requirement of 
investors and one that should be included in proposed mining laws and Investment 
Agreements.
75
 This recommendation was rationalised on the ground that investors require 
‘iron clad assurances that the investment environment will be stable and that the ‘rules of the 
game; will not change.’76 No explanation was given, for example, as to why these countries 
should adopt stabilisation clauses when Papua New Guinea achieved ‘outstanding successes’ 
without granting the clause. Rather, the recommendation appears to be based merely on the 
views expressed by some of the investors surveyed by the Bank that they required 
stabilisation clauses. If this is an acceptable rationale for introducing stabilisation clauses in 
a country, then every country, developing or not, should be granting stabilisation clauses 
because as was seen in the last chapter, investors prefer and do request stability guarantees 
wherever possible.
77
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One must therefore agree with critics who argue that the reforms were introduced 
from a perspective that privileged the interests of foreign investors.
78
 As such, incentives and 
guarantees to attract potential investors were favoured without due consideration of how they 
might affect the wider development objectives of these countries.
79
 This, as Bonnie 
Campbell argues, explains why the Bank conducted a survey with foreign investors but 
conducted no similar consultations with local actors.
80
 It also explains why little or no effort 
was made to link the concerns of investors expressed in the survey with the broader concerns 
regarding the contribution of the mining sector to national or regional macroeconomic 
strategies.
81
  
Consequently, while the Bank recommended stabilisation clauses to deal with the 
concerns expressed by investors, the report did not consider the potential negative effect of 
the clause on host states. This omission is glaring as developing countries had previously 
rejected the older (and often narrower) forms of stabilisation clauses due to their claimed 
effect on the sovereign power to legislate.
82
 The inability to consider the effect of re-
introducing the clause on host states does however conform to the stated objective of the 
Bank’s agenda as contained in the report. The report makes it clear that ‘the main objective 
of the bank’s intervention in African mining – whether through technical assistance or 
investment financing – should be to facilitate private investment and help reduce the country 
– and project –related risks for the private investors.’83  
It is beyond dispute that the Banks ‘main objective’ was achieved as the reforms led 
to the opening up of the extractive sectors of several developing countries to foreign 
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investors and the enactment of foreign investors-friendly laws. However, it is also beyond 
dispute that the increase in mining levels has failed to equate with better development 
outcomes for these countries. Not surprisingly, the fact that these countries granted 
excessively generous incentives locked in with stabilisation clauses is often cited as a key 
factor in the inability of these countries to benefit from increased FDI.
84
  
For example, in Ghana, the enactment of the 1986 Mining Code led to increased FDI 
into the country’s mining sector.85 Yet, for the two decades that the Code was in operation, 
the increased FDI did not translate into national economic development.
86
 Several studies 
have attributed this to the excessive capital allowances, exceptions, and tax concessions that 
were granted under the World Bank reforms.
87 
It is for this reason that, as will be discussed 
in more detail later, Ghana is among the many countries currently reviewing stability 
agreements.
88
  
As will also be discussed in more detail below, in some of these countries, even 
World Bank documents now acknowledge that the generous incentives and stabilisation 
clauses introduced during the reforms have contributed significantly to their inability to 
benefit from the increased FDI.
89
 This reinforces the argument being made here, that from 
the perspective of host states, there was little economic rationale for the re-introduction of 
stabilisation clauses in the 1990s. This however raises a further question. Why did the 
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governments agree to the World Bank’s recommendation to introduce the clauses into their 
statute books despite the seeming absence of a convincing economic rationale for it? A 
possible reason for this is considered below.  
4.2.4 Stabilising under the Shadow of the World Bank 
Several commentators writing from a legal perspective have highlighted the role 
financial institutions play in the requests for stabilisation clauses in developing countries.
90
 
They note that lenders and political risk insurers often push for stabilisation clauses to be 
included in the agreements governing projects they intend to fund.
91
 This, they argue, is 
because these financial institutions fear that new laws may reduce or damage the commercial 
viability of the project or negatively affect the repayments of loans.
92
 Such analyses often 
tend to focus on private financial institutions. However, in practice, the World Bank can be 
included in the list of financial institutions that may be affected by adverse changes in the 
law for several reasons.  
First, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which is the private sector arm of 
the World Bank, funds projects in developing countries in association with private investors 
‘without guarantee of repayment by the member government concerned, in cases where 
sufficient private capital is not available on reasonable terms.’93 Secondly, the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), also a member of the World Bank Group, issues 
guarantees for non-commercial risks in respect of FDI in member countries.
94
 The World 
Bank Group therefore has a legitimate reason to be concerned with legal mechanisms, such 
as stabilisation clauses, which mitigate the political risks of projects that are financially 
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supported by the IFC and MIGA as any change in the law which adversely affect such 
projects will also adversely affect them. 
At the same time, the World Bank has another unique role in developing countries. 
The Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the 
International Development Association (IDA) provide loans and grants (soft loans) 
respectively to developing countries where these countries are unable to obtain conventional 
loans on terms that are ‘reasonable.’95 In addition, the IDA provides grants to developing 
countries in risk of debt distress.
96
 As such, many developing countries turn to the World 
Bank for the servicing of their debts during periods of financial crisis.
97
 This role is 
enhanced by the Bank’s close relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
which has been increasingly playing the role of an international ‘lender of last resort.’98 As 
such, as one commentator notes, ‘mistreating the IMF’s sister institution is tantamount to 
jeopardizing access to your lifeline in the next storm.’99  
Furthermore, the Bank through the IDA also serves as a ‘donor of last resort’ to many 
developing countries.
100
 In line with the role, the IDA is the largest source of assistance for 
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these countries as well as the single largest source of donor funds for basic social services.
101
 
This role is further enhanced by the fact that aside from disbursing its own funds, the World 
Bank sometimes acts as an executing agency for projects being financed by other external 
donors.
102
 For example, the Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme, which 
provides technical assistance to developing countries, is co-sponsored by the UNDP and 12 
developed countries.
103
 However, the day–to–day execution of the programme is 
administered by the World Bank.
104
  
Based on the role of the Bank as described above, the Bank can influence policies in 
these countries through the conditions it attaches to the financial assistance it gives and as 
explained previously, had used this role to influence the contents of the legislation enacted 
during the reform period.
105
 This much was acknowledged by the Bank in a 1995 
publication: 
 
The Bank then started to condition its lending upon the adoption or 
implementation by the borrowing governments of certain laws or regulations 
that reflected the policies agreed upon with the Bank. In this process, the Bank 
comments on the proposed laws and regulations or amendments thereto 
prepared by the governments of the borrowing members to ensure that they 
conform to the objectives of the economic policy changes agreed upon with 
the Bank. Over the years, legal conditionality in adjustment loans has become 
more specific and frequent….Structural or sectoral adjustment conditionality 
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proved to be an effective way for the Bank to encourage its borrowing 
members to introduce necessary changes to their legal framework.
106
 
 
As stabilisation clauses had already been determined by the Bank to be ‘essential’, their 
inclusion, in addition to other investor friendly terms proposed by the Bank, became a 
condition for continued financial assistance from the Bank.
107
  
For example, in the 1990s, Zambia came under enormous pressure from the World 
Bank and the IMF to ‘quickly’ privatise its copper mines as part of economic reforms to 
restore macro stability.
108
 However, due to the strategic role of the mines in the country’s 
national development, the government was reluctant to privatise and kept postponing the 
date of the privatisation.
109
 Eventually, the Bank, the IMF and other donors made the 
privatisation of the mines a condition that Zambia must fulfil to continue to receive loans 
and other forms of support.
110 
In particular, the privatisation was made a pre-condition for 
Zambia to qualify for debt relief through the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
initiative.
111
 By 1999, following the continued reluctance of the government to privatise, 
major donors withheld some $530 million in aid to the country.
112
  
Eventually, the government was left with no choice but to proceed with the 
privatisation despite domestic concerns. As the then finance minister explains: ‘We were 
told by the IMF and the World Bank, that if we privatised we would be able to access debt 
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relief, and this was a huge carrot in front of us – like waving medicine in front of a dying 
woman. We had no option but to go ahead.’113 As a result of this scenario, the government 
was left with little choice than to sell the mines for prices known at that time to be less 
favourable to the country.
114
 The reason for this was that the investors, on realising that the 
sale of the mines had moved from just a market proposition to a precondition, pushed for, 
and succeeded in getting prices lower that what had been previously offered.
115
  
Consequently, the mines were privatised based on the provisions of the Mines and 
Minerals Act 1995 which had been enacted in line with the reforms proposed by the Bank 
and the IMF.
116
 Apart from providing for generous incentives and exemptions, the Act 
contained provisions authorising the mining Minister to include stabilisation clauses in 
MDAs with investors.
117
 It was pursuant to these provisions that MDAs were entered into 
with foreign investors for the privatised mines through negotiations brokered by the World 
Bank and the IMF.
118
 The exact terms of these MDAs were kept secret at that time. 
However, it later emerged they all contained stabilisation clauses exempting the investors 
from changes in the law for between 15 and 20 years.
119
 
 Another example can be cited from Madagascar. In 1996, the World Bank and the 
IMF made continued financial support conditional upon the country agreeing to implement 
the Bank’s proposed reforms in its mining sector.120 As a result, the country had to undertake 
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the reforms as determined by the World Bank. As the Bank acknowledged, it was the ‘leader 
of the policy dialogue’ in the reform process and used this role to ‘help’ the government 
undertake institutional and legal reform.
121
 The Mining Code of 1999, and the 2001 Law on 
Large-scale Investments are listed by the Bank as ‘outcomes achieved’ by the project.122 
This was in addition to the ‘Establishment Agreement’ for the Ilmenite Mining Project 
which the Bank had earlier brokered.
123
 Unsurprisingly, the Code, the Law and the 
Establishment Agreement all contained stringent stabilisation clauses exempting investors 
from all adverse changes in the law but specifically allowing them to benefit from favourable 
changes.
124
  
As mentioned earlier, recent studies, including those commissioned by the Bank, 
have confirmed that the contributions of mining to the economic development of most 
developing countries have remained low by international standards as a result of the 
significant fiscal incentives and guarantees given away as part of the reforms.
125
 The Bank 
however continues to benefit from these incentives and guarantees as they were included in 
several projects which the IFC and MIGA financially supported during and immediately 
after the reforms.
126
 In other words, on the one hand, stabilisation clauses were pushed by the 
Bank using its influential role as a lender and donor of last resort to developing countries 
through the IDA and the IBRD. Meanwhile, on the other hand, the Bank also benefits from 
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the protections offered by the clause in its capacity as a financier of projects containing the 
clause through IFC and MIGA.  
The foregoing highlights the key role played by the World Bank in the return of 
stabilisation clauses to developing countries from the late 1980s. However, this role has 
received little attention amongst commentators writing from a legal perspective. In tracing 
the return of stabilisation clauses, it is common for legal scholars to place the responsibility 
for the re-introduction of the clause solely on host governments. For example, in explaining 
the ‘unexpected comeback’ of stabilisation clauses, Thomas Wälde and George Ndi noted 
that the scramble for FDI at that time meant that several countries (especially high-risk 
transition economies) went to ‘considerable length to fashion their investment regime to 
respond to foreign investor concerns.’127 This, they argued, led to the re-emergence of 
‘promises not to alter a given legislative regime.’128  
From a strictly legal perspective, the above view is understandable. This is because 
while World Bank staff actively participated in the process and in several cases prepared the 
draft laws that re-introduced stabilisation clauses, the sovereign power to enact them into law 
rests with governments. However, such a view ignores the important political economy 
context within which these reforms were undertaken. It is therefore not surprising that 
commentators writing from a political economy perspective take a significantly different 
view by recognising the unique bargaining power the Bank had over the countries that 
underwent the reforms.
129
 Consequently, they often place a larger part of the responsibility 
for the outcome of the reforms, including the stabilisation clauses, on the World Bank and 
other donors.
130
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Even when legal commentators do acknowledge, or at least allude to, the fact that 
host governments may have been pressured to accept stabilisation clauses, this pressure is 
usually attributed to the so–called obsolescing bargaining theory (hereafter ‘OBT’).131 The 
main thesis of this theory is that foreign investors have stronger bargaining power at the 
initial stage of investment but relative bargaining power shifts to the host government over 
time as investment projects become profitable.
132
 For example, Wälde and Ndi later 
conceded that sometimes the word ‘extracted’ rather than ‘obtained’ may be a ‘more correct 
description’ of the way in which foreign investors came to benefit from stabilisation 
clauses.
133
 However, they, like most legal commentators, still relied on the OBT to conclude 
that the foreign investors were able to ‘extract’ the stabilisation guarantees because of their 
stronger bargaining power at the initial stage.
134
 This is not a view shared in this thesis.  
The discussion on the process leading to the re-introduction of stabilisation clauses 
shows that in many of these countries, the clauses were introduced mainly together with 
legislation that eased or completely removed the restrictions on FDI. The clauses were thus 
part of the legal framework governing FDI before these countries began formal negotiations 
with foreign investors thereby making the OBT significantly less relevant. Support for the 
above position can be found in the views of business/management scholars who developed 
the theory in the first place.
135
 The widely held view amongst these scholars is that OBT has 
largely outlived its usefulness, at least since the 1990s.
136
 According to this view, OBT is 
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now less useful because only a small amount of bargaining takes place as a result of the 
removal, by many governments, of the restrictions placed on FDI.
137
  
The view that the re-introduction of stabilisation clauses has more to do with the 
World Bank than with OBT is further reinforced by a new approach whereby investors 
persuade multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank, to support their projects in 
developing countries.
138
 This approach was used in several projects including the cross-
border West Africa Gas Pipeline project (hereafter ‘WAGP’), the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(hereafter ‘BTC’) oil pipeline project and the Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Projects.139  
In all three projects, the investors specifically requested that the World Bank be 
involved. As Stephen Arbogast noted with particular reference to the Chad-Cameroon 
project, the request by the investors was not because of ‘some sudden oil industry funding 
crises.’140 Rather, it was a deliberate decision by the investors to use the Bank’s influence to 
mitigate the perceived political risks of the projects.
141
 These requests were made at the 
initial stages of the projects when, if OBT were correct, the investors possessed strong 
enough bargaining powers to extract stabilisation guarantees to mitigate these risks. Yet, 
they rather relied on the World Bank’s ‘unique status’ in developing countries that ensures 
that their governments will be ‘highly reluctant to offend’ the Bank and as such will ‘tread 
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carefully’ with the investors.142 In other words, the investors needed the stronger bargaining 
power of the World Bank to mitigate the political risks of the projects. 
Ultimately, in all three cases, the Bank acceded to the requests of the investors and 
provided financial and political guarantees for the project.
143
 It also actively participated in 
the formulation of the legal and regulatory framework governing these projects.
144
 The result 
was the inclusion of some of the most stringent, complex and extensive stabilisation clauses 
seen in this study, in the legal arrangements governing these projects.
145
 As the Bank itself 
acknowledges, its involvement in such transactions is seen by investors as a ‘stabilizing 
factor’ because of the Bank’s ‘long term relationship’ with developing countries.146 This 
view is consistent with the argument that stabilisation clauses were re-introduced during the 
reforms largely as a result of the ‘stronger bargaining power’ possessed by the World Bank 
(as opposed to investors) over developing countries. Accordingly, this thesis rejects any view 
that seeks to explain the acceptance of stabilisation clauses solely in terms of an obsolescing 
bargain between investors and host states.  
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4.3 CONTRACTING UNDER A DARK CLOUD 
The previous section showed that stabilisation clauses were proposed in a uniform 
manner by the World Bank, at least within specific sectors. Yet, chapter 3 showed wide 
inconsistency in stabilisation practices among nations and sometimes within a country. This 
suggests that other reasons, apart from pressure from the World Bank also influence 
stabilisation practices. This part of the current chapter discusses a possible reason for this. It 
will argue that there is increasing evidence that corruption and transparency in the 
contracting process play a significant role in the disparity in stabilisation practices among 
countries.
147
  
4.3.1 Corruption and Transparency in the Extractive Industry in Developing 
Countries. 
First, the point needs be made that there is no precise and universally accepted 
definition of corruption due to the difficulty in formulating one that can apply to all forms of 
corruption in every jurisdiction.
148
 However, for the purposes of this work, corruption refers 
to ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’, in line with the working definition used by 
Transparency International (TI).
149
  
The term ‘transparency’ also does not have a precise definition. However, for the 
purposes of this work, it refers to the democratic practice of opening up government 
information and decision-making processes to scrutiny by citizens.
150
 Thus with particular 
reference to the extractive industry, transparency will require the establishment of clear and 
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consistent criteria for the grant of hydrocarbon licences and a public and competitive bidding 
process.
 
Furthermore, it requires that the contracting process should be one that is open and 
allows citizens to participate and that the final terms of the contract and information on 
revenue derived, or to be derived, are all made accessible to the public.
151
  
The point also needs to be made that, generally, the laws and regulations governing 
the extractive industry in most developing countries are public documents. It is the contracts 
made pursuant to these laws and the process of arriving at these contracts that are often 
shrouded in secrecy. This lack of transparency and the corrupt practices (both real and 
perceived) that it engenders are already well documented.
152
 Their effects on the sustainable 
development of these countries have also been well covered in the literature.
153 
However, it 
is useful to summarise these issues in a way that place them within the context of the present 
discussion. 
From the perspective of host governments of developing countries, the rationale for 
attracting FDI is to enable access to the huge financial resources required to fund measures 
to promote sustainable development.
154
 For this reason, since the 1980s developing countries 
have been encouraged and supported to create regulatory frameworks that are attractive and 
conducive for FDI, especially in their mineral resources sector.
155
 It was in this context that 
stabilisation clauses were portrayed as an ‘essential’ tool for attracting investment.156  
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Based on the above, in theory, developing countries accept stabilisation clauses in 
order to attract FDI to facilitate their sustainable development. This theory however diverges 
dramatically from the socio-economic reality in many resource-rich developing countries. 
While many of them may have attracted FDI as a result of creating an ‘attractive and 
conducive’ investment climate, the FDI so attracted has yet to significantly promote their 
sustainable development. Rather, ‘many countries home to great resource wealth are also 
home to some of the world’s poorest communities.’157 This is particularly the case in sub-
Sahara Africa where, interestingly, the most stringent stabilisation clauses are often found.  
Commentators agree that corruption is the main reason for the above state of 
affairs.
158
 The extractive industry of many resource-rich developing countries is particularly 
vulnerable to corruption. This is because the high commercial value of such resources makes 
them a key target for acts of misappropriation, corruption and plundering. This is in addition 
to the fact that the bulk of FDI into such countries is directed towards projects in this 
sector.
159
 Corruption thus manifests itself not only during the flow and allocation of revenues 
accruing from natural resources, but also during the negotiation of contracts and licenses. 
Indeed, numerous studies into the process of negotiating natural resource contracts in 
developing countries have highlighted how the often opaque nature of the process creates 
enough room for corruption and enables government officials to act in their own personal 
interest rather than in the economic interest of the state.
160
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It is for the above reasons that initiatives such as the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) have been launched.
161
 Through this initiative, and in addition 
to the work of other NGOs and bodies, some of the most guarded investment contracts have 
been made public.
162
 When this happens, the economic and legal analyses of the contracts 
often show that the balance of such contracts is strikingly tilted towards foreign investors.
163
 
This strengthens the perception that the contracts may have been negotiated in secret, and 
their terms kept secret in order to hide corruption. This perception is in turn strengthened by 
the findings from a recent study confirming that confidentiality clauses in contracts are often 
used as a means of hiding corruption rather than protecting trade secrets.
164
 There is thus 
strong support for the view that the eventual terms and conditions of natural resource 
contracts in many developing countries are significantly being influenced by corruption and 
lack of transparency. The possible effect of this on stabilisation practices in these countries is 
considered next. 
4.3.2 Corruption, Transparency and Stabilisation Clauses  
It is acknowledged that an analysis of the rationale behind the grant of stabilisation 
clauses should start from a presumption that all parties have acted legally, honestly and in 
good faith. However, it is also true that many of the contracts containing stabilisation clauses 
have been negotiated under the opaque circumstances described above. The particularly 
generous terms seen in the contracts when they are eventually exposed are difficult to 
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understand without assumptions of some degree of corruption. As Peter Rosenblum and 
Susan Maples observed, ‘inexplicable giveaways and major asymmetries in contracts, while 
they may simply be due to a lack of capacity of the negotiators, could also point to official 
misconduct resulting from corruption.’165  
The circumstances in which most of these contracts have been entered into, and 
subsequent events and revelations about the contracts and the regimes involved, suggest that 
more often than not, the reason for such ‘inexplicable giveaways’ may be corruption rather 
than incompetence. For example, commentators agree that while the background of the so 
called ‘Arab Spring’ may be diverse, the public outcry was largely directed against the 
wide–scale corruption and lack of accountability in these countries.166 The ‘Arab Spring’ 
also drew attention to the corruption perpetuated by some of the regimes, and an estimate of 
the massive funds with which they have corruptly enriched themselves has been provided by 
Transparency International.
167
 The list includes the four countries where their leaders have 
so far been ousted, namely, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen.  
These countries also shared another characteristic under their ousted regimes. They 
all offered stabilisation clauses in their natural resources sectors, the scope of which have 
been variously described as ‘comprehensive’, ‘considerable’, and ‘rather extensive’168 The 
ouster of these regimes has now opened these contracts to scrutiny and in some of these 
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countries the contracts are currently being reviewed amidst suspicion that the excessively 
favourable terms found in them may have been influenced by corruption.  
In Libya, for example, a committee has been set up to investigate oil contracts 
entered into by the previous regime and to end, amend or renegotiate such contracts if 
corruption is identified.
169
 At the same time, several of these companies are also being 
investigated by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (hereafter ‘US SEC’) over 
‘certain illicit payments to Libyan officials’ that may have violated the US Foreign 
Corruption Practice Act.
170
  
In such scenarios, it is difficult to isolate the ‘rather extensive’ stabilisation clauses 
contained in these contracts from the corrupt allegations surrounding the contracting process. 
As such, the presumption that stabilisation clauses have been accepted because of a desire to 
attract FDI for the benefit of these countries must be set aside. This should particularly be 
the case if a stated aim of the research is to proffer solutions to identified negative effects of 
the clauses as is the case with this work. Indeed, the study by Andrea Shemberg alluded to 
this point when it called for additional research to look into the improvement of the 
‘enabling environment’ for ‘good’ agreements.171 This additional research, the report 
recommended, should ‘in particular consider the effect of corruption, lack of transparency 
and non-competitive tendering and procurement process on the eventual form of HGAs.’172 
It is for the above reasons that this section seeks to examine the possible effects of 
corruption and lack of transparency on stabilisation practice in developing countries. 
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However, before proceeding, some caveats are necessary. First, by its nature, corruption 
largely takes place under opaque circumstances and is thus difficult to measure. As 
explained by Adam Graycar, this is because ‘the normal empirical tools of measurement are 
not always useful, as significant transactions are hidden and not reported, and any survey is 
unlikely to elicit a valid and reliable response.’173 For this reason, he notes that those who 
study corruption often do so through ‘desk reviews, surveys, focus groups, case studies, field 
observations, and professional assessments.’174 As such, he concludes that the results so 
obtained may apply to a specific study rather than an overall assessment.
175
  
Second, even in cases where there is a widespread perception or confirmed cases of 
corruption in a contractual process, it is hardly the case that the corruption can be linked to 
specific term(s) in the contract. What is, however, known is that corrupt payments are 
usually given by investors in exchange for favourable treatment and to obtain special favours 
from officials of host states.
176
 In this sense, a stabilisation clause can be seen as a special 
favour as it provides an additional guarantee of the stability of contractual terms. This is why 
in countries where stabilisation practice is relatively more transparent, investors wishing to 
obtain this ‘favour’ must furnish some consideration either in the form of the payment of a 
premium or agree to be subject to a higher tax rate.
177
  
Furthermore, from an investors’ perspective, stabilisation clauses are arguably the 
most important clause in investor-state agreements.
178
 The reason is simple. The purpose of a 
stabilisation clause is to protect the key terms in these agreements for the benefit of the 
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investors. As such, where there is evidence or widespread allegations that these terms have 
been influenced by corruption, it is difficult to isolate the stabilisation clauses from these 
allegations and evidence.  
Lastly, and based on the reasons already given above on the nature of corruption, and 
the difficulty in measuring it, the findings in this section do not claim  to make an overall 
assessment that stabilisation clauses are always linked to corruption and lack of 
transparency. However, they do highlight an increasing link between corruption, 
transparency and stabilisation clauses which helps to explain, at least in part, the wide 
disparity in stabilisation practices.      
4.3.3 Scope of Stabilisation Clauses and the Reputation of Regimes  
There is an increasing link between the scope of stabilisation clauses granted by a 
country and the reputation of the regimes that granted them. The broadest and most stringent 
forms of stabilisation clauses seen in this study are mostly in contracts or legislation entered 
into or enacted by regimes widely perceived to be corrupt and/or dictatorial. These contracts 
or legislation nearly always contain full freezing or full economic equilibrium clauses or a 
combination of both. In most cases, they have been drafted to protect the investors from 
every imaginable circumstance or event that may negatively affect them even if only 
slightly.  
Such contracts are also often drafted to protect the investors for the entire duration of 
the contract or at least a significantly long period. At the same time, these clauses often 
allow the investors to benefit from favourable changes in law. In most cases, these contracts 
have been negotiated under opaque conditions and the eventual terms kept secret as well. 
The stabilisation clauses only become known when they are leaked by civil society 
groups/NGOs or published by a subsequent government following the adoption of 
transparency initiatives.  
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The link between the scope of stabilisation clauses and the reputation of the regimes 
that granted them appears to hold true whether or not the contracts have been entered into as 
part of the reform process. Thus, regardless of whether these governments have been put 
under pressure from the World Bank, corrupt and/or dictatorial regimes appear more likely 
to grant the most stringent forms of stabilisation clauses. This includes the stabilisation 
clauses in the agreements governing the WAGP, the BTC oil pipeline project and the Chad–
Cameroon oil and pipeline project all of which are well known for their broad scope.  
With respect to the WAGP, there is an International Project Agreement (hereafter 
‘IPA’) which established an ‘Agreed Regime.’179 This ‘Agreed Regime’ is protected by full 
hybrid clauses. The clauses exempt the investors from all changes that may adversely affect 
the Agreed Regime including, court decisions, acts or omissions of the state and its agencies, 
new laws and taxes, and international treaties or similar commitments entered by the state.
180
 
In the event that these laws are made applicable to the investor(s), they are to be restored to 
the ‘same or an economically equivalent position it was or they were in prior to such 
change.’181 If the state fails to do this, the investor(s) must be paid ‘prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation.’182 The stability of the Agreed Regime is further reinforced by full 
hybrid clauses in the Treaty between the respective host governments.
183
  
Similarly, the respective BTC HGAs contain identical combination of detailed and 
complex freezing and economic equilibrium clauses.
184
 The freezing clause provides that no 
law ‘now or hereafter existing’ can ‘limit, abridge or affect adversely the rights’ of the 
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investors ‘or otherwise amend, repeal or take precedence over’ the Project Agreement.185 
The governments also agreed to ‘restore the Economic Equilibrium established under the 
Project Agreements if and to the extent that the Economic Equilibrium is disrupted or 
negatively affected, directly or indirectly, as a result of any change (whether the change is 
specific to the Project or of general application)’ in law ‘(including any Turkish Laws 
regarding Taxes, health, safety and the environment).’186  
The Chad–Cameroon project is also governed by several agreements. However, for 
the purposes of this study, the four key documents are the 1988 Convention Agreement,
187
 
the 2004 Convention Agreement replacing it,
188
 the 1997 COTCO Convention of 
Establishment (COTCO-Cameroon)
189
 and the TOTCO Convention of Establishment 
(TOTCO-Chad).
190
 The stabilisation clauses in these agreements differ in the way in which 
they are drafted.
191
 However, each contains a combination of stringent freezing and 
economic equilibrium clauses protecting the investors for the entire duration of the 
project.
192
 The governments agreed that they ‘shall not modify such legal, tax, customs, and 
exchange control regime in such a way as to adversely affect the rights and obligations’ of 
the investors.
193
 In addition, ‘no legislative, regulatory or administrative measure’, which is 
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contrary to the provisions of the Convention, shall apply to the investors without their prior 
written consent.’194  
Taken together, these three projects contain some of the most stringent, complex and 
extensive stabilisation clauses seen in this study. These clauses have already received 
extensive criticism in the academic literature and the work of NGOs on account of their 
radical and stringent nature and the way in which they might affect the protection of human 
rights.
195
 They were also all granted under opaque circumstances by regimes known to be 
dictatorial and/or widely perceived to be corrupt. At the same time, they were also all 
actively supported by the World Bank amidst intense criticism about the benefits of the 
projects to citizens. The Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline project is particularly illustrative in this 
respect.
196
  
The four agreements containing the stringent stabilisation clauses were signed 
between 1988 and 2004. In the case of Chad, the 1988 Chad Convention was signed by 
former president Hissène Habré who ruled Chad from 1982 until he was deposed in 1990. 
He fled to Senegal in 1990 after committing widespread misappropriations and human rights 
abuses, including political killings and systematic torture.
197
 He was first indicted in 2000 by 
Senegal and in 2005 by Belgium for charges on crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
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torture.
198
 He now faces trial for these offences before a special war-crimes court set up by 
the Senegalese government in 2012 on the orders of the African Union.
199
  
The 1998 TOTCO–Chad and the 2004 Chad Convention were signed by Habré’s 
successor Idriss Déby, who has ruled Chad since 1992 and is also running a dictatorial 
government.
200
 The regime is also well known for perpetrating widespread human rights 
abuses and ‘extensive misuse of public funds.’201 In 2004 when the Chad Convention was 
signed, the country appeared in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 
(hereafter ‘CPI’) 202 for the first time and was ranked as third most corrupt country in the 
world.
203
  
The reputation of the regime in Cameroon was no different. The stabilisation clauses 
in the 1998 COTCO – Cameroon were granted under the regime of Paul Biya who has ruled 
Cameroon since 1982 to date. In 1998 when the Convention was signed, Cameroon was 
listed as the most corrupt country in the world by Transparency International, a position it 
retained the following year.
204
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Based on the antecedents of the regimes in these countries, several local citizens 
together with a number of local and international NGOs called on the World Bank not to 
support the project until issues of corruption, transparency and the impacts of the projects 
were addressed.
205
 They argued that based on the endemic corruption and political repression 
in the country, the project would only generate profits for foreign investors and revenues for 
the corrupt enrichment of the regime and the further repression of the people.
206
 However, 
amidst these protests, the Bank provided the legal and financial support and guarantees 
required to enable the project to proceed. The result was the stringent stabilisation clauses 
described above.  
Subsequent events in Chad have confirmed that the stabilisation clauses were never 
granted because of a desire by the regime to attract FDI for the sustainable development of 
the country.
207
 This is because, under pressure from civil society and NGOs, the World Bank 
pressured the Chadian government to agree to invest at least 70 per cent of the revenue from 
the project on ‘priority programs’ that will facilitate the sustainable development of the 
country.
208
 However, once the project began to generate revenues, and in keeping with the 
antecedents of the regime, the President consistently ignored these arrangements.
209
 The 
revenue was repeatedly diverted for other purposes.
210
 This suggests that contrary to the 
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theoretical rationale for stabilisation clauses, the sustainable development of the country was 
not the reason the stringent stabilisation clauses were granted to ‘attract’ the project.  
By September 2008, even the World Bank was forced to admit that it is ‘evident’ that 
the arrangements to allocate funds for the sustainable development of the country ‘were not 
working.’211 It therefore decided to withdraw its support for the project.212 Significantly, the 
withdrawal only came after the full repayment of the IBRD and the IDA components of the 
loan it had granted to Chad.
213
 As such, as far as IBRD and IDA are concerned, the World 
Bank did not suffer any financial loss. It has also not suffered any significant financial loss 
for the IFC component of its loans as the investors are protected by the stringent stabilisation 
clauses which the Bank helped to broker.
214
      
The stabilisation clauses in the BTC pipeline projects, the WAGP and the Chad-
Cameroon project have received some attention in the literature. However, this should not be 
taken to mean that they are isolated cases where stringent stabilisation clauses have been 
granted by regimes with the reputation of being corrupt and dictatorial. While many mineral 
resources contracts are still kept secret, an increasing number of contracts that have been 
leaked or subsequently published point to a relationship between corruption, lack of 
transparency and stringent stabilisation clauses. A number of examples can be cited to 
illustrate this point.  
The original Mittal Steel MDA granted by the government of Liberia was negotiated 
in secret and its terms kept secret as well.
215
 Its terms and conditions, including the 
stabilisation clauses only came to light after the agreement was leaked by some local 
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citizens.
216
 The agreement contained the following combination of full freezing and 
inconsistency clauses exempting Mittal Steel from all adverse changes in the law but 
allowing it to benefit from favourable changes: 
 
….any modifications that could be made in the future to the Law as in effect on the 
Effective Date shall not apply to the CONCESSIONAIRE and its Associates without 
their prior written consent, but the CONCESSIONAIRE and its Associates may at any 
time elect to be governed by the legal and regulatory provisions resulting from changes 
made at any time in the Law as in effect on the Effective Date. In the event of any 
conflict between this Agreement or the rights, obligations and duties of a Party under 
this Agreement, and any other Law, including administrative rules and procedures and 
matters relating to procedure, and applicable international law, then this Agreement 
shall govern the rights, obligations and duties of the Parties.
217
 
 
The stabilisation clauses were included to protect the terms of the contracts for 
potentially 50 years (initial term of 25 years with the option of renewal for another 25 
years).
218
 It was granted by a transitional government described as ‘notoriously’ and 
‘exceedingly’ corrupt.219 Soon after the transitional government left office, the Dutch 
National Police’s International Corruption Project began an investigation into the 
circumstances surrounding the Mittal deal.
220
 In addition, key members of the transitional 
government including its Chairman were later indicted for corruption during their tenure by 
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an audit undertaken by ECOWAS and are currently undergoing criminal proceedings in 
Liberia.
221
 
  Another example can be cited from the stabilisation clauses in the mining sector of 
Madagascar, established as part of mining sector reforms undertaken with technical 
assistance from the World Bank.
222
 All three of the distinct regimes established by the 
reforms contain stringent stabilisation clauses exempting investors from all new laws but 
allowing them to benefit if the changes are favourable. For example, in the Establishment 
Agreement, the investors, ‘its affiliates and its Shareholders and Employees’ are exempted 
from the adverse effect of any ‘legislative or regulatory decision’ for the entire 40-year 
duration of the Agreement.
223
 Furthermore, in the event that there is an ‘unforeseen 
modification of the economic circumstances which disturbs the economy of the project’ to 
the detriment of the investors, ‘the State shall take appropriate measures to re-establish the 
economic balance thus disturbed.’224 Similar clauses exist in the Mining Code and the Law 
on Large-scale Investment where investors are exempted from all changes in law for 
specified periods (between 8 and 40 forty years) depending on the level of investment.
225
  
It should be stated that the World Bank now describes these stabilisation clauses as 
‘rather rigid’ and ‘demonstrates no room for adjustments for an extended period of time.’226 
These clauses were all granted or enacted into law during the regime of former President 
Didier Ratsiraka, who has been described as ‘nothing more than a dictator, practicing 
nepotism, corruption and power politics.’227 He ruled Madagascar for 23 years making 
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several constitutional changes to increase his powers while engendering corruption.
228
 He 
refused to hand over power even after he was defeated in an election until he was forced into 
exile by an armed rebellion.
229
 He and several of his officials were subsequently tried and 
convicted for corruption or abuse of office.
230
  
Another example can be cited from the stabilisation clauses granted in respect of the 
Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (hereafter ‘NLNG’) project.231 Under these clauses, the 
government commits itself not to amend the fiscal regime governing the project without the 
prior written agreement of the investors.
232
 The investors are further exempted from ‘new 
laws, regulations, taxes duties imposts, or charges of whatever nature which are not 
applicable generally to companies incorporated in Nigeria.’233 In addition, the investors have 
a right to ‘prompt, adequate and effective compensation in the event of expropriation of 
tangible property or property rights or interference with contract rights.’234 The clauses are to 
remain effective ‘so long as the Company or any successor thereto, is in existence and 
carrying on’ its business.235  
The scope of these stabilisation clauses was rightly described as ‘rare’ and 
‘extensive’ at the time they were granted.236 The clauses were granted through a military 
decree signed by General Sani Abacha, who ran a remarkably dictatorial government until 
his death in 1998. His government was characterised by extra-judicial killings, arbitrary 
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imprisonment and draconian legislation.
237
 At the same time, he was also well known for his 
remarkable corruption and was listed in a 2003 report by Transparency International as the 
world's fourth most corrupt leader in recent history.
238
 Almost US$3 billion of his looted 
funds have so far been traced and approximately US$1.3 billion recovered and returned to 
the country.
239
 After his death, he and several of his accomplices were variously indicted for 
bribery and corruption including for accepting bribes to influence the award of contracts for 
the construction of the same NLNG project for which the stabilisation clauses were 
granted.
240
  
Another example can be cited from the Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) signed 
by Kazakhstan during the 1990s. These PSAs were drafted in line with the country’s model 
contracts developed with the support of the World Bank.
241
 For example, the 1997 model 
PSA contained a full freezing clause exempting investors from any ‘amendments and 
additions to legislation which cause a deterioration’ to their financial position.242 It also 
contained a full economic equilibrium clause which ensures that if such amendments and 
additions are applied, then the parties shall meet to ‘introduce such amendments or 
alterations into the contract, which are necessary to restore the economic interest of the 
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parties to their status as of the moment of signing the contracts.’243 In line with these Model 
Contracts, several PSAs signed in the 1990s contained similar stringent stabilisation clauses 
protecting investors from unfavourable current and future laws usually for the entire duration 
of the agreement, which in some cases is up to 40 years.
244
  
The PSAs were negotiated during the World Bank-led reform process but the 
negotiations were carried out under extremely opaque conditions amidst widespread 
suspicion that their terms were being influenced by corruption.
245
 These allegations were 
subsequently confirmed through several legal proceedings in the US and elsewhere.
246
 The 
summary of the indictments in the US which have now led to some convictions is that bribes 
totalling over $80 million were offered on behalf of several oil companies to key officials of 
Kazakhstan including the President and Prime Minister.
247
  
According to the court documents, these bribes helped to facilitate the acquisition of 
six lucrative oil and gas rights.
248
 Of particular relevance, these ‘lucrative’ oil and gas rights 
relate to the projects known to be protected by stringent stabilisation clauses.
249
 The 
indictment noted that the unlawful payments ‘defrauded  the  Government  of  Kazakhstan  
of  funds  to  which  it was entitled  from  oil  transactions,  and  defrauded  the  people  of 
Kazakhstan  of  the  right  to  the  honest  services  of  their  elected and  appointed  
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officials.’250 In other words, the terms and conditions of the contracts, including the 
stabilisation clauses, were a product of dishonest services rendered by the Kazakhstan 
officials. In a related development in Italy, ENI is currently being investigated over 
allegations of corruption in Kazakhstan.
251
 The specific allegation is that ENI gave at least 
$20 million in bribes to a son-in-law of the Kazakh President who helped influence the first 
phase of the company’s investment in Kashagan oil field. 
A final example can be cited from the stabilisation practice in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (hereafter ‘DRC’). For example, a 2008 Congo-China agreement states 
that ‘all new legal and regulatory requirements which put the mining joint venture and the 
contractor in charge of infrastructure at a disadvantage will not be applied’252 In other words, 
the investors are exempted from all adverse changes in the laws and regulations. It is 
therefore not surprising that a group of legal scholars described this clause as ‘one of the 
most comprehensive and uncompromising stabilisation clauses’ they have ever seen.253   
The same description can be applied to the identical stabilisation clauses contained in 
two PSAs signed in 2006 and 2008.
254
 Both clauses exempt the investors from changes in 
the ‘general legal, financial, petroleum, tax, customs and economic conditions’ for the entire 
duration of the agreement while allowing them to benefit from any favourable changes.
255
 
These PSAs and the mining agreement were negotiated in secret and the final contracts were 
never publicly released. Their terms, including their stringent stabilisation clauses only 
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became known after they were leaked by NGOs/civil society.
256
  The context in which these 
agreements, just as every other agreement, were signed is aptly summarised by Global 
Witness as follows: 
 
Over the last ten years, in particular, numerous lucrative mining agreements were 
signed in opaque deals between unaccountable and unelected political leaders, 
mining companies and other economic operators. Little information is available 
on the circumstances surrounding the signature of these contracts and how much 
money was paid, and to whom, in the process. The result has been that vast 
profits have flowed out of the country, and into the pockets of corrupt leaders and 
businessmen, while the Congolese population continues to be subjected to 
extreme poverty.
257
   
 
 Indeed, the fact that the mineral sector in DRC has been and continues to be 
characterised by a lack of transparency, corruption and complete disregard for the laws of 
the country is well documented in numerous reports including those prepared by a Panel of 
Experts commissioned by the United Nations.
258
 In summary, these reports show how 
successive governments granted mineral contracts to investors in circumstances ‘widely 
perceived to be suspect.’259 Such contracts, the panel found, often contained terms that 
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appeared to be ‘particularly generous for the foreign investors involved.’260 It also showed 
that in some other cases, the grants of the concessions were done illegally.
261
 
From the perspective of investors, it may be argued that stringent stabilisation clauses 
are commensurate with the heightened political risks of the project brought about by the 
reputation of the regimes. In other words, the fact that a regime is widely known to be 
corrupt and/or dictatorial makes it more untrusted and thus provides legitimate reasons for 
investors to be protected by broader forms of stabilisation clauses. However, the 
circumstances in which some of these clauses have been granted suggest that the clauses 
may have had little to do with the level of the perceived risk in the country. The 
circumstances surrounding the extensive stabilisation clauses for the Nigerian LNG project 
is particularly illustrative.  
The company was incorporated in 1989 and was granted very generous incentives 
and exemptions at the time.
262
 However, these incentives and exemptions were not protected 
by stabilisation clauses. The extensive stabilisation clauses were included through an 
amendment decree signed on 18 November 1993 by Sani Abacha who only assumed power 
the evening before (i.e. on 17 November 1993) through a military coup. In such a scenario, it 
is difficult to conceive how the regime could have been legitimately convinced in just one 
night that the extensive stabilisation clauses were required to attract the project.  
Furthermore, all other decrees promulgated by the regime prior to, and immediately 
after, the Nigeria LNG decree had nothing to do with the promotion or attraction of FDI. 
Rather they all introduced measures to entrench dictatorship and corruption.
263
 This therefore 
suggests that rather than a desire to attract FDI to promote sustainable development, the 
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clauses may have been the outcome of an opportunistic behaviour. This view is supported by 
the following section which discusses the inability of most of these clauses to survive when 
faced with minimum standards of transparency.  
4.3.4 Transparency and Stabilisation Clauses 
The preceding section argued that there is increasing evidence that the broadest and 
most stringent forms of stabilisation clauses are granted by corrupt and/or dictatorial 
governments. This section argues that conversely, an increasing number of stabilisation 
clauses have been eliminated or had their scope reduced in the face of improved 
transparency and accountability in natural resource management.   
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is important to first mention that such 
transparency initiatives affecting stabilisation clauses are mostly implemented alongside 
other measures aimed at increasing the benefits that accrue to the countries from their 
extractive industry. For this reason, some commentators claim these changes are motivated 
by greed within host governments and anti-western sentiments against foreign investors.
264
 
In the words of Jeffery Sachs, ‘judged by the financial press of the US and Europe, the 
renegotiations of contractual terms are a sign of perfidious host-country behaviour.’265 
However, he proceeds to strongly rebut this view and insists that there is ‘much more than 
meets the eye.’266 He traces the cancellations and restructuring of these contracts to their 
inability to pass ‘minimal standards of honesty, transparency and due process.’267 He 
therefore concludes: 
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The ultimate source of contractual instability in Russia, Bolivia and many other 
countries, is not arbitrary host-country behaviour but rather the lack of legitimacy 
of the contractual process in the first place. The negotiations between investors 
and the state are habitually secret, and the resulting terms are almost always 
secret as well. An air of corruption hangs heavily over most deals. The public has 
no confidence in the legitimacy of the investor-state relationship.
268
  
 
Given previous findings, this study must surely agree with Sachs. The vast majority of 
the instances described where stabilisation clauses have been eliminated or had their scope 
significantly reduced occurred as a result of increased transparency and accountability.
269
 
The fact that these changes took place within the context of reforms aimed at ensuring more 
benefits for the host state is also understandable. As explained in previous sections, many of 
these stabilisation clauses were granted together with particularly generous terms in 
circumstances similar to that described by Sachs. It therefore follows that any effort to alter 
these clauses will necessarily be accompanied with reforms to alter the generous terms they 
were intended to stabilise in the first place.  
4.3.4.1 Effect of Transparency on Stabilisation Clauses 
The secrecy surrounding many existing contracts in the extractive industry of many 
developing countries has led to widespread perceptions among citizens that these contracts 
may have been influenced by corruption and that their terms and conditions are favourable to 
investors and against the interest of the country. This, coupled with the inability of the 
citizens to enjoy the benefits of the revenue generated by these contracts, has led to demands 
for more transparency and accountability in natural resource management.  
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In response to these demands, several governments in developing countries have 
been elected largely on campaign promises to increase transparency and accountability in the 
management of the natural resource sector. In some cases, these promises have been made 
together with specific promises to review, override or undermine stabilisation clauses. In 
keeping with these promises, these governments have introduced measures aimed at 
improving transparency. An increasingly noticeable effect of these initiatives is the 
elimination, or reduction, in the scope of stabilisation clauses granted by the affected 
countries.   
The nationalisation of the Bolivian hydrocarbon sector, which also led to the removal 
of stabilisation clauses from the country’s hydrocarbon laws, is a good illustration in this 
regard. That nationalisation has received substantial attention in the literature. However, the 
analysis is often presented solely from the perspective of a resource nationalism agenda by 
President Evo Morales.
270
 Little mention is given to the key role played by transparency and 
accountability in these processes.
271
 In reality, however, the decision to nationalise, 
including the removal of the stabilisation clauses, was the decision of the Bolivian people, 
not Morales’. This decision was expressed in a referendum in 2004 where the people voted 
by a huge majority to nationalise the hydrocarbon sector.
272
  
Of particular relevance, Bolivians voted by an overwhelming majority of 86.6 per 
cent to repeal the Hydrocarbon Law 1996 which introduced stabilisation clauses into the 
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country.
273
 The new Hydrocarbon Law, enacted to reflect the results of the referendum, 
imposed a duty on the government to be transparent in the management of the hydrocarbon 
sector by making it mandatory for contracts to be made public and giving citizens a right to 
information.
274
 At the same time, it also increased taxes, and authorised the government to 
renegotiate and replace the existing Risk Sharing Contracts containing stabilisation clauses 
with Operating Agreements.
275
  
  The Law still authorised the government to grant stabilisation clauses in the Operating 
Agreement.
276
 However, unlike the previous stabilisation clauses which exempted investors 
from all laws and taxes for the entire term of the contract, the new law limits stabilisation 
guarantees to the fiscal regime and subject to a maximum of 10 years.
277
 In addition, the 
agreements must be approved by the National Congress before they can become effective.
278
  
While the people were still disaffected that the provisions of the law did not go far 
enough, the two immediate predecessors of Morales were unwilling to implement the law 
largely on the ground that it went too far against investors.
279
 This ultimately led to their fall 
from office in a space of two years.
280
 In the election that followed, Evo Morales was 
overwhelming elected largely because he promised to implement in full the decision of the 
people as expressed in the 2004 referendum.
281
 In line with this promise, Bolivia has taken 
significant steps to improve transparency in the hydrocarbon sector.
282
 Citizens can now 
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access information about the terms and conditions of hydrocarbon contracts and the revenue 
derived from such contracts. Of particular relevance, the Nationalisation Decree enacted to 
reflect the wishes of the people, as expressed in the referendum, made no provision for 
stabilisation clauses to be included in the Operating Agreement.
283
 To date, as Bolivia 
continues to improve transparency in its hydrocarbon sector, stabilisation clauses are not 
known to have returned.   
A similar scenario is unfolding in Ghana. Several reports have highlighted the 
complete lack of transparency that existed in its mining sector prior to 2009.
284
 This fuelled 
suspicions that the decision to grant mining concessions, and the terms included in the 
concessions, were being influenced by corruption.
285
 It is however widely known that some 
of these contracts contained stabilisation clauses lasting at least 15 years even though their 
exact scope remains unknown.
286
 However, indications are that they may be very broad. For 
example, the 2004 Annual Report of AngloGold Ashanti acknowledged that the company 
has a stability agreement which exempts it from the adverse effects of new laws and other 
changes relating to ‘mining operations, taxes, fees and other fiscal imports’ for a period of at 
least 15 years.
287
  
In 2009, President John Atta Mills ran and won his election on a party manifesto that 
promised the implementation of several policies in the ‘mining and extractive industry’, 
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some of which are particularly relevant to this study.
288
 The Manifesto promised to 
implement measures to ensure ‘participatory review of mining and development’ and 
‘transparency in the management of mineral resources.’289 It also promised that if elected, 
the government will ‘abolish investment agreements that make mining operations enclaves 
exempt from legislative reforms/national emergencies.’290 In line with these promises, a 
committee was set up to review stability agreements entered into by the country.
291
 
Furthermore, the government has subsequently accepted a related recommendation by a 
Constitutional Review Committee which recommended that a provision allowing the 
government to undertake a periodic review of existing stabilisation clauses should be 
included in the country’s constitutions.292  
Another example can be cited from Zambia. As has been previously discussed, 
stabilisation clauses were re-introduced by the Mines and Minerals Act 1995 enacted under 
the shadow of the World Bank and the IMF.
293
 Pursuant to this Act, stringent stabilisation 
clauses were included in MDAs signed during the regime of former president Frederick 
Chiluba.
294
 However the fact that the government came under enormous pressure from these 
institutions to privatise the mines is only one side of the story. The other is that the 
privatisation process was undertaken under very opaque circumstances with allegations of 
                                           
288
 National Democratic Congress of Ghana, ‘Manifesto’ 
<http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/election2008/NDC_Manifesto.pdf> accessed 28 September 
2012. 
289
 Ibid. 
290
 Ibid. 
291
Rowland Phillips-Addo, ‘Gov’t Re-Negotiates Mining Agreements’ Business News (Accra, 30 April 2012); 
Reuters, ‘Ghana to Review All Mining Stability Agreements’ (09 February 2012) 
<http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE81806B20120209> accessed 28 September 2012. 
292
 Republic of Ghana, ‘White Paper on the Report of the Constitution’ (June 2012) 43 
<http://kitnes.net/1_6/1_124170/1_950361.pdf> accessed 28 September 2012. 
293
 See section 4.2.4 and Mines and Minerals Act, 1995, ss 9(1) (2).    
294
 See section 4.2.4. 
  
138 
 
corruption hanging over the MDAs signed by the government.
295
 In addition, the proceeds 
from the privatisation were plundered by the government leaving the majority of the citizens 
in a worse–off condition than they were before the privatisation.296 This led to widespread 
public discontent from 2007 about the lack of transparency and inability of the sector to 
benefit the country.
297
  
Consequently, a new Mines and Minerals Development Act was enacted in 2008 
aimed at improving transparency and increasing the benefits of mining to the country.
298
 The 
Act substantially curtailed the discretion given to the Mines Minister under the old Act.
299
 In 
particular, the possibility of the Minister granting stabilisation clauses through secretly 
negotiated MDAs was removed as the new Act abolished the grant of MDAs through which 
the Minister was previously able to grant stabilisation clauses.
300
 No other provision was 
included in the Act allowing for stabilisation clauses. Rather all existing MDAs containing 
stabilisation clauses were abolished.
301
 Stabilisation clauses have thus been unable to survive 
the transparency initiatives of the new governments.
302
 It should be stated however, that 
following threats of arbitration by investors that already had stabilisation clauses, the 
government agreed to allow such stabilisation clauses to remain valid for 10 years.
303
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However, this was only after the affected companies agreed to comply with the new fiscal 
regime in the 2008 Act.
304
      
Similarly in Tanzania, a lack of transparency in the process leading to the grant of 
MDAs under the 1998 Mining Act created a widespread perception of corruption amidst 
public sentiment that the MDAs contained ‘unnecessary tax incentives and stabilisation 
clauses.’305 These sentiments were confirmed when leaked copies of several MDAs showed 
that they all contained a combination of full freezing and economic equilibrium clauses 
protecting the investors from any change that puts them in a ‘worse off situation.’306 The 
duration of the clauses was for potentially 50 years, with an initial 25 years and an option of 
renewal upon the same terms and conditions.
307
  
However, in 2005, President Jakaya Kikwete was elected largely on a campaign 
promise to improve transparency in the mining sector and review all MDAs entered under 
opaque conditions.
308
 In line with these promises, the government has embarked on several 
initiatives to promote transparency in the mining sector, including commencing the EITI 
validation process and submitted its first EITI report in 2011.
309
 These initiatives were taken 
alongside the enactment of a new Mining Act in 2010. The new Act still grants the Minister 
the power to enter into MDAs containing stabilisation clauses. However, this is now limited 
to ‘applicable rates of royalties, taxes, duties and levies.’310 Furthermore, certain conditions, 
including a minimum threshold of investment must now be met before the clause can be 
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granted.
311
 Significantly, any stabilisation clause so granted is subject to review every 5 
years, as is every other term of the MDA.
312
 Thus, the possibility of a stabilisation clause 
that protects investors for potentially 50 years has been eliminated. Although these changes 
are not applicable to investors with existing stabilisation clauses, the Tanzania Chamber of 
Mines and Minerals (TCME) insists that such investors are under ‘considerable pressure’ to 
comply with the changes.
313
   
 A final example of a country where transparency initiatives by new governments 
resulted in the elimination of stabilisation clauses or a restriction in its scope can be cited 
from the Sierra Leone mining sector. Prior to 2007, the country’s mining sector was 
characterised by what has been described as ‘extreme lack of transparency.’314 All but one of 
the mining agreements entered into during this period were negotiated in secret, and the 
terms also kept secret.
315
 This led to a widespread perception amongst civil society that these 
agreements contain ‘stabilisation and confidentiality clauses.’316 This perception was 
strengthened in 2002 when the 2001 Sierra Rutile Agreement was published. The agreement 
had been negotiated and kept secretly but became a public document when, in order to 
strengthen the protections accorded to the investors, it was enacted as an Act of parliament 
and published in the Government Gazette.
317
  
The stabilisation clauses in the agreement exempted the investors from complying 
with the provisions of existing laws where such provisions are inconsistent with the 
                                           
311
 Article 10.3a. 
312
 Article 12. 
313
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agreement.
318
 Furthermore, ‘in the event that the Government enacts any legislation or 
changes any administrative rule or practice…which results in more onerous obligations 
being placed upon the company’ the government agreed to ‘hold the company harmless in 
respect of the increased cost of performing the more onerous obligations.’319  
The now public terms of this agreement, coupled with the perception that they had 
been corruptly obtained, created widespread mistrust of the government and the 
companies.
320
 As a result, Ernest Koroma won the presidential election in 2007 on a ‘strong 
anti-corruption ticket.’321 One of the five ‘core principles’ of his manifesto was to ensure 
‘integrity, transparency and accountability in the conduct of public affairs.’322 It also 
contained a promise to ‘review all exploration and mining contracts that are in operation.’323  
In line with the above promises, the country became an EITI candidate country in 
2008 and published its first report in 2010.
324
 In addition, in 2008, the government 
established a Task Force to review the country’s minerals policy. Based on the report of the 
Task Force, the government embarked on a review of the existing mining contracts to ensure 
greater benefits for the country and to improve accountability and transparency ‘according to 
the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative compliance model.’325 So far, at least two 
mining agreements, including the Sierra Rutile Agreement, have been negotiated.
326
 More 
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importantly, the 2009 Mines and Minerals Act enacted alongside this review introduced 
several measures to improve transparency and stronger governance in the mining sector.
327
  
For example, the rights and obligations of all relevant parties in the grant of mining 
licenses have been made very clear, and the relevant government bodies must now provide, 
in writing, reasons for their decisions.
328
 Investors, or potential investors, adversely affected 
by such decisions can now challenge them in Court.
329
 In addition, the Act imposed an 
obligation on the relevant Minister to ensure greater access to mining agreements and other 
relevant documents.
330
 In line with these provisions, in January 2012, the government 
launched an Online Repository where relevant information on mining documents and 
revenues could be publicly accessed.
331
  
Consistent with the findings in several other countries, stabilisation clauses in Sierra 
Leone were affected by the introduction of these transparency initiatives. Under the previous 
Act, the Secretary of State was able to grant stabilisation clauses by virtue of the wide 
discretionary power given to him to privately negotiate mining agreements.
332
 However, this 
provision was removed in the 2009 Act thereby removing the possibility of stabilisation 
clauses being legally granted in Sierra Leone’s mining sector.  
4.3.4.2 Changes to Stabilisation Practice: Transparency or Obsolescing Bargaining?  
 
The changes in the use of stabilisation clauses discussed above were implemented by 
new governments several years after the original legislation or contracts containing the 
stabilisation clauses were enacted or entered into. It is therefore possible that those who still 
hold on to the obsolescing bargaining theory may use it to explain these changes. In other 
                                           
327
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words, it is possible to argue that the governments were subsequently able to alter the 
stabilisation clauses simply because they had a stronger bargaining power than when the 
stabilisation clauses were originally granted. However, such an argument ceases to be 
convincing in the face of an increasing number of cases where the changes took place either 
during negotiations or immediately after the clauses became known to the public. The 
circumstances in which these changes occurred suggest that the original unsatisfactory 
stabilisation clauses were largely a function of the lack of transparency in the contracting 
process rather than the stronger bargaining power of the investors.    
For example, the stringent stabilisation clauses in the BTC pipeline project were 
subsequently reduced in 2003 to exclude laws relating to human rights, labour, health, safety 
and the environment from its ambit.
333
 However, this was not because of any increase in the 
bargaining powers of the respective governments. Rather, it resulted from a Unilateral 
Undertaking by the investors.
334
 This happened because the IFC ‘strongly encouraged’ the 
investors to disclose the key project documents as a way of dealing with the intense 
criticisms surrounding the project.
335
 Consequently, the investors published the key project 
agreements online in 2003.
336
 Following the publication, several terms of the agreements 
and, in particular, the ‘radical’ nature of the stabilisation clauses received intense criticism in 
both the academic literature and from NGOs.
337
 Four months later and without any known 
interference by the governments, the investors made the undertaking reducing the scope of 
the clauses. This suggests that the scope of the initial clause may have gone beyond what the 
investors legitimately required. Yet, the clauses were included in the agreements and 
remained unchallenged for as long as the terms of the agreements were kept confidential.  
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Similarly, the scope of the full freezing clauses in the Mittal Steel MDA was also 
subsequently narrowed to cover specific fiscal issues.
338
 The original agreement was signed 
in August 2005 at a time when Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who was the frontline candidate for the 
then forthcoming presidential elections, had promised to review all contracts signed by the 
transitional government if she were to win.
339
 The renegotiation process commenced in 
January 2006 (5 months after the original agreement was signed), and the amended 
agreement was signed in December 2006. The company did not therefore start its operations 
in Liberia until the amended agreement was signed and ratified by the Liberian 
Parliament.
340
  
As such, the decision by the investors to accept the new terms including the 
significantly narrower stabilisation clauses cannot be attributed to the OBT. Rather, it 
reflects the fact that the broad scope of the initial stabilisation clauses may have been 
unnecessary, but was included because of the lack of transparency in the process leading to 
the agreement. This may explain why the clauses were unable to pass the minimal standards 
of transparency established by the new government. These transparency measures have seen 
Liberia move from 137
th
 out of 159 countries in the 2005 Transparency International CPI
341
 
to 91
st
 out of 183 countries in the 2011 CPI.
342
  
As part of the transparency measures, mineral resource contracts are no longer 
confidential documents but must be scrutinised and approved by parliament after which they 
are published online.
343
 A review of some of the recent agreements that are now online show 
                                           
338
 See discussion in section 4.3.3. For details of the changes see, Government of Liberia, ‘Summary of the 
Main Changes Brought About by the Review of the Mittal Mineral Development Agreement 
<http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/MittalAgreementFinalMitrix.pdf> accessed 04 October 2012.  
339
 Cook Liberia’s (n 219) 11. 
340
 See, for example, Reuters, ‘Liberia says has signed Revised Mittal mining deal’ (28 December 2006) 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2006/12/28/liberia-mittal-idUKL2847972320061228> accessed 04 October 2012.   
341
 TI, ‘CPI 2005’ <http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005>accessed 04 
October 2012. 
342
 TI, ‘CPI 2011’ (n308). 
343
 All contracts, concessions and agreements are now available online at 
<http://www.leiti.org.lr/content_maindoc.php?main=65&related=65> accessed 04 October 2012. 
  
145 
 
that with the increased transparency, the scope of stabilisation clauses granted in the Liberian 
mining sector is becoming narrower and more ‘balanced’. In addition, several provisions 
have been included to make the agreements more flexible.  
For example, the stabilisation clause in a 2011 MDA only stabilises taxes and 
duties.
344
 As such, except as provided in the Agreement and the country’s Revenue Code, the 
investors are subject to all Liberian laws ‘in effect from time to time, including with respect 
to labor, environmental, health and safety, customs and tax matters.’345 Where such laws 
impose ‘additional material obligations’ on the investors, the parties shall agree on 
‘appropriate transitional arrangements’ in order to give the investors ‘a reasonable period of 
time’ to comply.346 However, even the stabilised taxes and duties can be adjusted in line with 
a periodic review to be undertaken every 5 years.
347
 In addition, the parties agreed to modify 
the agreement at any time where a ‘Profound Change in Circumstances’ has occurred.348 
These provisions should enable the government to levy a windfall profit tax where the prices 
of minerals rise significantly beyond what was obtainable at the time the agreement was 
signed. Such an action may not have been possible under previous stabilisation clauses.      
The argument that some unnecessary stabilisation clauses may have been included in 
natural resource contracts because of a lack of transparency is further supported by the 
recently renegotiated London Mining Agreement in Sierra Leone.
349
 As explained earlier, 
the possibility of granting stabilisation clauses in the Sierra Leonean mining sector was 
removed in 2009.
350
 However, in spite of this, the government still granted a stabilisation 
clause to London Mining that same year. The clauses exempted the investor from any 
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change in the tax laws for the 25 year duration of the agreement with the option of renewal 
for a further 15 years on the same fiscal terms.
351
 
In line with the newly introduced transparency initiatives, members of the public and, 
in particular, civil society groups gained access to the terms of the agreement. Consequently, 
the stabilisation clause, along with some other terms of the agreement, were criticised for 
being ‘illegal’.352 In the absence of any law with which to justify the stabilisation clause, the 
government was left with no option but to renegotiate the agreement.
353
 The amended 
agreement, while hailed as an improvement still faces some criticisms.
354
 However, perhaps 
not surprisingly, the stabilisation clauses did not survive the test of transparency and were 
removed. Rather, the agreement now specifically provides that the terms of the agreement 
will be reviewed in 2020 and ‘any new fiscal benefits will be subject to negotiation.’355  
The link between transparency and stabilisation clauses can also be seen in the 
increasing number of cases where increased transparency and public scrutiny in the course of 
on-going negotiations ensure that proposed stabilisation clauses were removed, or their 
scope significantly reduced. Two cases are particularly illustrative. The first is the 
negotiations that led to the signing of PSAs between the Ugandan government and Tullow 
Oil (and its partners) over the Lake Albert Rift Basin project. The second is the botched 
Fiscal Contract for the Alaska pipeline project. 
Public and parliamentary interest in the negotiations leading to the PSAs between the 
Ugandan government and Tullows Oil and its partners was heightened following the 
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publication of a leaked copy of an earlier PSA for the project.
356
 The scrutiny was especially 
focused on the following stabilisation clause:  
 
If following the effective date, there is any change, or series of changes, in the 
laws or regulations of Uganda which materially reduces the economic benefits 
derived or to be derived by Licensee hereunder, Licensee may notify the 
Government accordingly and thereafter the Parties shall meet to negotiate in good 
faith and agree upon the necessary modifications to this agreement to restore 
Licensee to substantially the same overall economic position as prevailed 
hereunder prior to such change(s).
357
 
 
The clause was widely criticised by both civil society and the country’s parliament.358 
The country’s parliament went further and took the unusual step of passing a resolution 
asking the government to review all PSAs already executed and ‘in particular’ to ‘discard’ 
the stabilisation clauses.
359
  The resolutions also contained several paragraphs requesting an 
account of all revenue received by the government,
360
 that the government joins the EITI
361
 
and that confidential clauses be removed from future contracts.
362
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The President failed to comply with many of the resolutions. However, the scrutiny 
from the public and parliament was enough to make him send a request to the investors 
asking them to remove the stabilisation clauses in the draft PSAs. The request and the 
subsequent negotiations that followed were widely reported in the media.
363
 In the end, even 
with this half-hearted approach, statements and Press Releases issued by the government 
suggest that the scope of the stabilisation clauses have been significantly narrowed.
364
   
The new version, according to the President, is ‘tightly defined’ and only allows the 
investors to be compensated where tax measures cause a ‘substantial loss of economic 
benefits’ to them.365 Furthermore, the ‘loss of economic benefits’ is said to be ‘scientifically 
defined’ using Net present value (NPV) as the yardstick.366 Neither the PSAs nor the 
stabilisation clauses has been formally released to the public. As such, a more accurate 
analysis of the scope of the amended stabilisation clauses must wait. However, as one 
commentator notes,
367
 the brevity of the press statement released by Tullow Oil to confirm 
the signing of the PSAs is an indication of the concessions they may have had to make.
368
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  The second example comes from the stabilisation clauses included in the botched 
Fiscal Contract governing the Alaska pipeline project in the US.
369
 In 2006, the investors 
reached an agreement with the then Governor Frank Murkowski on the fiscal regime to 
govern the project.
370
 The fiscal regime was to comprise a Petroleum Profit Tax’ (hereafter 
‘PPT’),371 and the Fiscal Contract.372 The terms of these agreements were arrived at 
following years of negotiations conducted privately by the Governor and his aides. It must 
be said that such ‘private’ negotiations were consistent with Alaska laws at the time.373 
However, many Alaskans viewed this particular negotiation with suspicion.
374 
This was 
especially because several top civil servants and the consultant appointed by the government 
were either fired or resigned because they insisted that the fiscal regime was too favourable 
to investors.
375
  
The suspicions surrounding the negotiations were confirmed when the terms were 
made public after being presented to the Alaska legislature for approval. Both the PPT and 
the Fiscal Contract came under intense scrutiny. The PPT was criticised for giving investors 
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concessions that were ‘way in excess of what the economics of the project required’,376 for 
containing too many ‘sweeteners’ for the investors and for being ‘unfair’ to Alaska.377  
The criticisms against the Fiscal Contract were more intense largely because it 
contained a stabilisation clause protecting the fiscal regime established by the PPT.
378
  The 
clause provides that the ‘State is temporarily contracting away for the Term its power to 
impose any new Taxes, or change any existing Taxes, that apply to each Participant’s 
Interests in its oil and gas related business activity in Alaska.’379 It therefore exempts the 
investors from future changes in the tax laws of Alaska for between 30 and 45 years.
380
 This 
clause was supported by the legislative committee overseeing the project,
381
 and presented to 
the State legislature for approval despite the fact that according to the Alaskan constitution, 
‘the power of taxation shall never be surrendered.’382   
Amidst aggressive lobbying by the investors and intense debate in the media and the 
legislature, the PPT was passed in 2006. However, the Fiscal Contract was rejected in its 
entirety as the legislature succumbed to public sentiments, particularly those directed against 
the stabilisation clause.
383
 However, the damage had already been done to the Governor’s 
popularity, and he suffered a humiliating defeat in the Republican primary elections which 
took place that same year.
384
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Elected because of promises made during the campaign, the new Governor, Sarah 
Palin, urged the Alaska State Legislature to review the PPT. Consequently, a new Act was 
enacted in 2007 which amended some of the fiscal terms in the PPT and in particular 
increased the revenue accruable to the state.
385
 Furthermore, the Alaska Stranded Gas 
Development Act which enabled the previous government to negotiate privately with 
investors was repealed and replaced by the Alaska Gas Inducement Act (AGIA). The new 
Act eliminated the possibility of private negotiations, instead providing that the evaluation 
and selection of investors for projects should take place in an open and competitive public 
process.
386
 In line with the provisions of this Act, a new agreement was subsequently 
reached with investors for the project under a more transparent process. Unsurprisingly, it 
did not contain stabilisation clauses and the project is proceeding without the clause.
387
 This 
is despite the fact that the investors continue to desire and request ‘competitive and stable 
fiscal terms.’388 
The fact that the stabilisation clause did not survive in the new transparently 
negotiated agreement is, however, only one part of the story. The other is that the terms of 
the previous agreement (of which the stabilisation is one), were in fact influenced by 
corruption. Soon after his electoral defeat, the former governor and his chief of staff were 
arrested and indicted along with several local and national legislators, lobbyists and 
                                           
385
 Alaska Clear and Equitable Share Act (ACES) HR 200. For a detailed discussion of the changes introduced 
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accessed 08 October 2012. 
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executives of VECO (an Alaska based oil service company) over widely publicised 
allegations of bribery and corruption.
389
  
The summary of the allegation, as aptly captured by one of the many press releases 
announcing the indictments, is that the government officials ‘conspired to perform official 
acts in exchange for monetary and other financial gain to the detriment of Alaska, its 
economy, and its citizenry.’390 Specifically, they were indicted for collecting bribes in 
exchange for supporting the inclusion of favourable terms for investors in the PPT and Fiscal 
Contract.
391
 As at October 2011, the indictments have led to 10 convictions including 6 
former Alaskan legislators, 2 senior executives of VECO, a business man, and a lobbyist.
392
 
It should be emphasised that Alaska is in a developed country while the focus of this 
work is on developing countries. However, the use of Alaska as an illustration is deliberate. 
The purpose is to show that the link between stabilisation clauses and corruption and lack of 
transparency remains true whatever the level of development of the country. In this sense, it 
can be argued that the relatively lower rate of corruption in developed countries plays an 
important role in the absence of stabilisation clauses in these countries. The Alaska example 
suggests that one reason for this is because it will be more difficult to grant stabilisation 
clauses in developed countries due to the higher level and/or demand for transparency and 
accountability. At the same time, the electoral backlash is likely to be more severe in view of 
the relatively stronger level of democracy in developed countries.  
                                           
389
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Further, the Alaskan  Alaska  Fiscal Contract is the only instance seen in this study 
(at least in the last decade) where a government in a developed country, or any of its 
constituent units, accepted a stabilisation clause and went as far as including it in a draft bill. 
It is therefore significant that the State of Alaska and the negotiation process leading to the 
Fiscal Contract share several similar characteristics with the examples already discussed in 
developing countries. First, the agreements were negotiated in secret. Second, many of the 
key actors were later indicted for bribery and corruption. Third, around the time the 
agreements were being negotiated, several studies rated Alaska as having the most corrupt 
public sector in the US.
393
 Finally, the stabilisation clause could not survive the minimal 
standards of transparency, and this did not stop the project from proceeding. This is not a 
mere coincidence. Rather, it is consistent with the findings of this thesis that a significant 
number of stabilisation clauses granted by developing countries may have been unnecessary 
but were nevertheless granted due to corruption and the lack of transparency in the 
contracting process.   
4.4. STABILISING ILLEGITIMACY? 
Before concluding this chapter, it is important to emphasise that it is not suggested 
here that stabilisation clauses are only negotiated and accepted by corrupt and/or dictatorial 
governments under opaque circumstances. There are several developing countries where 
stabilisation clauses are granted transparently by relatively transparent and accountable 
governments. The stabilisation regimes in Latin American countries offer a good example in 
this regard.
394
   
                                           
393
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In the first ever Revenue Watch Index released in 2010, all nine Latin American 
countries that were assessed ranked relatively high in the transparency of their extractive 
industries.
395
 Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru were ranked in the highest 
of the three tiers in the index, which means that their governments provide public 
information relating to the management of their extractive industries.
396
 The remaining three 
countries (Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela and Bolivia) were in the middle tier of the index, 
meaning that while there are still some gaps, their governments provide citizens with 
substantial information about their management of the extractive industry.
397
  
Consistent with the findings in this study, the high level of transparency in these 
countries is reflected in their stabilisation practices. Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia and Ecuador are 
not known to grant stabilisation clauses and have no laws authorising the grant of 
stabilisation clauses.
398
 The remaining countries do have stabilisation regimes in place. 
However, in line with the high level of transparency in these countries, the procedure and 
criteria for the grant of a stabilisation clause is clear, consistent and transparent.  
For example, specific agencies or committees are given the responsibility to negotiate 
and grant the clause in accordance with the criteria already established.
399
 The scope and 
duration of the clauses granted are limited and the investors must meet certain criteria which 
ensure that these countries benefit directly from the grant of the clause.
400
 Despite this, 
however, their governments still find it difficult to justify the grant of the clause in the face 
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of transparency. As a result, they have had to manage public sentiments against the clause by 
either altering the clause or taking steps to limit the further grant of the clause. For example, 
as at the end of 2011, Venezuela has not entered into a stability contract since 1999 when its 
current stabilisation regime was put in place.
401
  
Similarly, in Colombia, the government took steps in 2011 to further restrict access 
to the clause. New investment was redefined to ensure that stability agreements cannot be 
entered into for on-going projects.
402
 Furthermore, previously an investor had to pay the 
equivalent of 0.5% (unproductive periods) and 1% (productive periods) of the amount 
invested to get in order to benefit from a stabilisation clause. However under the new law, 
the consideration the investor will pay is to be assessed according to the risks to be assumed 
by the country should they enter into a stability agreement.
403
 
 In Chile, the government imposed a tax on mining companies in order to deal with 
domestic pressure following the high mining prices in 2005.
404
 Five years later, the tax was 
increased to raise funds to deal with the earthquake suffered by the country at that time.
405
 
Both changes were not enforced on companies that had stabilisation clauses in their contracts. 
However, in both cases the majority of the companies ‘voluntarily’ complied.406  
In Peru, the previous government was also unable to justify the continuous adherence 
to stabilisation clauses but was unwilling to take any action against existing contracts with 
stabilisation clauses.
407
 Consequently, President Ollanta Humala based his 2011 election 
campaign largely on a promise to impose higher royalties and was the only candidate who 
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402
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promised to review existing tax stability contracts if elected.
408
 He won. In line with his 
promise, by September of that same year, new laws were passed by Congress to implement 
these promises.
 409
 The laws increased taxes and royalties for companies without stability 
contracts while companies with stability agreements were to pay a voluntary Special Mining 
Contribution. 
Proponents of stabilisation clauses see it as a tool that host governments can use to 
attract FDI to facilitate their sustainable development. No doubt, this might be a reason for 
the grant of stabilisation clauses by some governments. However, the findings in this study 
also suggest that the re-introduction of stabilisation clauses into the statute books of many 
developing countries resulted from pressure from the World Bank rather than their 
conviction that the clauses were indeed required to attract FDI. It also shows that an 
increasing number of stabilisation clauses may not have been granted had the contracting 
process met even minimal standards of transparency.  
All the examples found in this study, where stabilisation clauses were reduced or 
eliminated, took place within the last decade and in the context of the rapid growth at the 
global level in transparency and accountability initiatives in the extractive industry. The 
evidence suggests that as these initiatives crystallise in countries, the use of stabilisation 
clauses diminishes. In other words, while governments appear willing to grant stabilisation 
clauses when negotiations are conducted in secret, they seem unable to defend or justify the 
inclusion of the clause when they are held to account by their citizens. This may explain why 
in several countries, parties and candidates have been elected into office largely on the 
platform that if elected, they will review, override or undermine stabilisation clauses. The 
rejection of stabilisation clauses is thus closely tied to public sentiments over the legitimacy 
                                           
408
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of the contracts in the first place. In other words, the citizens are not prepared to stabilise 
illegitimacy.   
4.5. CONCLUSIONS 
The re-introduction of stabilisation clauses into the statute books of many developing 
countries was largely influenced by pressure applied by the World Bank during the Bank-led 
reforms. Stabilisation clauses were made a key component of the legislative reforms the 
Bank proposed to, and facilitated in, developing countries. Receiving technical assistance 
and other forms of support from the Bank became conditional upon implementing the 
reforms, including the grant of stabilisation clauses. In view of the Bank’s relationship with 
developing countries as a major lender, such developing countries were left with little or no 
choice but to accept the reforms, including the stabilisation clauses, especially in the light of 
the economic crisis at the time.   
Corruption and lack of transparency in the contracting process also help to explain 
why several developing countries re-introduced stabilisation clauses and continued to grant 
even more extensive forms of the clause. Thus, regardless of whether these governments had 
been put under pressure from the World Bank, the most stringent forms of stabilisation 
clauses were more likely to be found in contracts or legislation entered into, or enacted by, 
regimes known to be (or widely perceived to be) corrupt and/or dictatorial. 
Conversely, increased transparency and accountability in the contracting process 
usually led to the removal or reduction in the scope of stabilisation clauses granted by a 
country. Within the past decade, an increasing number of countries have either eliminated or 
significantly reduced the scope of stabilisation clauses that they grant, all in the context of 
the rapid growth at the global level of transparency and accountability initiatives in the 
extractive industry.   
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This thesis does not claim that only corrupt and/or dictatorial governments continue 
to accept stabilisation clauses. There are several developing countries where, in relative 
terms, stabilisation clauses are granted openly by transparent and accountable governments. 
However, even in these countries, the link between stabilisation clauses and transparency 
holds true. The higher levels of transparency are reflected in their stabilisation practices. 
This is seen in the narrower scope and limited duration of stabilisation clauses that they grant 
and the extraction of some form of consideration from investors before they can access the 
clause. 
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CHAPTER 5 -  SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE MISPLACED FOCUS 
ON SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 
5.1  INTRODUCTION  
  The literature on the impact of stabilisation clauses has evolved in a 
compartmentalised way by focusing on the potential impacts of the clauses on host states’ 
abilities to enact and implement social and environmental laws.
1
 Yet, the concept of 
sustainable development emerged as a result of the rejection of the ‘unsustainable’ approach 
whereby environmental protection, social development and economic growth are 
compartmentalised and treated as separate and distinct goals.  
The chapter is therefore aimed at building an understanding of sustainable 
development and to demonstrate that the focus on social and/or environmental laws in the 
literature on the impact of stabilisation clauses is misplaced. The chapter will begin by 
briefly tracing the evolution of sustainable development in international law and policy. The 
meaning and core elements of sustainable development are then discussed. This will be 
followed by an examination of the legal relevance and implication of sustainable 
development. The chapter will conclude with an examination of the misplaced focus on 
social and environmental laws. 
5.2  SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
5.2.1 Evolution of Sustainable Development in International Law and Policy 
 The recognition that environmental and developmental problems are global in nature 
and therefore require international cooperation to arrive at solutions gave birth to concerns 
for sustainable development at the global level.
2
 Consequently, the UN General Assembly 
                                           
1
 In some of the literature, ‘human rights’ is sometimes used as a surrogate for social and environmental law. 
2
 This arose out of the scholarly debates during that period over the effect of industrialisation in developed 
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Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population' (1
st
 edn, J.Johnson 1798); Paul R Ehrlich, The Population 
Bomb (Ballantine Books 1968); Donella H Meadows and ors, The Limits to Growth:  A Report for the Club of 
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(UNGA) resolved to convene a UN Conference on the Human Environment.
3
 To prepare for 
the conference, its Secretary-General was mandated to submit a report dealing, among other 
issues, with ‘the main problems facing developed and developing countries...including the 
possibilities for increased international cooperation, especially as they relate to economic 
and social development, in particular of the developing countries.’4   
As an aid in the preparation of this report, the Secretary-General commissioned a 
panel of experts to advise him on the relationship between the environment and 
development.
5
 In the resulting ‘Founex Report’, the panel observed that the concern for the 
environment in developed countries had resulted from the undesirable effects of 
industrialisation.
6
 However, for developing countries, the major environmental problems that 
they faced were ‘predominantly problems that reflect poverty and the very lack of 
development of their societies.’7 The report therefore advised that ‘in large measure, the 
environmental problems that are of importance in developing countries are those that can be 
overcome by development itself.’8  
  In 1972, in line with the original mandate of UNGA and based upon the findings of 
the Founex Report, the UN Conference on the Human Environment (hereafter ‘UNCHE’) 
was convened in Stockholm, Sweden.
9
 The Conference witnessed a sharp dissonance 
between developing and developed countries.
10
 While developed countries steered the debate 
towards environmental issues, developing countries focused on development issues, and, in 
                                           
3
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5
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Convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UN 1972) 
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9
 UN, ‘Report of the UN Conference on the Human Environment’ (Stockholm 06 – 16 June 1972, UN Doc 
A/CONF.48/4/Rev 1). 
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 For a detailed account of this dissonance, see the following: Louis B Sohn, ‘The Stockholm Declaration on 
the Human Environment’ (1973) 14 Harvard Intl L Rev 423; Lavanya Rajamani, Differential Treatment in 
International Environmental Law (OUP 2006) 55.  
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particular, poverty eradication.
11
 To reconcile these positions, economic development was 
recognised as not being necessarily incompatible with environmental protection in the 
documents adopted at the UNCHE.
12
 Although none of these documents contains the term 
‘sustainable development’, they contain provisions that laid the foundation for the 
formulation of the concept, including the need to integrate environmental protection with 
social and economic development.
13
  
About a decade after UNCHE, a World Commission on Environment and 
Development was constituted by the UN General Assembly to continue with the global 
efforts to promote development that was sustainable.
14
 A key mandate of the Commission 
was to recommend ways of achieving greater cooperation between developed and 
developing nations that would ‘lead to the achievement of common and mutually supportive 
objectives which take account of the interrelationships between people, resources, 
environment and development.’15  
In 1987, the Commission submitted its report and in it recommended ‘sustainable 
development’ as the solution to global environmental and development problems.16 The 
report, widely known as the Brundtland Report, stated that the key element of ‘sustainable 
development’ is the recognition that environmental protection and economic development 
are inextricably linked and therefore, must be completely integrated in decision-making ‘not 
just to protect the environment, but also to protect and promote development.
17
 The report 
and its recommendations were accepted by the UN General Assembly and transmitted to all 
                                           
11
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12
 The three outcome documents are: Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, 16 June 
1972, UN Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev (hereafter ‘Stockholm Declaration’); Action Plan on the Environment, 16, 
June 1972, UN Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev; Resolution on Institutional and Financial Arrangements, 16 June 
1972, UN Doc A/Conf.48/14/Rev.1. 
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 See, for example, Stockholm Declaration (n 12) Preamble and principles 8 – 18. 
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 UNGA, Process of Participation of the Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond, 19 
December 1983, UN Doc A/RES/38/161. 
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 Ibid para 8b 
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 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (OUP 1987) (hereafter 
‘Brundtland Report’) 8, 309-343. 
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 Ibid 4-5, 37. The Report is called ‘Brundtland Report’ in reference to the Chairman of the Commission, Gro 
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governments and UN agencies, inviting them ‘to take account of the analysis and 
recommendations contained in the Report of the Commission in determining their policies 
and programmes.’18  
In 1992, in line with the recommendation of the Brundtland Report, the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was convened in Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil.
19
 The Conference reaffirmed the idea developed at Stockholm, and reinforced in the 
Brundtland Report, that environmental protection is not necessarily incompatible with 
development. However, it did so with a changed tone, approach, and philosophy, as reflected 
in the title ‘UNCED’.20 At Stockholm, the focus had been on the impact of human activities 
on the environment and the environment was assessed in terms of human needs. At Rio, the 
focus shifted to development concerns and on how to ensure that economic development 
processes took into account environmental protection. The shift in focus was deliberate, and 
resulted from the issues highlighted in the Brundtland Report and the efforts by a coalition 
formed by developing countries to ensure that their developmental concerns shared the 
centre stage with environmental considerations.
21
    
For the purposes of this thesis, the most significant documents produced by the 
UNCED are the Declaration on Environment and Development (‘Rio Declaration’)22 and 
Agenda 21: A Programme for Action for Sustainable Development.
23
 The Rio Declaration 
contained 27 principles, which again emphasised the need to integrate environmental 
protection with the development process in order to equitably meet the needs of present and 
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 UNGA, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, 11 December 1987, UN Doc 
A/RES/42/187, Resolution 6. 
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 Brundtland Report (n 16) 343; UNGA, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 22 
December 1989, UN Doc RES/44/228, Resolution 3.  
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 Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, ‘Sustainable Development in International Law’ in Hans Christian Bugge 
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23
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future generation.
24
 Of particular relevance, the Declaration clearly affirmed the 
anthropocentricity of the concept of sustainable development by making human beings ‘the 
centre of concerns for sustainable development.’25 As such, unlike the Stockholm 
Declaration, it was less specific on the management of natural resources and nature 
conservation, while emphasising poverty reduction and development concerns.
26
 
Agenda 21 contains a comprehensive plan, complete with strategies, programmes, 
and recommendations of actions that states can adopt to implement sustainable development 
in accordance with the principles contained in the Rio Declaration.
27
 It is important to note, 
and these are points that will be emphasised often in this thesis, that Agenda 21 is a 
‘dynamic programme’ evolving ‘over time in the light of changing needs and 
circumstances.’28 In addition, it is to be implemented by each country ‘according to their 
different situations, capacities and priorities.’29  
The Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 reflected the understanding of what sustainable 
development meant to states at the time. They provided a substantive elaboration of the 
concept and also laid the legal and institutional foundations for its practical application and 
implementation.
30
 Although both documents are not legally binding, their importance is 
underscored by the fact that they still serve as guidelines for national, regional and 
international action to promote sustainable development.
31
 They also continue to exert 
significant influence in the practical application and implementation of sustainable 
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31
 For example, countries are still working to develop and implement National Sustainable Development 
Strategies as required by Agenda 21. <http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/dsd_aofw_nsds/nsds_pdfs/NSDS_map.pdf> 
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development both internationally and nationally.
32
 It therefore comes as no surprise that the 
Rio Conference has been described as the ‘political legitimization of sustainable 
development.’33  
In 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) was held in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, to review progress made since Rio and ‘reinvigorate the global 
commitment to sustainable development.’34 In the lead up to the conference, developing 
countries again laid emphasis on economic and social development and sought to ensure that 
these formed the core of the agenda at the conference.
35
 Ultimately, the WSSD focused on 
five specific subjects known by the acronym WEHAB (water and sanitation, energy, health 
care, agriculture and biological diversity).
36
  
The summit adopted two policy documents: The Johannesburg Declaration on 
Sustainable Development (hereafter ‘Johannesburg Declaration’)37 and the Johannesburg 
Plan of Implementation (hereafter ‘Johannesburg Plan’).38 The Johannesburg Declaration 
reaffirmed the commitment of the international community to sustainable development, 
traced the efforts made so far by the global community to achieve it, and highlighted the 
present challenges facing humanity.
39
 On the other hand, the ‘Johannesburg Plan outlined the 
main points of international and national policy to be undertaken to implement the 
commitments originally agreed at the Rio Conference and reaffirmed at WSSD.   
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 For an excellent discussion of the build-up to the WSSD see Rajamani (n 10) 61 -66. 
36
 See generally UN, Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 04 September 2002, UN Doc A/Conf.199/20. 
 
37
 UNCED, Johannesburg Declaration of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 04 September 2002, 
UN Doc A/Conf.199/20, 1  
38
 Johannesburg Plan (n 36). For a detailed discussion on the outcome of the summit, see, Kevin R Gray, 
‘World Summit on Sustainable Development: Accomplishments and New Directions?’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 256. 
39
 See generally principles 1 – 14. 
  
165 
 
The WSSD discussions brought various constitutive elements of development 
thinking together and thus the contents of the outcome documents provided a good overview 
of how the international community conceptualised sustainable development at that time.
40
 
The most important contribution in this regard is the clarification of the components of 
sustainable development. Both the Declaration and the Plan recognised environmental 
protection, economic development and social development as the ‘interdependent and 
mutually reinforcing pillars’ of sustainable development and advocated for greater 
integration between them.
41
 This approach followed the success of developing countries at 
the WSSD to define sustainable development so that it incorporated social and economic 
development.
42
 The more integrated, balanced treatment of the social, economic and 
environmental goals showed how the concept of sustainable development has evolved, and, 
as will be discussed later, reflects the contemporary understanding of sustainable 
development.
43
  
In line with the 10-yearly gatherings since UNCED, the UN Conference on 
Sustainable Development (hereafter ‘Rio+20’) was held in 2012.44 The outcome document 
renewed political commitment for sustainable development, assessed progress made, 
examined implementation gaps, and recommended ways to address new and emerging 
challenges.
45
 Of particular concern to this thesis is the fact that the Conference reaffirmed 
three points.  
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First, it reaffirmed the Rio principles and past action plans on sustainable 
development.
46
 Second, it reaffirmed that environmental protection, social development and 
economic growth are the three pillars of sustainable development and therefore called for 
these pillars to be integrated, ‘recognizing their interlinkages, so as to achieve sustainable 
development in all its dimensions.’47 Third, it reaffirmed that the eradication of poverty 
remains the ‘greatest global challenge facing the world today and an indispensable 
requirement for sustainable development.’48  
The relevance of these affirmations is that they show that there has been little change 
to the understanding of sustainable development in international law and policy 20 years 
after Rio. Furthermore, for developing countries, the challenges of sustainable development 
remain the same 50 years after the Stockholm Conference. These are points that will be 
returned to later.
49
 Before then, it is important to examine the meaning and core elements of 
sustainable development. 
5.2.2  What is Sustainable Development? 
Almost three decades after the term ‘sustainable development’ was made popular by 
the Brundtland Report, some commentators still feel its exact meaning remains unclear.
50
 
What then is the ‘sustainable development’ upon which global consensus was reached at Rio 
and reaffirmed at Johannesburg and Rio+20? Is it indeed possible or desirable to have an 
‘exact’ meaning of sustainable development for it to be achieved? This section attempts to 
answer these questions.  
The Brundtland Report, in proposing ‘sustainable development’ defined it as 
‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
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generation to meet their own needs.’51 However, the imprecise nature of this definition has 
led to an avalanche of interpretations. A review of these interpretations reveals that they 
work within the definition in the Brundtland Report but differ in terms of the emphasis 
placed on one or more of the pillars of sustainable development.
52
 Consequently, although 
the definition in the Brundtland Report remains the most widely quoted definition of 
sustainable development, some commentators have argued in favour of a single precise 
international definition.
53
 The summary of their argument is that a single precise definition 
will make the concept easier to implement by states and enforced by courts.
54
 
The argument in favour of a unitary definition for sustainable development is 
however rejected by others.
55
 The most incisive rejection of this argument comes from 
Michael Jacobs.
56
 While he concedes that it is important to continue to clarify ‘what the 
concept means in practice’, he argues convincingly that the debate over the ‘meaning of the 
concept’ is misguided.57 This, he argues, is because sustainable development is a 
‘contestable concept.’58 Contestable concepts, he explains, have two levels of meaning. The 
first is unitary and vague and is often expressed in a short definition while the second level 
of meaning is how the concept should be interpreted in practice.
59 
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Accordingly, he argues that a unitary definition for sustainable development is only 
possible at the first level and that has been achieved by the definition in the Brundtland 
Report.
60
 The variety of definitions at the second level, he argues, is due to the different 
interests of those who use the term.
61
 However, neither the vagueness nor variety of 
definitions makes the concept useless.
62
 He therefore concludes that the definition in the 
Brundtland Report is deemed sufficient to express the concept; arguments can then proceed 
as to what must be done to achieve it in practice.
63
 
         While there may be some merit in the arguments for a unitary definition of sustainable 
development, one cannot but agree with Jacobs. This is because the Brundtland Report made 
it clear that although the pursuit of sustainable development should be a global objective, ‘no 
single blueprint of sustainability will be found, as economic and social systems and 
ecological conditions differ widely among countries.’64  For this reason, the Report proposed 
that the interpretations of what constitutes sustainable development may vary among 
countries.
65
 However, all interpretations ‘must share certain general features and must flow 
from the consensus on the basic concept of sustainable development and on a broad strategic 
framework for achieving it.’66  Furthermore, Agenda 21 also recognised the futility in 
defining sustainable development in precise terms as it allows countries to interpret the 
principles contained in the Rio Declaration ‘according to their different situations, capacities 
and priorities.’67  
As such, it is argued that a single precise definition of sustainable development is not 
required for the concept to be promoted, especially at the national level. This thesis therefore 
makes no attempt to provide a single precise definition of sustainable development. Instead, 
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the focus will be on the contemporary understanding of sustainable development and the 
common elements that can be identified as being central to a sustainable development 
approach. Consequently, based on the prior review of the evolution of the concept in 
international law and policy, the contemporary understanding of sustainable development is 
the integration of economic development, environmental protection, and social development 
in development decision–making in order to improve the quality of life of the present 
generation while enabling future generations to do the same.
68
 A discussion of the core 
elements inherent in this understanding follows.   
5.2.3  The Core Elements of Sustainable Development 
 A common approach by commentators in discussions about the meaning of 
sustainable development is to identify the main ‘principles’ or ‘elements’ of the concept.69 A 
review of the various principles identified by commentators reveals a striking similarity 
indicating some degree of consensus about the content of sustainable development. It is 
however not particularly useful to this thesis to consider all the principles. As such, the 
discussion here is limited to a brief overview of the three principles upon which an 
overwhelming consensus has been formed as comprising the minimum requirements of 
sustainable development. This is based upon a review of their recurrence in international 
legal texts and the academic literature.  
5.2.3.1  Principle of Integration 
The principle of integration has been variously referred to as the ‘central’,70 
‘foundational’,71 and ‘most essential’ principle of sustainable development.72 Notions of the 
                                           
68
 This understanding is also reflected in the use of the term in international instruments and jurisprudence. See 
section 5.2.4.   
69
 See, for example, Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2
nd
 edn, CUP 2003) 253- 
266; Duncan French, International Law and Policy on Sustainable Development (MUP 2005) 51 – 70;  Jane 
Holder  and  Maria Lee, Environmental Protection, Law, and Policy: Text and Materials (2nd edn, CUP 2007) 
231-243; Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law on the Environment (3
rd
 edn 
OUP 2009) 116-123; Jacobs (n 55) 24; Boyle and Freestone (n 53) 8 – 16. 
70
 French (n 69) 54.    
  
170 
 
principle can be found in the Stockholm Declaration.
73
 However, it was Principle 4 of the 
Rio Declaration that gave birth to the principle of integration as it is being conceptualised 
today when it stated that ‘in order to achieve sustainable development, environmental 
protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be 
considered in isolation from it’74   
Essentially, the principle requires the simultaneous and coherent considerations of 
economic, social and environmental concerns in a development decision. This requirement 
lies at the heart of sustainable development and the application of the other principles of the 
concept depends largely on an integrated approach. As such, there is consensus amongst 
commentators that the principle serves as a conceptual framework to guide the consideration 
of other principles and thus best reflects how sustainable development should be pursued in 
practice.
75
 It is therefore not surprising that the principle permeates the Rio instruments, the 
documents produced at the various conferences on sustainable development and international 
treaties aimed at sustainable development.
76
  If interpreted correctly, the principle should 
affect the way policies are created and realised both at the national and international levels 
and also guide the implementation of specific measures aimed at sustainable development.
77
    
5.2.3.2  Intergenerational Equity 
A core idea behind sustainable development is that the present generation should 
consider the long term effects of their actions in order not to constrain the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs. Intergenerational equity is therefore one of the main 
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justifications for sustainable development. The principle of intergenerational equity had 
existed separately in both international environmental law and international development 
law.
78
 They were then brought together within the context of sustainable development by the 
following: ‘The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet the 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.’79 
Intergenerational equity refers to the obligation of present generations to take into 
account the long term impact of their activities in order to ensure that future generations are 
also able to meet their own developmental and environmental needs.
80
 While this basic 
premise is understood, there remains considerable scope for debate as to how to implement 
the principle in practice.
81
 However, commentators do agree that the starting point in 
pursuing intergenerational equity is to ensure that the present generation do not unduly 
restrict or impose unreasonable constraints on the options that are available to future 
generations to meet their own needs and to solve their problems.
82
  
5.2.3.3  Intragenerational Equity 
Unlike intergenerational equity which seeks to address equity between generations, 
intragenerational equity addresses inequity within the present generation.
83
 Essentially the 
principle refers to the obligation to ensure a fair and just distribution of the benefits of the 
earth’s resources within the present generation. Although this includes the obligation to 
ensure equity within a country, it is particularly concerned with addressing the widening gap 
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in resources between developing and developed countries in the sustainable development 
discourse.
84
    
Intragenerational equity is critical to sustainable development as it will be difficult to 
avoid ecological and other crises without the eradication of poverty and inequity within the 
current generation.
85
 This is because those within the present generation who cannot meet 
their essential needs will often destroy their immediate environment in order to survive.
86
 
Accordingly, without intragenerational equity, it would be difficult to achieve 
intergenerational equity, and consequently, sustainable development.  
While there remains a difference of opinion on the modalities and instruments to be 
used to implement intragenerational equity, its main idea of ensuring fairness and justice 
within the present generations, and, its importance to sustainable development, is generally 
understood and accepted by the global community. In practice, it usually takes the form of 
provision of financial assistance from developed to developing countries, and the application 
of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility.
87
  
5.2.4  Legal Relevance and Status of Sustainable Development in International Law 
and Policy. 
This section examines the legal relevance and status of sustainable development. The 
main aim is to show how the concept has grown, how it is being conceptualised or 
understood and the duty that it imposes on states. The analysis will include a brief 
examination of the usage of ‘sustainable development’ in international legal texts and in 
national constitutions. It will conclude with an analysis of the legal status of the concept in 
international law. 
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References to ‘sustainable development’ can be found in a growing number of 
treaties covering various issues at both the global and regional levels.
88
 Such references may 
appear as a principle to be taken into account in the implementation of the treaty. For 
example, parties to the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
agreed that their relations and activities should be conducted ‘in accordance with the 
objective of sustainable development.’89  
In other cases, sustainable development is included as an objective or a purpose of 
the treaty. For example, an objective of the 2007 Charter of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations is to ‘promote sustainable development so as to ensure the protection of the 
region’s environment, the sustainability of its natural resources, the preservation of its 
cultural heritage and the high quality of life of its people’90  
The references to sustainable development in a growing number of treaties are 
particularly relevant for two reasons. First, it confirms the contemporary understanding of 
sustainable development. Thus although the sustainable development objective is worded 
slightly differently in each treaty, generally, the principle of integration is reflected within 
each interpretation.
91
 Interestingly, this remains the case even in treaties where the parties 
are mainly developed countries. For example, the signatories to the European Landscape 
Convention proclaimed that they are ‘concerned to achieve sustainable development based 
on a balanced and harmonious relationship between social needs, economic activity and the 
environment.’92   
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Second, the references to sustainable development in a growing number of treaties can 
be seen as evidence of state practice recognising sustainable development as an objective of 
the international community and one which each country is expected to promote and take 
into account when implementing treaties.
93
 It is conceded that mere references do not create 
legally binding obligations to achieve sustainable development per se. However, the fact that 
the concept is made an objective or purpose of a treaty makes it directly relevant not only in 
the implementation of the obligations imposed by the treaty but also in any judicial 
interpretation of the provisions of the treaty.  
The view that the references to sustainable development in treaties have legal 
implications received support from the Appellate Body of the WTO in the Shrimp Products 
Case.
94
 It considered the legal significance of the sustainable development objective in the 
WTO Agreement and concluded that the explicit recognition of sustainable development as 
an objective ‘demonstrates a recognition by WTO negotiators that optimal use of the world’s 
resources should be made in accordance with the objective of sustainable development.’95 As 
such, the concept of sustainable development ‘must add colour, texture and shading’ to the 
interpretation of the agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement.
96
  
At the national level, a significant number of national constitutions now contain 
references to sustainable development.
97
 In some of these constitutions, the references may 
be found in the preamble.
98
 However, in the majority of cases, sustainable development 
appears as part of the objectives and general principles to guide national policies. For 
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example, one of the ‘fundamental tasks of the state’ prescribed in the 2010 Constitution of 
the Republic of Angola is ‘to promote harmonious and sustainable development throughout 
national territory.’99   
The reference to sustainable development in national constitutions is worded and 
operationalised slightly differently in each constitution. However, most formulations reflect 
the contemporary understanding of the concept built around the core elements. For example, 
the preamble to the French Charter for the Environment highlights intergenerational and 
intragenerational equities by stating that ‘in order to ensure sustainable development, choices 
designed to meet the needs of the present generation should not jeopardise the ability of 
future generations and other peoples to meet their own needs.’100 The Charter then goes on to 
advocate for an integrated approach by proclaiming that ‘public policies shall promote 
sustainable development. To this end they shall reconcile the protection and enhancement of 
the environment with economic development and social progress.’101 
While national constitutions are not formal sources of international law within the 
context of Article 38 (1) of the ICJ Statute, they contain the fundamental principles of 
national legal orders and also constitute an important aspect of state practice.
102
 Therefore, 
the growing reference to sustainable development in national constitutions is an indication of 
the weight states attach to the concept. For example, the Constitution of Ethiopia 1994 goes 
even further to create a collective ‘right’ to sustainable development.103 Furthermore, it 
provides that the sustainable development of Ethiopia is the central focus of the country’s 
foreign policy and ‘all international agreements and relations concluded, established or 
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conducted by the State shall protect and ensure Ethiopia’s right to sustainable 
development.’104  
 Despite the widespread endorsement of sustainable development by states in 
international and national legal texts, the legal status of the concept has been the subject of 
debate.
 
A review of these debates indicates three broad positions. At one end of the spectrum 
there are those who argue that the concept is a norm of international customary law.
105
 The 
strongest support for this view comes from Judge Christopher Weeramantry.
106
 He argues 
that sustainable development is not merely a concept but is a ‘principle with normative 
value.’107 For support, he relies on the ‘wide and general recognition of the concept’ in 
international instruments, by international organisations and in state practice.
108
 He therefore 
concludes that the principle of sustainable development ‘is thus a part of modern 
international law by reason not only of its inescapable logical necessity, but also by reason of 
its wide and general acceptance by the global community.’109  
The view that the principle of sustainable development is now part of customary 
international law is however rejected by those at the other end of the spectrum. The most 
incisive criticism in this regard comes from Vaughan Lowe.
110
 He rejects the suggestion by 
Judge Weeramantry that references to the concept in international instruments are evidence 
of the concept’s translation into customary international law.111 Although he concedes that 
there is frequent use of the term in international legal texts, he argues that this does not 
translate into evidence of general practice accepting the concept as law, in the absence of any 
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instance where states rely on the concept as a binding rule of law constraining their 
conduct.
112
   
More fundamentally, Lowe argues that the uncertainty regarding the exact meaning 
and scope of the concept means it lacks a ‘fundamentally norm-creating character such as 
could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law’ as laid down by the ICJ in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.
113
 Consequently, although he agrees that the concept 
does have normative status, he maintains that ‘the argument that sustainable development is 
a norm of customary international law, binding on and directing the conduct of states, and 
which can be applied by tribunals, is not sustainable.’114   
   The dominant view however falls somewhere between these two extremes discussed 
above. Proponents of this view concede that sustainable development still falls short of a 
binding international legal principle.
115
 However, they argue that the concept nevertheless 
significantly influences decision-making in all contexts and the practice of states.
116
  
For example, Nico Schrijver argues that Lowe stretched his criticism of Judge 
Weeramantry ‘somewhat too far’ especially as regards his argument that the concept suffers 
from theoretical obscurity and confusion.
117
 He agrees that the concept is not yet a binding 
rule of customary law.
118
 However, he concludes that based on ‘significant recent 
developments’, the concept has become an established objective of the international 
                                           
112
 Ibid 23 – 24. 
113
 Ibid 31. (Germany/Denmark; Germany/Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 3.  
114
 Ibid 30. See also French (n 69) 51; Handl (n 53) 25 – 26. 
115
 See as examples, Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 69)126 - 127; Nico Schrivjer, ‘Development - The 
Neglected Dimension in the Post - Rio International Law of Sustainable Development’ in Hans Christian 
Bugge and Christina Voigt (eds), Sustainable Development in International and National Law (ELP 2008)233; 
BM Marong, ‘From Rio to Johannesburg: Some Reflections on the Role of International Legal Norms in 
Sustainable Development (2004) 16 Georgetown Intl Env L Rev 21, 45. 
116
 Ibid. 
117
 Schrivjer, Development (n 115) 233. 
118
 Ibid. 
  
178 
 
community and a concept with an ‘established status’ in international law, although he does 
not state what this status is.
119
  
  Similarly, BM Marong agrees that the concept could be normative in the sense that it 
serves as a guide to practical reasoning in diverse decision-making contexts at the national 
and international levels.
120
 However, he suggests that the concept is best treated as an 
overarching societal objective for which law has a role to play for it to be achieved.
121
 Based 
on this perspective, he concludes that although it falls short of a binding legal obligation, the 
legal notion of sustainable development implies a legitimate expectation on the part of the 
international community that states and other actors conduct their affairs in line with the 
objective of sustainable development.
122
 
The differing views of commentators concerning the legal status of sustainable 
development in international law indicate that no easy answer can be given to the question. 
While there is no doubt that there is widespread global acceptance of ‘sustainable 
development’, this is not sufficient to make it a rule of customary international law in the 
traditional sense. For it to be one, states must also ‘feel that they are conforming to what 
amounts to a legal obligation.’123 At present, it is difficult to argue that this is the case. For 
example, almost 20 years after Agenda 21 called on states to adopt sustainable development 
strategies to integrate policies, some states are yet to adopt such a policy suggesting that they 
do not feel legally bound to do so.
124
 In other words, it is difficult to argue with certainty that 
there is opinio juris, which along with state practice, is required to establish a binding legal 
custom under customary international law.
125
 Consequently, it must be conceded that at 
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present, sustainable development is yet to attain the status of a binding rule of customary 
international law, in the traditional sense.  
However, that is not the end of the matter. As some commentators have noted, the 
legal relevance of sustainable development is not solely dependent on its normative status.
126
 
The historical evolution of the concept and its use in international legal texts shows that 
international law recognises a principle (or at least the concept) of sustainable development. 
The jurisprudence on sustainable development also confirms that the concept does influence 
the outcome of cases and the practice of states irrespective of its legal status.
127
 For example, 
in the Pulp Mills case, the ICJ, in interpreting Article 27 of the 1975 Statute of the River 
Uruguay affirmed sustainable development as an objective of the global community which 
should influence the practice of states.
128
   
 The decisions of some national courts also confirm that states are expected to pursue 
the objective of sustainable development irrespective of its exact status in international law. 
For example, in the Eppawela Case the Sri Lankan Supreme Court noted as follows:  
 
Admittedly, the principles set out in the Stockholm and Rio De Janeiro 
Declarations are not legally binding in the way in which an Act of our Parliament 
would be. It may be regarded merely as “soft law” Nevertheless, as a Member of 
the United Nations, they could hardly be ignored by Sri Lanka.
129
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Similarly, in the Fuel Retailers case, the South African Constitutional Court construed and 
applied the concept of sustainable development based on its evolution in international law 
and went on to dismiss the appeal partly because it was ‘not persuaded that the principles of 
sustainable development are engaged’ in the matter.130 
5.3 THE MISPLACED FOCUS ON SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS  
  Agenda 21 states that investment is critical to the ability of developing countries to 
achieve sustainable development.
131
 It therefore encouraged countries, in particular 
developing countries, to mobilise ‘higher levels of foreign direct investment’ through 
policies that promote investment.
132
 For this reason, countries were advised to maintain a 
‘stable policy regime’ as it encourages investment by enabling business and industry to 
implement longer-term policies.
133
     
  However, at the same time, Agenda 21 also encouraged each country to ‘establish 
policies that allows them to benefit fully from the flows of foreign investment, within the 
framework of national, social, economic and developmental goals.’134 The question that 
arises is whether developing countries are able to establish and implement the required 
policies where they have granted stabilisation clauses to create a ‘stable policy regime’ for 
investment purposes. In other words, do stabilisation clauses adversely affect sustainable 
development by limiting the ability of states to establish and implement the policies required 
to promote their sustainable development? For over a decade after the Rio Conference and 
the re-introduction of stabilisation clauses into developing countries, this question has 
received little attention.   
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Concerns about the effect of stabilisation clauses on host states’ regulatory abilities 
began in earnest in 2003 following the publication of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (hereafter 
‘BTC’) pipeline project documents.135 Amnesty International then published a report 
claiming that the stabilisation clauses contained in the project documents had the potential to 
limit the host states’ ability to implement their human rights obligations under international 
law.
136
 The report generated substantial interest and resulted in a huge literature on the 
potential impacts of stabilisation clauses on host states’ regulatory abilities.137 However, 
these studies were concentrated on the potential impact of the clause on the ability of states 
to enact and implement social and environmental laws.
138
 This remained the case even where 
such studies claimed to focus on the impact of the clause on sustainable development.  
For example, Audley Sheppard and Antony Crockett posed the question whether 
stabilisation clauses are a threat to sustainable development.
139
 They then answered the 
question simply by considering what impact, if any, the clause has on the enactment and 
application of social and environmental laws on investors.
140
 Similarly, Lorenzo Cotula 
sought to examine ‘the implications of the regulatory taking doctrine and of stabilisation 
clauses for host state regulation in pursuit of sustainable development goals.’141 However, he 
quickly added that the analysis focuses ‘specifically’ on the impact of the clause on the 
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enactment of ‘regulation raising the social and environmental standards applicable to 
investment projects.’142   
   The remainder of this chapter will argue against this approach whereby the impact of 
stabilisation clauses is considered solely in terms of its impact on the ability of host states to 
enact and apply social and environmental laws on investors or investment projects. In doing 
so, due consideration is given to the possible reasons why this approach has been followed in 
the literature. This is particularly important in view of the avalanche of material and the 
diverse demography of the authors behind these works (academicians, practitioners, NGOs, 
UN agencies, international financial organisations and so on). The reasons given below are 
not intended to be exhaustive. However, they reflect the main reasons behind this approach, 
based upon a review of the literature.  
5.3.1  Possible Reasons behind the Focus on Social and Environmental Laws 
5.3.1.1  Fragmented Institutions and Policies  
   One reason why the literature on the impacts of stabilisation clauses has been focused 
on social and environmental laws is the fragmented and compartmentalised nature of 
institutions and policies. As a result, institutions tend to analyse the impact of the clause only 
to the extent that it affects their narrow compartmentalised concerns.   
  For example, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Business and 
Human Rights (SRSG) helped facilitate research about the potential effects of stabilisation 
clauses on human rights.
143
 Yet several years later, the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development recommended stabilisation clauses to developing countries as an investment 
attraction tool.
144
 The concerns raised earlier about the clause by the SRSG (another UN 
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body) were simply ignored as no mention was made about the potential impact of the clause 
on human rights.  
  The compartmentalised analysis of stabilisation clauses is especially prevalent in the 
literature that is written from a legal perspective. Environmental lawyers are generally 
concerned with the potential impact of stabilisation clauses on the enactment of 
environmental laws.
145
 Human rights lawyers are generally concerned with its potential 
impact on human rights laws.
146
 On the other hand, investment lawyers generally view 
stabilisation clauses simply as an investment protection tool.
147
 As a result, they generally 
ignore the potential impacts of the clause but are mainly concerned with how to make the 
clause more effective in protecting investors.
148
   
   The focus on human rights and the environment in discussions on the impact of 
stabilisation clauses is further fuelled by the fact that the legal debates surrounding the 
impact of the clause were brought to the fore by those working in the field of human rights 
and/or the environment. Commentators not in this field usually only became engaged in the 
debate from the perspective of investors’ protection. Their involvement thus appears to be an 
attempt to ensure that ‘opponents’ of stabilisation clauses do not use the currently more 
morally fashionable human rights and environmental discourses to undermine the protection 
being offered by the clauses.  
  For example, Sheppard
149
 and Crockett
150
 are generally commercial practitioners and 
their examination of the impact of the clause seems more about challenging the view that 
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stabilisation clauses affect human rights in favour of their claimed function in investment 
attraction.
151
 Similarly, both the World Bank and the IFC have been actively involved in the 
processes that led to the drafting of the stringent stabilisation clauses in the BTC pipeline 
project and the project was partly funded by the IFC.
152
 At that time, no attempt was made to 
consider the potential adverse effect the clauses might have on host governments. However, 
when the potential impact of the clause on human rights was brought to the fore by human 
rights NGOs, the IFC quickly intervened in the debate by jointly facilitating the study by 
Andrea Shemberg.
153
   
The point needs to be made that separating policies and institutions into distinct parts 
with each institution focused on its compartmentalised concerns may not be wrong in itself. 
However, where such institutions are concerned with policies that directly relate to the 
pillars of sustainable development, then such fragmentation may create ‘institutional gaps’ in 
the pursuit of sustainable development as it directly conflicts with the principle of integration 
which is at the heart of sustainable development.
154
 Indeed, a key challenge to sustainable 
development identified in the Brundtland Report, is that the institutions facing the 
challenges, both at the national and international levels, have been established based on their 
‘narrow preoccupations and compartmentalized concerns.’155  
The need to analyse the impacts of stabilisation clauses through an integrated, rather 
than a fragmented, approach becomes even more important since the clauses are mainly used 
in the extractive industry, as have been noted in previous chapters. This is because projects 
in this sector usually have a huge combination of interconnected economic, social and 
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environmental impacts. It therefore makes little sense to approach the impact of stabilisation 
clauses only as to their social and or environmental impact.  
5.3.1.2  Reluctance to Engage with Economics 
   The focus on social laws (including human rights) and environmental laws in the 
literature on the impact of stabilisation clauses may also be due to the reluctance by lawyers 
to engage with economics.
156
 This reluctance, it must be said, is not limited to analyses of 
stabilisation clauses. Rather, it is reflective of the way in which lawyers, particularly public 
international lawyers, tend to approach issues relating to the relationship between natural 
resource exploitation and sustainable development in developing countries.
157
 This, as 
Thomas Wälde has argued, is because public international lawyers, especially those in the 
field of environmental law, generally hold the view that economic analysis is ‘beside the 
point and likely to be incorrect, confusing and misleading anyway.’158    
   The argument may be made that the reluctance to engage with economics is justified 
by the fact that such an analysis is best undertaken by economists, rather than lawyers. If this 
argument is true, then it can also be used to question the competence of lawyers to analyse 
the impact of stabilisation clauses on environmental protection since lawyers are not 
environmental scientists. The point being made here is that, in practice, legal commentators 
advocate for stronger environmental and human rights protection based either on data from 
the environmental sciences or actual evidence of human rights abuses and environmental 
degradation. In the same way, consideration can and ought to be given to economic data, or 
the actual evidence of the economic situation in developing countries when analysing the 
impact of stabilisation clauses.   
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  It is therefore not suggested here that engaging with economics when analysing the 
impact of stabilisation clauses on sustainable development will provide all the answers. It is 
also not suggested that legal commentators should conduct a sophisticated economic analysis 
of the impact of stabilisation clauses. However, there seems to be a reluctance by legal 
commentators to consider even the most basic economic analysis or to apply basic economic 
data to their analysis of stabilisation clauses. As a result, the analyses tend to diverge 
significantly from practice.   
  For example, the discussion in chapter 3 showed that legal commentators justify the 
acceptance of stabilisation clauses by reference to a need by developing countries to compete 
for FDI.
159
 However, a review of the literature on current trends and future projection in the 
extractive industry, in addition to a basic application of the economic principle of demand 
and supply, tells another story.
160
 Similarly, legal commentators generally assume that 
stabilisation clauses attract FDI.
161
 However, a review of the inflow of FDI into selected 
countries, following changes to their stabilisation clauses, did not point to any robust link 
between stabilisation clauses and FDI.
162
 Rather, the empirical evidence that does exist in the 
economic literature on the determinants of FDI suggests that the political risk that 
stabilisation clauses are aimed at is a marginal factor in investment decision-making.
163
   
Engaging with economics in an analysis of stabilisation clauses is particularly 
important to understanding the impact of stabilisation clauses because a stabilisation clause 
is primarily an economic tool aimed at protecting the ‘economics’ of the project in favour of 
the investor.
164
 In addition, they were re-introduced into developing countries as part of 
broader economic reforms aimed at attracting FDI to facilitate those countries’ sustainable 
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development.
165
 Furthermore, a review of the available evidence, including from press 
statements, media reports, parliamentary hearings, international arbitration, domestic court 
cases and government documents dealing with disputes between governments and foreign 
investors over stabilisation clauses, reveal that the causes of the disputes are fiscal in 
nature.
166
 
 Thus, the reluctance to engage in economics has created a situation where there is a 
‘controversy’ in the literature over the potential impact of stabilisation clauses on human 
rights and environmental laws. Meanwhile, the only controversy over stabilisation clauses 
that do exist in the real world is centred on fiscal and economic issues.
167
 This clearly 
suggests that, for host governments, it is the economic and fiscal constraints that stabilisation 
clauses impose on them that affect their ability to pursue sustainable development objectives. 
As such, the focus on human rights and environmental laws, while ignoring the economic 
consequences, masks the real threat that stabilisation clauses pose to their sustainable 
development.   
5.3.1.3  Lack of Exposure to the Situation in Developing Countries 
    Stabilisation clauses are used in developing countries. As such, the effects of 
whatever constraints they impose are borne primarily by developing countries. 
Consequently, if an analysis of the impact of the clause on sustainable development is 
to have any semblance to reality, it must be done within the context of the situation in 
developing countries. This is particularly so because the discussion of the evolution of 
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sustainable development in international law and policy shows that sustainable 
development poses different challenges for developed and developing countries.
168
  
  For developed countries, the key challenge is how to get the benefits of a cleaner 
environment without sacrificing economic growth. This is because the bulk of their 
environmental problems are caused by industrialisation and technological 
development.
169
 However, the environmental problems in most developing countries 
are predominantly caused by poverty and economic under-development.
170
 This 
difference in the sustainable development challenges for developed and developing 
countries is reflected in all the major documents on sustainable development and the 
environmental policies of developing countries.
171
  
Furthermore, the extractive industry plays a critical role in the ability of many 
resource-rich developing countries to achieve sustainable development compared to resource 
rich developed countries. For example, in the 2011/2012 fiscal year, the total contribution of 
the oil and gas sector to the UK’s economy was about two per cent.172  This was despite the 
fact that in the same year, the UK was one of the largest producers of oil and gas in the 
EU.
173
 That same fiscal year, the oil industry in Nigeria accounted for 95 per cent of all 
exports and almost 80 per cent of all government revenue.
174
 Thomas Wälde is therefore 
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surely correct when he concluded that the extent to which developing countries depend on 
their natural resource is ‘to a degree not understood in developed countries.’175 
It is therefore not surprising that as seen in the previous chapter, the social, political 
and economic systems in most resource-rich developing countries are determined, to a large 
extent, by the foreign exchange earnings and tax receipts from the extractive industries.
176
 
Indeed, several governments have been replaced largely because of their policies towards the 
extractive industries.
177
 In some of these countries, the elections of new governments were 
partly influenced by specific campaign promises to review natural resources contracts 
including stabilisation clauses in order to obtain greater economic benefits for their 
countries.
178
  
  Based on the above, it could be possible to analyse the impact of stabilisation clauses 
in the UK (assuming the government grants such clauses) by focusing on their social and 
environmental impacts and still reach conclusions that reflect reality. However, it is difficult 
to see how such an approach can produce conclusions that are relevant to developing 
countries in view of the way in which receipts from their extractive industries affect their 
ability to promote sustainable development. The focus on the impacts of stabilisation clauses 
on environmental and social laws may therefore reflect a lack of practical and theoretical 
understanding of the situation in developing countries.
179
 This is because such an approach 
takes the analysis out of the context of developing countries where stabilisation clauses are 
used.  
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5.3.1.4  Western Influence  
 The focus on environmental and human rights laws in the literature on the impact of 
stabilisation clauses also reflects how sustainable development is sometimes treated in 
international law and politics. As Nico Schrijver correctly argues, over the years, 
developmental concerns have been given relatively less weight in international law and 
politics in the field of sustainable development.
180
 Thus since the 1992 UNCED, 
international environmental law and human rights have received an impressive follow up 
while the international law of development has been neglected and subject to considerable 
challenges.
181
  
  In an unrelated study, Thomas Wälde makes some comments which help to explain 
the neglect mentioned by Schrijver above.
182
 He argues that most of the debate, formulation 
and discussion of ‘sustainable development’ come from developed countries.183 Where this 
is not the case, the debate is nevertheless heavily influenced and usually funded (directly or 
indirectly) by developed nations.
184
 This, he argues, ensures that the debate is ‘intellectually 
“owned”’ by developed countries but spread through NGOs and their branches in the 
developing countries.’185 For this reason, he argues, the voice of developing countries is 
rarely heard in substance.
186
 The situation, he further notes, is made worse by the fact that 
the badly equipped state of developing countries’ universities means that ‘there is little, if 
any, possibility of think-tank work not dependent on Western funding, which almost always 
favours work in, with and for Western themes.’187 This therefore makes it ‘almost 
impossible’ for an intellectual from a developing country to act independently from the 
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direct or indirect influence and expectations that come with such funding, especially as these 
expectations are ‘clothed in a morally appealing philanthropic and friendly language.’188 
  The above views separately expressed by Wälde and Schrijver may be used to 
explain the focus on human rights and environmental protection in the literature on the 
impact of stabilisation clauses. The findings in this thesis, and a review of the literature, 
show that concerns have always been raised by commentators writing from a developing 
countries’ perspective about the potential economic and development implication of 
stabilisation clauses. However, these concerns, and how they might affect sustainable 
development have not attracted any significant international attention. 
  An example of this is Yinka Omoregbe, who in 1996 raised concerns about the 
economic implication of stabilisation clauses in the Nigerian LNG (Fiscal Incentives 
Guarantees and Assurances) (Amendment) Act 1993.
189
 She argued that the clauses have the 
potential to prevent the government’s revenue expectations from the project from being 
met.
190
 Also, during the parliamentary processes that led to the enactment of Ghana’s 
Minerals and Mining Act 2006, several local activists and civil society objected to the 
inclusion of stabilisation clauses in the Act.
191
 They argued that stability agreements should 
not be included in the Act, because ‘economic situations can change for better or worse.’192 
However because these concerns were mainly economic in nature, they were not seen as a 
sustainable development issue. Neither did they attract significant international attention. In 
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fact, such concerns are often dismissed by Western investment lawyers and press as a mere 
expression of resource nationalism sentiments.
193
 Where host governments listen to these 
concerns and take steps towards it, their actions are also judged by the Western press as ‘a 
sign of perfidious host-country behaviour.’194   
  Stabilisation clauses only generated massive interest and attention when Amnesty 
International highlighted their potential impact upon human rights (used as a surrogate for 
social and environmental laws) impact.
195
 Since then, the flurry of commentaries and studies 
on the impact of stabilisation clauses, which has been mainly undertaken or sponsored by 
NGOs, academics or institutions from or based in the West, have taken the same approach. 
The focus has thus been in line with the sustainable development priorities of developed 
countries, rather than addressing the real concerns in developing countries where the clauses 
are used. It therefore comes as no surprise that despite the massive literature on the impact of 
stabilisation clauses on human rights and environmental laws, Sheppard and Crockett could 
still reach the following conclusions in 2012 that brings into question the practical relevance 
of such studies: 
    
  To date, there appears to be no evidence to support the argument that stabilisation 
clauses have a chilling effect on the improvement of human rights or 
environmental standards. In particular, the authors of this chapter are not aware of 
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any reported case law, arbitral award, or even anecdotal evidence that 
demonstrates that stabilization clauses have had this chilling effect in practice.
196
  
 
  Winfred Beckerman is therefore surely correct when he argued that unless the environmental 
aspects of a sustainable development problem in a developing country are highlighted, such 
problems are unlikely to attract international attention and interest.
197
  
5.3.1.5  Flawed Interpretation of the Concept of Sustainable Development 
    As explained earlier, the focus on social and environmental laws remains true even 
when the specific literature claims to be focused on the impact of stabilisation clauses on 
sustainable development.
198
 For example, Sheppard and Crockett concluded that stabilisation 
clauses are not a threat to sustainable development because they did not operate as a 
constraint to ‘bonafide law reform in relation to environmental or social matters.’199 This 
way of viewing the impact of stabilisation clauses reflects the arguments seen in the few 
commentaries purporting to analyse the impact of stabilisation clauses on sustainable 
development.
200
 It thus explains that the focus on social and environmental laws is due, in 
part, to a flawed understanding or interpretation of sustainable development.  
  First, such an approach ignores the principle of integration which as noted previously 
has been variously described as the ‘central’, ‘foundational’, ‘bedrock and ‘most essential’ 
principle of sustainable development.
201
 Indeed, the historical evolution of sustainable 
development shows that the concept was proposed because humanity faced an ‘interlocking 
                                           
196
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197
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crisis.’202 Yet the policies enacted, and institutions established, to deal with the crisis have 
been fragmented, leading to development that is unsustainable because environmental, social 
and economic goals are treated solely as distinct and separate goals.
203
 It is therefore 
submitted that an analysis of the impact of stabilisation clauses on sustainable development, 
which ignores its impact on economic growth and how this might affect the other two pillars, 
negates the basic premise of sustainable development.  
  Second, a review of the literature also suggests that the focus on social and 
environmental laws may be due to an interpretation of sustainable development that treats 
the concept as being interchangeable with environmental protection. This flawed 
understanding of sustainable development, it must be said, is not limited to the analyses of 
the impacts of stabilisation clauses. Rather, it reflects the way some public international 
environmental lawyers tend to interpret sustainable development.
204
 In other words, for such 
lawyers, sustainable development is viewed as a synonym for environmental protection.
205
    
However, some other public international lawyers have challenged this approach, and 
rightly so. For example, Maria-Claire Cordonier Segger argues that sustainable development 
was not proposed as a ‘compromise term’ to refer to a more environmentally friendly way of 
exploiting natural resources, nor as a ‘softer’ way to refer to environmental laws and policies 
in developing countries.
206 
Indeed, although sustainable development law encompasses much 
of international environmental law, there are important differences. As Patricia Birnie, Alan 
Boyle and Catherine Redgwell argue:   
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International environmental law encompasses both much and less of sustainable 
development. There is major overlap in rules, principles, techniques and 
institutions, but the goals are by no means identical. Most obviously, sustainable 
development is as much about economic development as about environmental 
protection; while these two goals are integrated, they remain distinct. 
207
    
 
  The discussion of the evolution of sustainable development in international law 
supports the view that sustainable development is as much about economic development as it 
is about environmental protection and social growth.
208
 As a result, sustainable development 
may be impeded not only when the exploitation of natural resources is environmentally 
inefficient but also when it is commercially inefficient.
209
 This means that any constraints on 
the ability of the government to maximise the commercial efficiency of its extractive 
industry also affects sustainable development. As such, an analysis of the impact of 
stabilisation clauses that ignores this aspect but claims to be focused on ‘sustainable 
development’ is unsustainable. 
  The final flaw with analysing the impacts of stabilisation clauses on sustainable 
development solely in relation to their social and environmental impacts is that this assumes 
that sustainable development is a fixed state of harmony. In other words, it assumes that 
progress has been made within the economic pillar by using stabilisation clauses to attract 
FDI. As such what is required is to subsequently enact and implement social and 
environmental laws in order to maintain the harmony. This view of sustainable development 
is flawed because the ‘sustainable development’ proposed in the Brundtland Report, 
discussed at global conferences and used in several legal texts, is ‘not a fixed state of 
                                           
207
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harmony.’210 Rather, it is ‘a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the 
direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional 
change are made consistent with future as well as present needs.’211 It is for this reason that 
Agenda 21 is a ‘dynamic programme’ evolving ‘over time in the light of changing needs and 
circumstances.’212  
    Thus to achieve sustainable development, governments must adopt and implement 
laws and policies that facilitate sustainable development, and ‘regularly assess and modify 
them’ when appropriate to improve their effectiveness.213 It thus means that all laws, 
including fiscal and economic laws must be able to adapt to change if they are to remain 
effective in promoting sustainable development.  
   Accordingly, if stabilisation clauses impose constraints on the ability of host states to 
regularly assess and modify their fiscal or economic laws, sustainable development is 
impeded. However, this impact may not be revealed where the analysis simply focuses on 
the ability of a government to enact social and environmental laws. This is particularly the 
case for developing countries where the link between economic growth, social development 
and environmental protection operate most directly.
214
  
  Before concluding this discussion, it is important to emphasise that it is not suggested 
here that the literature dealing with stabilisation clauses and human rights and/or 
environmental protection serve no useful purpose. Such studies, and in particular the study 
by Andrea Shemberg, have helped to highlight how stabilisation clauses are drafted, and how 
this may constrain the ability of host states to protect human rights and the environment.
215
 
However, it is argued that this is as far as such studies may go.  
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  Based on the discussion so far in this chapter, it is submitted that studying the impacts 
of stabilisation clauses solely in terms of their impacts on human rights seems to be an overly 
simplistic, emotional response to a more complicated issue. For such analyses to have any 
semblance to reality, they must go further to give careful consideration to the often complex 
interactions between all three pillars of sustainable development and how stabilisation 
clauses affect their integration. This is particularly so because, as the following analysis will 
show, fiscal and economic policies are critical to the ability of developing countries to 
promote sustainable development. 
5.3.2  Economic and Fiscal Policies and Sustainable Development  
     First, the point needs to be made that it may be possible to identify certain measures 
taken to implement sustainable development according to the constituent pillar at which they 
are aimed. However, more often such measures do not fit into strict categorisation. This is 
because the purpose and effect of such laws may significantly impact on more than one of 
the pillars of sustainable development.
216
  In addition, several countries have enacted, or are 
in the process of enacting, laws specifically aimed at sustainable development.
217
 These laws 
cannot be appropriately labelled as ‘environmental’, ‘social’ or ‘economic laws’. They are 
simply ‘sustainable development’ laws, even where they are not explicitly so named.218    
  Whatever the title given to laws enacted to implement sustainable development and 
the specific pillar(s) at which that they may be aimed, their effective implementation largely 
depends on the ability of the governments in question to fund the measures prescribed in 
their laws. For example, the Manitoba Sustainable Development Act 1997 imposed a duty on 
the provincial government to provide grants to support ‘innovative projects, activities, 
                                           
216
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217
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research and developments that further the sustainability of Manitoba's economy, 
environment, human health and social well-being and support environmentally sustainable 
economic growth.’219 The grants were to be given from a ‘Sustainable Development 
Innovations Fund’ established for that purpose, which consisted of ‘amounts appropriated to 
it.’220 The effectiveness of this Fund, and the measures that it was expected to finance, thus 
depended on the amount of revenue available to the province. This in turn depended on the 
effectiveness of their fiscal and economic policies in generating revenue.  
   The importance of effective fiscal policies in promoting sustainable development is 
even more critical for developing countries as they are more constrained by financial 
resources in their pursuit of sustainable development. It is for this reason that Agenda 21 
called for a ‘substantial flow of new and additional financial resources to developing 
countries, in order to cover the incremental costs for the actions they have to undertake’ to 
implement sustainable development.
221
 However, as will be discussed in detail later, 
sustainable development is better advanced when the means to finance the measures taken to 
implement it come, as much as possible, from domestic resources.
222
  
The principal sources of domestic finance are private savings and government 
revenue derived mainly from taxation.
223
 Thus the tax policy, which forms part of the 
government’s fiscal policies, is of crucial importance to the promotion of sustainable 
development in these countries.
224
 This is particularly so as weak tax structures in many 
developing countries have ensured that, despite being poorer and in need of more funds, 
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developing countries’ tax revenues remain, on average, lower than those of developed 
countries.
225
  
Given the importance of fiscal policies including, tax policies in the ability of 
developing countries to achieve sustainable development, the fact that these issues are not 
getting the attention they deserve in international legal discourse has been described as 
‘strange’ and ‘surprising’.226 This argument can be extended into the context of this thesis to 
argue that given the importance of fiscal laws in promoting sustainable development, it is 
strange and surprising that studies into the impact of stabilisation clauses have focused 
almost entirely on social and environmental laws. This surprise, however, diminishes when 
viewed against the arguments made in the last section.
227
 The neglect of fiscal policies and 
other development issues is therefore not because these issues are not important. Rather, it is 
because the debate and discussion have been heavily framed and/or influenced by the West.  
Before concluding on this point, it is important to mention that in recent years, 
increasing attention is being given to the link between taxation and sustainable development. 
The interaction between fiscal policies, including tax laws, poverty eradication and human 
rights protection has been receiving more attention. Consistent with the argument made in 
previous sections, the increased attention has been brought about by a shift in the rhetoric in 
the West. This debate is again largely influenced by human rights and environmental groups 
who are increasingly beginning to see the link between fiscal and other non–
environmental/human rights policies and the realisation of human rights.
228
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For example, in a 2010 event jointly organised by the Business and Human Rights 
Resource Centre and Global Witness, significant attention was given to the effect on human 
rights of issues such as corruption and lack of transparency, inequitable concession contracts, 
and tax avoidance/evasion.
229
 According to the co-hosts, these issues were identified as 
‘deserving greater attention by governments, companies and civil society when it comes to 
policy and law-making.’230 This, they argued, was because these issues have been ‘at best 
peripheral to the human rights and business’ debate thus far.231   
  The reason for this shift is simple. The recent (and on-going) economic crisis in many 
developed countries has brought about a realisation that protecting the environment and 
human rights depends to a significant extent on economic policies.
232
 Economic policies 
taken to implement austerity measures have reduced capital allocation for the full realisation 
of some human rights, especially economic, social and cultural rights.
233
 As governments’ 
priorities stay focused on economic recovery, certain expenditure is now regarded as a 
burden that can no longer be afforded. Indeed many governments of developed countries are 
currently reforming their welfare systems and cutting public spending despite concerns that 
these measures impede the realisation of certain human rights.  
For example, human rights concerns have been raised over the so-called ‘bedroom 
tax’ being implemented in the UK whereby housing benefit payments have been reduced for 
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social tenants deemed by the government to have more bedrooms than they need.
234
 
However, the government has consistently rejected these concerns largely on the ground that 
the ‘bedroom tax’ is required to save £500m a year as part of the government’s austerity 
measures.
235
   
It is for such reasons that the role of fiscal and tax policies in replenishing this 
diminished capital stream for promoting sustainable development, including the protection 
of human rights and the environment, has taken on added significance in the UK and other 
developed countries. It has therefore been given ‘greater exposure’ by human rights and 
environmental groups.
236
 As a result, tax evasion and tax avoidance issues have been brought 
to the fore by several governments in developed countries, including the British Prime 
Minister who pledged to use the G8 ‘to drive a more serious debate on tax evasion and tax 
avoidance’ because it is an issue ‘whose time has come.’237 
5.4 CONCLUSIONS  
There will always be those who argue over the exact meaning and legal status of 
sustainable development. However, the basic premise and core elements of the concept are 
now largely established. The historical evolution of the concept shows that its goal is to 
reconcile economic, social and environment policies to improve the quality of life of present 
generations without placing undue constraints on the ability of future generations to do the 
same. Furthermore, the usage of ‘sustainable development’ in international legal texts and 
jurisprudence confirms that it is now a fully established objective of the international 
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community and states are therefore expected to conduct their affairs in line with this 
objective.  
Despite the widespread acceptance and usage of sustainable development, little is 
known about the way in which it may be affected by stabilisation clauses. This is because 
while much has been written on the potential impact of the clause, the focus has been on 
social and environmental laws. The second part of this chapter sought to explain the possible 
reasons for this focus and in the process argued that the focus is misplaced. Indeed, for 
developing countries, fiscal and economic policy reforms are as important, if not more 
important, to sustainable development, than simply enacting more environmental and social 
laws. This is because achieving sustainable development depends to a significant extent on 
the ability of governments to alter their fiscal and economic policies to ensure that the 
maximum available resources are provided to fund their sustainable development measures.  
As the following chapter will argue, stabilisation clauses impose a constraint on the ability of 
host states to do this.   
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CHAPTER 6 –  THE IMPACT OF STABILISATION CLAUSES ON 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
6.1  INTRODUCTION  
  The last chapter argued that if an analysis of the impact of stabilisation clauses is to 
have any semblance to reality, it must give careful consideration of the complex interactions 
between the pillars of sustainable development. It must also be undertaken with a particular 
eye on the sustainable development challenges in developing countries as this is where the 
clauses are used.  This is what this chapter seeks to do.  
  In practice, the exact way in which stabilisation clauses affect sustainable 
development may vary from country to country. This thesis therefore takes a three-pronged 
approach to discussing these effects. First, the chapter will examine the straightforward link 
between fiscal/economic policies and the enactment and implementation of environmental 
and social laws, including human rights laws. The aim is to show that the constraints 
imposed by stabilisation clauses on fiscal and economic policies directly affect the other 
pillars of sustainable development. Second, four ways in which stabilisation clauses can 
affect sustainable development in any resource-rich developing country are discussed. 
Finally, two case studies will be presented to help illustrate how stabilisation clauses affect 
sustainable development in practice. 
6.2  THE REDUCTION OF POLICY SPACE ON SOCIAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS.   
    As explained earlier, sustainable development is promoted when social, economic 
and environmental goals are integrated in development decision-making. As such, if a policy 
aimed at promoting sustainable development is to be effective, it must give careful 
consideration to the interactions between these three pillars. As stated by Agenda 21, such 
policies should be regularly assessed and modified in the light of changing needs and 
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circumstances to improve their effectiveness.
1
 The need for such adaptive policies is 
particularly acute as global sustainable development challenges are becoming increasingly 
complex, dynamic and uncertain.
2 
 
In many developing countries, there is already significant evidence of how foreign 
investors exploit weak regulatory frameworks to commit human rights abuses and damage 
the environment.
3
 At the same time, there is also significant evidence that foreign investors 
exploit weak tax structures to evade or avoid paying taxes.
4
 This is in addition to the fact that 
many of these contracts, which have been signed with corrupt and/or dictatorial regimes, 
already provide over-generous terms to investors thereby reducing the revenue accruing to 
the countries.
5
 As such, if the extractive industry in resource-rich developing countries is to 
contribute to their sustainable development, their legal and regulatory regimes will need to 
be regularly assessed and modified in the light of changing needs and circumstances, not 
only to protect the environment and human rights but also to promote economic 
development. Stabilisation clauses, however, impose a significant constraint on the ability of 
developing countries to do this. 
 The main way in which stabilisation clauses affect sustainable development is that 
they reduce the policy space needed to alter fiscal and economic policies to mobilise the 
maximum of available resources to finance sustainable development measures. By 
exempting investors from new laws or ensuring that they are compensated for complying 
with such laws, stabilisation clauses reduce the space within which developing countries can 
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2
 See generally Darren Swanson and Suruchi Bhadwal (eds), Creating Adaptive Policies: A Guide For Policy-
Making in an Uncertain World (Sage 2009).  
3
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subsequently alter their fiscal and economy policies to make them more effective in the light 
of changing needs and circumstances.  
For example, a 2010 report on Madagascar conducted for the World Bank found that 
the government’s revenue from its mining regime was relatively low by international 
standards.
6
 The reason for this, the report notes, was that the ‘rigid’ stabilisation clauses in 
the mining agreements ‘demonstrate no room for adjustments for an extended period of 
time.’7 As a result, while the government’s expenditure and public expectations will rise in 
the years ahead, the government’s revenues will remain limited.8 This example broadly 
reflects the way in which stabilisation clauses affect the ability of several developing 
countries to alter their fiscal regime to raise revenue to fund their sustainable development 
objectives.  
Thus, the effect of the focus in the literature on the impact of stabilisation clauses on 
social and environmental laws is that it creates a distinction between the ability of host 
countries to enact and implement such laws and their ability to alter the fiscal regime 
applicable to an investment. As far as the effective implementation of sustainable 
development is concerned, such a distinction hardly exists in practice. As the following 
sections will show, any limitation placed by stabilisation clauses on host states’ ability to 
enact and implement fiscal and economic laws affects, not only economic progress, but also 
environmental protection and social growth.  
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6.2.1  Fiscal/Economic Policies and Environmental Protection.  
Laws and regulations are important in protecting the environment. Indeed, at the 
national level, the use of 'command and control' regulation, which involves the setting of 
standards to protect the environment, have made substantial gains.
9
  However they have been 
variously criticised for being rigid,
10
 complex,
11
 and for discouraging market innovation as 
firms have no incentive to protect the environment beyond the standards set.
12
   
More importantly, ‘command and control’ regulation has also been criticised as being 
inefficient, ineffective and incapable of addressing some of the major current environmental 
challenges such as climate change, loss of biodiversity, deforestation and unsustainable 
consumption of natural resources.
13
 The reason for this is that these problems are extremely 
complex and tackling them has enormous economic and social implications.
14
  
For example, addressing reliance on carbon dioxide, one of the major contributors to 
climate change, will have implications for a range of industrial, agricultural, transport and 
consumption activities. Consequently, there are doubts about the effectiveness of command 
and control environmental regulation in bringing about meaningful change across such an 
expanse of daily life.
15
 Thus to be effective, environmental laws and regulations dealing with 
these issues will need to be complemented by fiscal and economic policies. This point was 
aptly made in Agenda 21: 
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Environmental law and regulation are important but cannot alone be expected to 
deal with the problems of environment and development. Prices, markets and 
governmental fiscal and economic policies also play a complementary role in 
shaping attitudes and behaviour towards the environment.
16
 
 
It is for this reason that the use of ‘economic’ or ‘market-based’ instruments have for long 
been advocated in the academic literature, by international organisations and at global 
conferences on sustainable development.
17
  
An economic instrument encompasses any policy instrument designed to use prices 
or economic incentives to influence behaviour in a way that achieves environmental 
objectives. They may be classified in a number of ways. However, the instruments usually 
identified are taxes/charges/levies, tradeable quotas, subsidies, deposit-refund schemes and 
performance bonds.
18
  
 The case for the use of economic instruments in dealing with environmental and 
sustainable development challenges is already well established in the literature.
19
 Taxes or 
levies put a price on either emissions from, or inputs into, a process.
20
  They therefore help to 
internalise the external cost of goods and services.
21
 Economic instruments are also useful in 
implementing the ‘polluter pays principle’, which is a key principle of sustainable 
development.
22
 This is because through taxes or levies, whoever is responsible for damage to 
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June 1992, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26) Annex II (hereafter ‘Rio Declaration’) Principle 16.  
18
 OECD Economic (n 17) 14. 
19
 See, as examples, Ackerman and Stewart (n 17); David Driese,n 'Economic Instruments and Sustainable 
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the environment can be made to bear the cost associated with repairing the damage.
23
 This 
financial burden on the polluter thus serves as an incentive for the polluter to use less 
harmful environmental practices, while the revenue generated can be used to fund 
environmental protection measures.
24
  
It is therefore not surprising that economic instruments have been described as the 
'hottest growth industry in environmental law.'
25
  Their use is also projected to continue to 
increase in the future not only because of their effectiveness and efficiency but also because 
they engender a degree of political acceptability that cuts across party and ideological 
boundaries.
26
 Thus whilst not without some critics, the use of economic instruments is a 
policy option that is available and encouraged for use in all countries, including developing 
countries, to protect the environment.
27
   
The presence of stabilisation clauses may however reduce the policy space within 
which developing countries can utilise economic instruments to protect the environment. 
This is because economic or market based instruments are usually fiscal in nature, often 
imposed in the form of taxes or levies, and usually administered by the relevant government 
body saddled with the responsibility of managing taxes.
28
 As such, even where a stabilisation 
clause does not mention environmental laws or explicitly exclude them, it could still affect 
environmental protection by limiting the ability of host states to use economic and other 
market-based instruments to protect the environment. This is because they may breach 
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stabilisation clauses if they impose fiscal measures to discourage environmentally harmful 
behaviour or to raise revenue to finance environmental protection measures. 
Consequently, even where the host state has the ability to enact and implement 
environmental laws, the constraints imposed by stabilisation clauses reduce the policy 
options available to the host country to formulate appropriate environmental laws and 
policies, and effectively implement them. They may therefore continue to rely on a 
‘command and control’ regulation even when it is ineffective and inefficient to do so. 
Furthermore, by imposing a constraint on the ability of a host state to alter their fiscal and 
economic policies, stabilisation clauses can weaken the ability of developing countries to 
generate revenue to finance measures aimed at promoting economic growth and eradicating 
poverty. This again has a direct effect on the environment, as those who are poor will often 
destroy their environment in order to survive.
29
  
6.2.2  Fiscal/Economic Policies and Social Laws.  
Similar to the arguments made with respect to environmental protection, the mere 
enactment of social laws cannot lead to the improvement of social standards, and in 
particular, the promotion of human rights. A lot depends on the enactment and 
implementation of progressive and equitable economic policies.
30
 This is particularly the 
case for the actualisation of rights that go beyond traditional civil and political rights.
31
 This 
is because the enjoyment and enforcement of civil and political rights depend, to a large 
extent, on the state of democracy in the country. As such, in most democratic countries, such 
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rights are already recognised and included as constitutional rights.
32
 Such rights are therefore 
unlikely to be significantly threatened solely by stabilisation clauses.  
On the other hand, the realisation of so-called 'second'
33
 and 'third' generation rights
34
 
is closely linked to favourable fiscal and economic conditions. For example, for the right to 
education to be realised, governments must build schools and employ teachers. No amount 
of human rights law can build a classroom. Governments must therefore have access to the 
financial and technical resources to facilitate the realisation of these rights.  
The straightforward link between economic policies and the realisation of human 
rights was recognised in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
where parties agreed:   
 
to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, 
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
35
 
 
More recently, the interactions between economic/fiscal policies, poverty eradication 
and human rights were highlighted in the UN Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and 
Human Rights adopted by the UN Human Rights Council.
36
 Article 3 notes: ‘poverty is an 
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urgent human rights concern in itself’ and is ‘both a cause and a consequence of human 
rights violations and an enabling condition for other violations.’37 It then went on to draw the 
following link between fiscal and economic policies, and environmental protection and 
human rights:   
 
States must take deliberate, specific and targeted steps, individually and jointly, to 
create an international enabling environment conducive to poverty reduction, 
including in matters relating to bilateral and multilateral trade, investment, taxation, 
finance, environmental protection and development cooperation. This includes 
cooperating to mobilize the maximum of available resources for the universal 
fulfilment of human rights.
38
 
 
The Tax Justice Network in Germany has also recently identified three ways in 
which fiscal policies can contribute to human rights.
39
 First, they argue that fiscal policies 
help to raise the revenue required to finance the public goods and services required for the 
realisation of human rights.
40
 Second, fiscal policies promote the realisation of human rights 
by contributing to the redistribution of income from the richer to the poorer strata of 
society.
41
 Third, they can help reduce conduct that is detrimental to human rights by 
internalising the ecological and social costs of certain goods and services.
42
   
In the light of this straightforward link between fiscal and economic policies and 
human rights, stabilisation clauses can also affect the ability of host states to protect human 
rights, even if human rights laws are excluded from their scope. Where, as is always the 
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case, such clauses cover fiscal laws, the host state will be unable to mobilise the maximum 
of available resources to use to facilitate the realisation of human rights. Such a country may 
therefore be unwilling to enact any binding law recognising and giving legal effect to many 
social and economic rights, not because it lacks the power to do so but because it cannot 
afford it.  
Based on the foregoing, it is submitted that if the evidence in developing countries 
counts for anything, it is not the constraints stabilisation clauses impose on the legislative 
competence of host states in the area of human rights and environmental laws that affect 
sustainable development. It is the constraints that they impose on host states’ ability to enact 
and implement the fiscal policies or the fiscal aspects of the laws (including human rights 
and environmental laws) that underpin sustainable development. A discussion of four areas 
in which this constraint may affect sustainable development follows. 
 
6.3 IN WHAT WAYS DO STABILISATION CLAUSES AFFECT SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES? 
6.3.1  Stabilisation Clauses and Domestic Resource Mobilisation  
The point has already been made that in many developing countries, the main 
challenge faced in achieving sustainable development is finance.
43
 It is for this reason that 
richer developed countries pledged to offer financial support equivalent to 0.7 per cent of 
their Gross National Income (GNI) in international development aid to developing 
countries.
44
  
There are however several problems with excessive reliance on aid to finance 
sustainable development. First, it is insufficient and unstable. The 0.7 per cent aid target is a 
moral, rather than a legal commitment. Richer developed countries are therefore not under 
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any legal commitment to meet the target. Consequently, over 30 years after it was set, only 
five countries have met the target.
45
 It is also volatile as it depends to some extent on the 
economic and political situation in the donor country. Thus, the recent financial and 
economic crisis in several developed countries has weakened the commitment of these 
countries to meet the 0.7 per cent aid target.
46
 As a result, development aid to poor countries 
has been falling in the last few years.
47
  
For example, in 2010, the UK government reaffirmed its commitment to meet the 0.7 
per cent target and to ‘enshrine this commitment into law.’48 However, the government has 
yet to meet this commitment, while plans to enshrine it into law have been repeatedly 
postponed.
49
 It is thus difficult to achieve sustainable development through such an 
insufficient and volatile source of funding. Indeed, a recent UN report had warned that the 
developing world is unlikely to meet the targets set in the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) primarily because Western donors have reneged on their aid commitments.
50
  
  Second, a point emphasised in the earlier Brundtland Report is that international 
development aid has failed to facilitate sustainable development in developing countries not 
only because of its inadequacy but also because ‘too often’ such aid reflects the priorities of 
the donor, rather than the needs of the recipients.
51
 Yet, almost three decades after the 
Brundtland Report, little has changed. International development aid is still often tied to 
conditions that may not necessarily reflect the sustainable development priorities of the 
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recipient country.
52
 Rather, they remain ‘heavily concentrated and dependent on the 
priorities (often geopolitical or strategic, including security considerations) of the donors.’53  
  It is conceded, as some have argued, that in some cases the donor countries impose 
these conditions because they are legitimately interested in ensuring that the aid money is put 
to efficient use, especially in countries with high rates of corruption.
54
 In addition, the 
attached conditions may include the implementation of certain reforms that the donors see as 
being beneficial to the recipient country’s sustainable development. However, even where 
the intentions of the donor countries are genuine, it may still produce an unsustainable 
outcome.   
  In the first place, as some commentators have noted, the focus on the priorities of the 
donors may push through reforms regardless of their viability in the light of country specific 
circumstances.
55
 This may impede, rather than promote, sustainable development because 
the multiplicity of the challenges facing several developing countries requires policies 
tailored to the specific situation of each country, rather than a ‘one-size-fits-all approach.’56 
It is for this reason that it was recommended that Agenda 21 should be implemented 
‘according to the different situations, capacities and priorities of countries.’57 Thus, where a 
country’s domestic policies would contribute to their sustainable development but may 
negatively affect the interests of donors, the country may be unable to effectively implement 
such a policy if doing so will breach the condition attached to the development aid. 
  Furthermore, as acknowledged by even the World Bank, the ‘main problem’ with 
attaching conditions to aid is that even where the reforms are beneficial to the recipient 
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country, they may not feel that they ‘own’ the reforms.58 As a result, they may proceed to 
implement the reforms in a ‘formal, superficial and unsustainable’ manner.59 And as Paul 
Brietzke argues, this may end up ‘poisoning the well’ for more sensible reforms later.60 In 
addition, it may mean that the government and policy-makers of developing countries will be 
more accountable to donors and their investors than they are to their citizens.
61
   
  There is thus a growing consensus that developing countries must look inwards and 
harness domestic resources to finance their sustainable development measures.
62 
In other 
words, sustainable development requires that the means to finance public goods and services 
should come, as much as possible, from domestic resources especially tax revenues. This 
will increase the stability of the government’s budget and aid planning towards sustainable 
development as tax revenue is much less volatile and more predictable than development 
aid.
63
 In addition, it will reduce dependence on aid and foreign loans thereby freeing these 
countries, at least to some extent, from the conditions attached and their potential adverse 
effect on sustainable development. In other words, it gives developing countries a greater 
‘policy space’ and flexibility within which to define their sustainable development goals in 
the light of their country specific priorities, rather than that of donors.
64
 In short, it will mean 
that these countries can ‘own’ their sustainable development goals and processes. 
   However, a key challenge for many resource-rich developing countries in mobilising 
domestic resources is legal tax avoidance by multinationals in the extractive industry.
65
 As 
discussed in chapter 4, the combination of pressure from the World Bank and corrupt and/or 
dictatorial leaders led to the granting of a vast array of tax incentives and exemptions to 
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foreign investors by developing countries.
66
 As many of these exemptions and incentives 
now unnecessarily deprive the affected countries of revenues, reforming the tax system is 
required to increase tax collection and mobilise domestic resources. In many of these 
countries, stabilisation clauses have been used by investors to undermine such reforms and 
therefore impede governments from mobilising the domestic resources required to free 
themselves from excessive reliance on international development aid. In some cases, foreign 
investors simply rely on the stabilisation clauses to continue to apply the previous fiscal 
regime, which, as far as the countries’ laws are concerned, has ceased to become law. For 
example, mining investors with stability agreements in Ghana are still paying the old rate of 
three per cent in royalties rather than the five per cent introduced by the Minerals and 
Mining (Amendment) Act 2010.
67
  
  In other cases, the stabilisation clauses are used as a bargaining tool by the investors 
to extract concessions from the government, including the granting of stabilisation clauses 
for an extended period at the new rate. For example, in Zambia, investors with stabilisation 
clauses only agreed to apply part of the fiscal regime established by the 2008 Mines and 
Minerals Act after they used the threat of international arbitration to make the government 
reinstate for another 10 years stabilisation clauses that they had previously abolished.
68
  
  Whether investors refuse to comply with the law or agree to comply after extracting 
concessions from the government, the result is a reduction in the efficacy of the law. The use 
of stabilisation clauses has therefore created a situation where several poor developing 
countries are unable to mobilise the maximum available domestic resources to finance their 
sustainable development and are therefore forced to continue to rely on aid. Indeed, a study 
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by Martin Sturmer using Ghana, Zambia and Namibia as case studies, found that developing 
countries generate relatively low revenues from their extractive industries compared to 
Australia.
69
 In particular, he found that if these countries were to fix their taxes in line with 
Australia’s implicit tax rates, they would receive the equivalent of 35 per cent of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) from 2003 to 2008.
70
 Yet, as the findings from this study 
show, all three countries (particularly Zambia and Ghana) are being constrained by 
stabilisation clauses from making any alteration to the fiscal regime in their mining sectors.  
  Meanwhile, the richer developed countries are able to alter their fiscal regimes and 
raise more revenue from which they are able to give development aid to the poorer 
developing countries. For example, the UK was able to raise around £2billion in 2011 by 
increasing the supplementary charge on companies operating in the North Sea from 20 per 
cent to 30 per cent.
71
 That same year, the UK gave ODA and humanitarian assistance worth 
around £78 million to Ghana.
72
 Yet, that same year, Ghana was able to double its revenue 
from the mining sector to $500 million from $210million the previous year due to an 
increase in the royalty rate from 3 per cent to 5 per cent.
73
 The increase in revenue is 
significant and is reflective of the impact even a marginal adjustment to fiscal policy and tax 
rate can make. However, it also gives an idea of the financial and revenue implications of the 
constraints that stabilisation clauses can impose on the ability of developing countries to 
mobilise domestic resources to finance sustainable development programmes. This is 
especially because some of the major mining companies have so far relied on stabilisation 
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clauses to avoid paying the new rate of taxes and royalties. All the increases have thus 
largely come from companies without stabilisation clauses. 
Before concluding this section, it is important to also observe that the difficulties that 
stabilisation clauses impose on domestic resource mobilisation are likely to be exacerbated 
during periods of economic or financial crisis. This is because during such periods, 
developing countries are often faced with unique economic crises, including balance of 
payments problems caused by acute foreign exchange shortages.
74
 In such a period of 
‘development emergency’, a developing country’s ability to mitigate the effect of the crisis is 
largely tied to its ability to enact and implement urgent fiscal measures that may include 
temporary tax measures and capital restrictions.
75
 Yet, as many developing countries noted 
during the last global recession that affected them, they will require ‘greater policy 
flexibility’ to be able to do so.76 As stabilisation clauses reduce the policy space to undertake 
such fiscal measures, it is likely to hinder the ability of developing countries that grant the 
clause to take the measures required without acting in breach of the clause.  
6.3.2  Stabilisation Clauses and ‘Windfall Profit’ Taxes 
    Another way in which stabilisation clauses affect sustainable development in 
developing countries is that they may be used to impose a constraint on their ability to 
benefit from unexpected but significant changes in the economic, or geological, fortune of a 
project. For example, the sustained rise in the prices of most non-renewable natural 
resources since 2003 was largely unforeseen.
77
 As a result, the fiscal regime in many 
countries is such that a declining proportion of the increasing profit accrues to the 
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government.
78
 Even where these contracts do contain an internal mechanism that adjusts the 
benefits of the government and investors in line with changes in profitability, it may still be 
unable to fully benefit the host state where the balance of the original contracts is heavily 
tilted in favour of the investors.
79
  
  While the need to alter the fiscal regime for this purpose is important to both 
developed and developing countries, it is particularly so for developing countries. This is 
because most developed countries have relatively well-developed and sophisticated tax 
systems that may be able to accommodate their desire to capture some of the additional 
profits. However, this is not the case in developing countries. Furthermore, many of the 
contracts in developing countries containing stabilisation clauses have been negotiated and 
signed during the period of World Bank reforms when the prices of mineral resources were 
relatively low, in addition to the over generous incentives granted to investors.
80
 As a result, 
most resource-rich countries (both developed and developing) have sought to review the 
fiscal regimes governing these contracts to enable them to also benefit fully from the 
additional or ‘windfall’ profits.81 
   The simplest method used by several countries to capture some of the additional 
benefits is the imposition of a ‘windfall’ tax otherwise called ‘additional’ or ‘supplementary’ 
tax’.82 A windfall profit tax is a tax imposed only on additional profits based upon a pre-
determined threshold.
83
 The additional revenues generated could then be used to finance 
sustainable development measures. For example, in 2012, the Australian government 
introduced profit-based taxes on all new and existing oil, gas and mining companies in 
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Australia.
84
 The taxes formed part of a taxation system reform aimed at creating a tax 
structure that would ‘position Australia to deal with its social, economic and environmental 
challenges and enhance economic, social and environmental wellbeing.’85 Part of the 
additional revenue is to be used to fund a $3.6 billion ‘Benefits of the Boom’ package 
announced in the 2012-13 Budget.
86
 The package includes lump sum allowances to 
struggling Australians, tax reliefs for Australian businesses and investments in ‘critical 
productivity-enhancing infrastructure’ especially in the regions where oil, gas and mining 
activities occur.
87
 
  Similarly, since 2002 the UK government has imposed and increased a 
‘supplementary charge’ on all oil companies operating in the North Sea.88 Part of the funds 
raised by the charge were used to fund several sustainable development initiatives, including 
the cancellation of a planned increase in fuel duty and an immediate cut in pump prices.
89
 
These measures ensured progress in the social and economic pillar of sustainable 
development. However, in taking this decision, environmental protection was integrated into 
the decision-making process.
90
 This led to the conclusion that the increase in the charge will 
not increase activity in the oil and gas industry and therefore pose no ‘sustainable 
development, wider environment and health’ risk.91     
 The above examples reflect how relatively easy it is for developed countries to 
impose windfall profit taxes and use the additional revenue to fund sustainable development 
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measures. The laws imposing the taxes in Australia were passed in March 2012 and came 
into effect in July 2012. The UK’s increase was announced in the 2011 Budget Speech and 
was effective immediately.
92
 In both cases, the taxes were applied equally to new and 
existing projects, without exceptions, despite opposition and complaints from the industry.
93
 
This is because while investors were not happy with the changes, they could not, and did not, 
mount any legal challenge against the taxes in the absence of any contractual commitment by 
the host governments in the form of a stabilisation clause. 
However, several developing countries analysed in this thesis have been largely 
unsuccessful in their attempts to enact and implement windfall profit taxes for similar 
reasons. This is because investors in these countries have been able to rely on stabilisation 
clauses to successfully challenge the enactment or implementation of similar profit-based 
taxes. In some cases, they have been able to rely on stabilisation clauses to delay the 
enactment of windfall profit tax laws. Where such laws have been enacted, they are also able 
to rely on the clauses to seek to be exempted from their applicability or to be compensated 
for complying with them. Faced with the threat of international arbitration and the possibility 
of being ordered to pay huge amounts in compensation for breach of stabilisation clauses, 
developing countries are left with four possible options. 
  The first option is to delay either the enactment or the implementation of the law 
despite the legitimate intentions behind it especially in terms of its contribution to 
sustainable development. For example, the government of Tanzania has so far been unable to 
impose a windfall profit tax because of significant opposition from the industry relying on 
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stabilisation clauses.
94
 This is despite the clear advice from its Planning Commission to do 
so in order to mobilise revenue to finance its Five Year Development Plan.
95
   
   The second option taken by governments is to abolish such laws if they have already 
been enacted and in the process forego the projected revenue. This is especially the case 
where the vast majority of the investors for whom the laws have been made have been 
granted stabilisation clauses. In such a case applying the law to a few, and in most cases 
smaller investors, may not achieve the desired purpose. This is the option taken, for example, 
by Zambia. In 2008, the country introduced a windfall profit tax as part of the fiscal regime 
established by the new mining law.
96
 In introducing the tax, the government was aware of 
the potential constraints the stabilisation clauses in existing Mineral Development 
Agreements (MDAs) imposed on their ability to enforce the law. This is clear from the 
parliamentary debates leading to the enactment of the law, where the country’s 
parliamentarians noted that the stabilisation clauses placed the MDAs ‘above the fiscal laws’ 
of Zambia.
97
 It was for this reason that the MDAs containing the stabilisation clauses were 
abolished.
98
 However, following the threats of arbitration, the government had to abolish the 
windfall profit tax in 2009.
99
 
 The third alternative taken by developing countries is to apply the windfall profit tax 
on investors without stabilisation clauses while exempting those with stabilisation clauses. 
They may otherwise apply the law to all investors and compensate those with stabilisation 
clauses. This option again has the effect of reducing the effectiveness of the law by reducing 
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the projected revenue the government could have derived to fund their sustainable 
development objectives. This is especially the case if the majority of the investors, who 
would have been affected by the law, have been granted stabilisation clauses.  
An example of a country that took this approach is Peru. Since 2006, windfall profit 
taxes have dominated the country’s political space and presidential campaigns.100 Successive 
governments expressed their intention to impose such a tax to raise revenue to fund 
infrastructure, tackle poverty and address economic distortions.
101
 However, due to 
continuous opposition from investors with stabilisation clauses, the imposition of a windfall 
profit tax was delayed until 2011.
102
 Similar opposition by investors relying on stabilisation 
clauses, have also made the current government adjust its campaign promise to introduce a 
windfall profit tax even though there was a ‘political consensus’ that it should be imposed.103 
In the end, in order to fulfil its election promise to impose windfall profit tax, while at the 
same time avoiding arbitration, the government had to exempt companies with stabilisation 
clauses from the bulk of the fiscal changes. They were exempted from paying royalties and 
windfall profit taxes. The changes only required them to pay a ‘special contribution’, subject 
to their agreeing to do so.
104
 However, those without stabilisation clauses were made to pay 
increased royalties on their operating profits and a windfall profits tax on their net profits.
105
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The last option taken by developing countries is to ignore the constraints imposed by 
stabilisation clauses and insist on applying the windfall tax to all investors. However, in the 
few cases seen in this thesis where this option was used, many of the investors with 
stabilisation clauses went ahead and instituted international arbitration against the country 
for breach of the stabilisation clauses and/or relevant Bilateral Investment Treaties.
106
 This is 
particularly the case in countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela where windfall 
profit taxes were combined with several other measures including direct and indirect 
nationalisations leading to several international arbitration proceedings against these 
countries.
107
 Consequently, the governments were either forced to negotiate and compensate 
investors or had arbitral awards entered against them for damages in favour of investors for 
the losses suffered as a result of the windfall profit tax.
108
 
Whether the disputes in question ended with the investor being compensated or 
judgment entered against the host state, the consequences remain the same. The amount of 
revenue intended to be mobilised to fund sustainable development measures was either 
significantly reduced or altogether foregone. For example, the two major oil investors in 
Algeria relied on stabilisation clauses to institute international arbitration proceedings 
against the country for applying a 2006 windfall profit tax on them.
109
 In the end, the 
government had to settle both cases by agreeing to pay a sizeable compensation to both 
investors.
110
 Both investors were seeking approximately $10 billion against the country for 
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the effect of the tax. Yet, the settlement reached included a delivery of additional crude oil 
volumes in the amount of approximately $2.7 billion within a year.
111
 It also included an 
amendment to the PSA that adds at least $2.6 billion to the net present value of the company 
at current prices and an extension to the development licences granted under the PSA for a 
further 25 years.
112
 
The size of the compensation package shows the amount of revenue which the 
government had to forgo because of stabilisation clauses. However, doing so may have 
enabled the government to avoid the possibility of being held liable by arbitrators to 
completely indemnify the investors for all the losses suffered as a result of the law, as was 
the case in some recent arbitral awards.
113
 Thus regardless of which option a host state 
decides to take, stabilisation clauses are likely to impose constraints on a state’s ability to 
benefit from additional profit brought about by an unexpected change in the economic 
fortune of a project. This unduly affects their ability to mobilise resources to finance their 
sustainable development measures.   
   Before concluding the discussion under this heading, it is important to point out that 
it is not suggested here that foreign investors should not be protected from arbitrary and 
opportunistic unilateral adjustments to the fiscal regime governing their investment. Indeed, 
too frequent changes to the fiscal regime could reduce the overall viability of FDI in a 
country and consequently reduce its inflow. However, the need for fiscal stability must be 
balanced with the legitimate pursuit of host governments’ sustainable development goals. 
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The evidence seen in this thesis is that stabilisation clauses, as they are currently drafted, do 
not achieve this balance.
114
  
 The example of windfall taxes is discussed here in greater detail not only because it 
highlights this imbalance but also because of its unique implication for sustainable 
development. This is because while questions may be asked about the fairness or policy 
legitimacy of tax increases, there does seem to be a clear justification for countries wanting 
to impose windfall profits to earn additional revenue for their development.  
By definition, a windfall profit tax is imposed on additional net profits earned by 
companies.
115
 They are therefore mainly paid during periods of unusually high prices.
116
 
Thus from the investor’s perspective, a windfall profit tax rarely affects the economic 
equilibrium of the project in a significant manner. For this reason, such taxes can rarely 
constitute an expropriation. Indeed, in Burlington v Ecuador, the majority of the arbitrators 
rejected the investor’s claim that the windfall profit tax was expropriatory.117 They held that 
since the tax was based on excess profits, even the 99 per cent rate did not ‘substantially’ 
deprive Burlington of its investment neither did it render it ‘worthless or unviable.’118  
A similar view was taken by the tribunal in Sergei Paushok and ors v. Mongolia.
119
 
Here the tribunal also found that Mongolia’s 2006 windfall profit tax, calculated at 68 per 
cent rate, was compatible with the FET standard established by the Mongolia-Russia BIT.
120
 
The tribunal went on to dismiss the entire claim mainly because the investor did not have a 
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stabilisation clauses which would have protected it from the increase.
121
 On the other hand, 
the tribunal in Burlington v Ecuador held that Ecuador was liable to pay damages to the 
investor, not because the effect of the windfall tax was expropriatory but because the steps 
Ecuador took in enforcing the tax (contrary to the stabilisation clause) constituted 
expropriation.
122
 In other words, both tribunals made similar findings that the windfall tax 
laws in Ecuador and Mongolia did not constitute expropriation. However, the fact that 
Burlington had a stabilisation clause contributed to a different outcome.  
While windfall profit taxes may not significantly affect the economic equilibrium of 
an investment, the inability of host governments to impose such taxes can substantially 
undermine sustainable development for several reasons.  Firstly, the volatile nature of 
commodities prices makes it increasingly difficult to foresee with certainty the future 
economics of these projects.
123
 As a result, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the 
extent, quality and future prices of the resource at the time of entering into the contract.
124
 
For these reasons, the ability of resource-rich developing countries to achieve sustainable 
development is significantly affected by the cyclical nature of commodities’ prices.125  
A windfall profit tax is therefore a good way, not only to undertake as many 
sustainable development measures as possible, but also, to save some of the windfall in order 
to cushion the effect of periods of low prices or negative shocks from market fluctuations. 
This is particularly important for sustainable development as the progressive realisation of 
human rights and the environment is often impeded or undermined during periods of 
economic and financial crisis.
126
 It was the inability to do this that contributed to the 
economic crisis that undermined sustainable development in many developing countries 
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during the period of sustained low minerals prices in the 1980s.
127
 It therefore makes sense 
that if the sustainable development of these countries was negatively affected by unusually 
low prices, it ought to be significantly promoted by unusually high prices. This is especially 
so because for many of these countries, their geological endowment is increasingly 
becoming the only comparative advantage that they possess to compete in an increasingly 
competitive global economy.
128
  
  Secondly, as observed by UNCTAD, since most of these resources are non-
renewable ‘the underlying philosophical presumption’ in their administration is that the 
government should derive ‘maximum benefits from any surpluses generated.’129 This 
philosophical presumption is tied to the fact that as these resources are finite, the host state’s 
ability to mobilise revenue from it to finance their sustainable development will terminate 
once these resources run out.
 
Accordingly, achieving sustainable development is closely tied 
to their commercially and environmentally efficient exploitation, not only for the benefit of 
the present generation but also for the benefit of future generations. If the present generation 
is unable to maximise the benefit of any surplus, they are likely to be unable to pass on any 
significant benefit from the exploitation of these resources to future generations. 
   At the same time, future generations will be left with little or no extractive minerals 
from which to mobilise revenue to finance their needs. It therefore seems perfectly legitimate 
for governments to seek to capture some of the benefits of extreme market forces towards 
which neither party has made any material investment or strategic contribution.
130
 However, 
as this section has argued, stabilisation clauses can impose a significant constraint on the 
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ability of host countries to do so thereby affecting their ability to promote sustainable 
development. 
6.3.3  Stabilisation Clauses, Energy Subsidy Reform and Sustainable Development  
  Another way in which the reduction of fiscal policy space by stabilisation clauses can 
affect sustainable development is in the area of energy subsidy reform.
131
 In most developing 
countries, energy prices are kept low through subsidies.
132
 This means that generally, the 
government pays the difference between the lower price of fuel at the pumps and the actual 
higher cost of the product.
133
  
    Energy subsidies have been rationalised on account of their sustainable 
development function, including the eradication of poverty and promotion of social 
cohesion. The reason is that subsidising energy products in this way helps alleviate poverty 
and facilitate economic growth by ensuring that citizens, especially those within low income 
groups, can afford modern sources of energy.
134
 In addition, for resource-rich developing 
countries, it is often seen as a way of spreading the benefits of the resources to their 
citizens.
135
 It is for this reason that most of the world’s fuel subsidies are found in 
developing countries, especially those which themselves export fossil fuels.
136
  
  However, current policy consensus is that energy subsidies have wide-ranging 
adverse consequences for sustainable development that outweigh their benefits.
137
 The initial 
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adverse effects are largely economic in nature. However, they do generate significant 
environmental and social consequences. In terms of their economic impacts, commentators 
agree that subsidies encourage wasteful consumption as they keep energy products under-
priced.
138
 This increases the economic costs to the government and thus may increase fiscal 
imbalances and reduce the amount of resources available to finance other sustainable 
development measures.
139
 Energy subsidies may therefore have adverse consequences for 
economic growth in the long term as they can lead to an economically inefficient allocation 
of scarce resources.
140
 
  In terms of social progress, while subsidies are touted as a way of promoting social 
cohesion and eradicating poverty, in practice, they often generate negative impact on social 
development.
141
 This is because several studies have suggested that the benefits of the 
subsidies are often captured by higher-income households due to their higher per capita 
consumption levels.
142
 As a result, the poorest members of society, who need the subsidies 
most, do not get a fair share of the benefits.
143
 Thus, rather than improving social cohesion 
and facilitating intra-generational equity, energy subsidies often reinforce social inequality 
thereby undermining the pursuit of sustainable development. 
 The environment is also negatively affected by energy subsidies in several ways. 
Allocating funds for energy subsidies to keep energy products under-priced can reduce both 
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the funds available, and the incentives for investment, into renewable energy.
144
 It also 
masks the environmental costs of energy products thereby helping to negate the 
implementation of the polluter pays principle.
145
 By encouraging excessive consumption, it 
also accelerates the depletion of natural resources with implications for future generations.
146
 
Finally, energy subsidies also contribute to global warming as increased consumption leads 
to increased greenhouse gas emissions and other pollutants.
147
 It is for this reason that Annex 
1 Parties to the Kyoto Protocol pledged to progressively reduce ‘fiscal incentives, tax and 
duty exemptions and subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors.’148 Several OECD and 
IEA analyses indicate that phasing out subsidies could reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
as much as 10 per cent by 2050 compared with business-as-usual.
149
 
Implementing reforms aimed at removing energy subsidies is therefore one key way 
to promote sustainable development. Apart from helping to protect the environment, it 
should also free up revenues, some of which can be invested into critical sectors and 
measures that can facilitate sustainable development.
150
 For resource-rich developing 
countries, undertaking such reforms is becoming increasingly ‘crucial and urgent’ to their 
sustainable development due to the sustained high world oil prices.
151
 This is because a 
higher price in international markets means that the governments will spend more on 
subsidies to keep the price lower in the domestic market.
152
 Yet, it is in these countries that 
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the cost of subsidies is ‘especially acute’ as oil exporting developing countries accounted for 
two-thirds of the world’s total.153   
Meanwhile, as discussed in the previous section, many of these countries are unable 
to capture fair benefits from the increase in world prices because of stabilisation clauses.
154
 
Thus, subsidising energy prices is increasingly becoming a growing economic liability for 
these developing countries leading to increased public debt and squeezing other government 
spending.
155
 Consequently, in recent years, an increasing number of countries have 
concluded reforms, or are in the process of reforming, inefficient energy subsidies.
156
 In 
view of the complex relationship between subsidies and environmental protection, social 
growth and economic development, most commentators agree that for reforms aimed at 
eliminating subsidies to be effective, they must be managed within the context of sustainable 
development.
157
  
  Despite the widely acknowledged benefits of reforming energy subsidies, it remains a 
politically difficult decision, especially for governments of resource-rich developing 
countries. This is because the original idea behind introducing subsidies was to help alleviate 
poverty and spread the benefit of the resources. The effects of removing such subsidies may 
therefore hit the poorest and most vulnerable hardest. Thus to be successful, a reform must 
include measures to strengthen social safety nets to ensure that consumers can cope with the 
higher price in the long run.
158
 This is particularly the case for developing countries as they 
already have weak or non-existent safety nets.  
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There is no ‘one size fits all’ approach on how to do this. However, the consensus 
that has emerged from the literature on subsidies reform and lessons from past experiences 
are that reforms must include immediate short-term measures to address any acute impacts, 
especially on low-income households and other vulnerable groups.
159
 Such mitigating 
measures can include targeted cash or near-cash transfers, school meals and subsidised urban 
transport.
160
 It therefore means that governments must mobilise revenue to undertake these 
measures, especially those requiring immediate implementation. In most cases, doing so will 
require an adjustment in certain fiscal policies, especially in the energy sector where the 
subsidy is being applied. This is so even in wealthier developed countries where energy 
subsidies have already been substantially removed. 
For example, part of the revenue raised by the Supplementary Charge in the UK was 
used to offset some of the immediate impacts of the high energy prices and to tackle long 
term fuel poverty.
161
 Similarly, the recently introduced carbon tax on generators of fossil-
fuel based energy in the UK is designed to discourage fossil fuel consumption while also 
providing an incentive to invest in low-carbon power generation.
162
 At the same time, part of 
the revenue raised will be used to tackle long term fuel poverty.
163
 Also, the Australian 
government recently introduced a carbon tax for similar reasons.
164
  More than half of the 
revenue to be generated is to be used to help, in particular, low income households in the 
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form of tax cuts and increased welfare payments to help mitigate the immediate and long 
term effect of high energy prices.
165
 
  However, for developing countries that grant stabilisation clauses, the clauses can 
impose a significant constraint on their ability to implement similar reforms. As discussed in 
previous sections, stabilisation clauses have been relied upon by investors in not complying 
with laws used to mobilised domestic resources either in the form of tax or royalty increases 
or in the form of windfall profit taxes. As carbon taxes constitute a fiscal measure, they are 
likely to be covered by stabilisation clauses, even if they are also directed to deal with 
environmental issues.
166
  
  This constraint makes it more difficult for developing countries to address issues 
such as climate change. It also makes it difficult for them to undertake successful subsidy 
reforms as a result of the limitation in their ability to mobilise funds to implement immediate 
mitigating measures for the majority of their citizens who are to be acutely affected by the 
removal of energy subsidies.  In other words, they are deprived of ‘climate finance’, 
described as a ‘viable means of attaining funding and capacity-building for a broad spectrum 
of policies and measures required for removing fossil fuel subsidies, mitigating negative 
consequences and leveraging co-benefits.’ 167 
  As a result of the reduced fiscal space brought about by stabilisation clauses, the 
option left to many developing countries is to pass on the entire burden of the removal of 
subsides to their citizens. In other words, the citizens, many of whom already live in poverty, 
are expected to pay for the increase in world oil prices, while the bulk of the windfall accrues 
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to investors with stabilisation clauses. As a result, despite the sound economics behind the 
removal of fuel subsidies and its potential benefits to sustainable development, it is 
politically difficult to implement in developing countries. Attempts to do so have been met 
with protests by citizens who are unwilling to undergo further suffering.
168
  
  For example, Ghana removed fuel subsidies in December 2011, about the same time 
it imposed a windfall profit tax and increased corporate taxes in the mining sector.
169
 
However, after some of the major mining companies relied on stabilisation clauses and 
refused to pay the new taxes, the estimated revenue from the increases was substantially 
reduced and the government decided to abolish the tax.
170
 Thus, in the absence of sufficient 
revenue to undertake effective immediate mitigation measures, the government was forced to 
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reinstate the subsidy in 2012 following massive protests in the country.
171
 This was despite 
the fact that the government continues to insist that its removal remained ‘long overdue.’172  
6.3.4 Stabilisation Clauses and Policy Coherence 
  The grant of stabilisation clauses in a country may also affect sustainable 
development by creating policy incoherence. The discussion in chapter 3 showed that in 
several developing countries, stabilisation clauses are granted to some investors and not to 
others even within the same sector.
173
 This has created a situation where in a bid to adhere to 
the terms of stabilisation clauses, several governments have had to design different fiscal 
regimes or laws for investors with stabilisation clauses.
174
 No doubt this approach has its 
benefits as it allows the government to be able to implement new fiscal policies, including 
new tax laws, on some investors. However, it also raises several policy implications which 
may affect the ability of governments to effectively pursue their sustainable development 
goals. 
  In the first place, where stabilisation clauses are only granted to foreign companies 
but not to local companies, it can create unequal competition between foreign and domestic 
investors. To help understand how this unequal competition may arise and the way in which 
it might affect sustainable development, it may be useful to draw lessons from the 
application of the principle of non-discrimination in international economic law as embodied 
in the obligation to provide national treatment. 
  The obligation to provide national treatment is perhaps the single most important 
standard of treatment in international investment agreements.
175
 It can be defined as ‘a 
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principle whereby a host country extends to foreign investors treatment that is at least as 
favourable as the treatment that it accords to national investors in like circumstances.’176 The 
idea behind the principle is to ensure some level of ‘competitive equality’ between foreign 
and domestic investors.
177
 Of particular relevance to this thesis is the fact that this principle, 
while intended as a tool to attract FDI, also raises some important development issues.
178
  
  A strict application of the principle in practice may actually work to create unfair 
competition against the national investors, especially in developing countries. This is 
because in most cases, the foreign firms have more economic advantages in terms of access 
to finance, skills, technical know-how and markets. For this reason, a rigid application of the 
principle may impede or otherwise negatively affect the development of domestic 
companies. Thus, for such countries to maximise the contribution of FDI, some degree of 
flexibility may be required in the treatment of national investors to ensure that the 
application of national treatment does not create a de facto better treatment for foreign 
investors.
179
 This flexibility is required to create certain qualifications and exceptions to 
national treatment, when appropriate, in order to accommodate the development needs of the 
country.
180
  
    Based on the foregoing, where stabilisation clauses are granted to foreign but not to 
local investors, it works to create the opposite effect of what is required to maximise the 
contributions of FDI to a country’s development. As discussed in chapter 3, stabilisation 
clauses are mainly available for and granted to foreign investors.
181
 This may largely be due 
to the fact that the clauses were re-introduced as part of reforms to attract FDI. As a result, it 
is often the case that domestic companies that operate even within the same sectors are not 
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granted the clause. They are therefore subject to changes in the laws of the host state and 
must comply with any new tax laws enacted by the country. This creates a situation whereby 
domestic companies may pay more in taxes and are subjected to a greater financial burden 
than foreign companies.  
  Thus, while in practice, the application of the principle of national treatment requires 
some exemptions and qualifications to protect development policies in developing countries, 
the grant of stabilisation clauses to only foreign investors creates the opposite effect. First, it 
entrenches a formal de facto discrimination against domestic investors and may therefore 
facilitate an even greater distortions in the domestic economy. Second, as stabilisation 
clauses reduce policy space, they reduce the flexibility that the host government needs to 
ensure that the application of national treatment does not lead to a de facto more favourable 
treatment for foreign investors. Consequently, the ability of domestic firms to grow and to 
maximise the benefits of the spill over effect of FDI may be significantly constrained, 
thereby defeating some of the rationale for seeking to attract FDI in the first place. 
   Where, as is in some countries, stabilisation clauses are granted to some foreign 
investors and not to others, then an unfair playing field is also created among foreign 
investors. Again, this can impede, rather than promote sustainable development in the long 
run. As such, in the longer term, a country may have to grant stabilisation clauses to other 
investors or risk not attracting others. For example, several other Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG) projects have been considered in Nigeria for several years.
182
 To create a level 
playing field, the government may need to grant similar incentives and guarantees as it did to 
Nigeria LNG Limited.
183
 However, to date, none have been able to take-off. Part of the 
problem is that the investors are not satisfied with the level of guarantees being offered to 
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them and are demanding more from the government in terms of absorbing the political risks 
of the project.
184
    
  Similarly, several of the mining companies without stability agreements in Ghana 
have also threatened to cut down on investments in the country due to the introduction of a 
new fiscal regime.
185
 Significantly, the complaint is not so much about the burden of the 
fiscal regime.
186
 Rather, they argue that a situation where they have to pay more taxes and 
royalties than other major foreign companies is ‘not sustainable’ as it does not create a ‘level 
playing field.’187 For these reasons, some of the companies have also decided to pursue and 
obtain stability agreements and to tie their future investment decisions to the ability to obtain 
one.
188
 
  Also, the introduction of a windfall profit tax in Mongolia was a contributory factor 
in the withdrawal from the country of several smaller foreign companies who did not have 
stability agreements.
189
 Many of them left because they could not get financing to continue 
their projects.
190
 While the details of the reasons behind the inability of these companies to 
get funding are not fully known, it is possible to infer from the discussion in chapter 4 that 
the bankability of their projects diminished.
191
 This is to be expected because where all other 
things are equal, a project financier with limited resources to finance competing projects in a 
country is more likely to finance the project with a stabilisation clause than the project 
without one. Thus unless the government is willing to grant stabilisation clauses to all 
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investors, at least within the same sector, the selective granting of the clause may end up 
discouraging further investment.
192
 
  Further, the exemption of certain companies from the effect of new laws because of 
stabilisation clauses raises a question of policy coherence. This is because as new laws are 
being enacted and made applicable only to certain investors, it creates a complex situation 
whereby different rules will apply to different companies even within the same sector. 
Considering that the regulatory regime in most developing countries is weak, this creates an 
unnecessary complication for regulatory agencies that may increase the cost of regulation 
and encourage tax avoidance.  
  For example, some of the fiscal incentives granted to the Nigerian LNG were 
stipulated to expire in six years if a cumulative average sale price were to reach a specified 
amount.
193
 However, the relevant agencies mandated to implement the provision could not 
implement this threshold stipulation because they did not have the sales data to carry out the 
required analysis.
194
 It is partly for this reason that the relevant minister called for the NLNG 
Act to be reviewed in order to make it ‘industry specific’ rather than ‘company specific.’195 
  The policy incoherence caused by stabilisation clauses can also create a situation 
whereby these agencies are made to enforce laws that are no longer in existence. This is 
because, where over the years, such countries repeal existing laws and enact new laws to 
replace them, investors with stabilisation clauses will not be affected by the new laws. At the 
same time, they may not be affected by any law as the old law may have been repealed. 
Regulatory agencies may be expected to enforce laws and regulations that are no longer on 
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the statute books of the country and for which regulatory capacity may have been 
extinguished.  
  The previous chapter discussed how many African countries have enacted new 
mining laws that generally include more measures on transparency, impose higher 
environmental and social standards on investors and increased taxes and royalties.
196
 
However, in many of these countries, several companies with stabilisation clauses have 
refused to comply with the new laws, especially with the fiscal changes. They have therefore 
relied on their stabilisation clauses to continue to apply the fiscal regime established by the 
previous laws that now only exist in their contracts but not the countries’ statute books. As 
some stabilisation clauses have been granted for as long as the company is operating or the 
project is in existence, it means that a company may actually be subject to no law for 
decades. The country may therefore be left with the option of regulating the company solely 
by what is contained in their contract as that will be the only document governing their 
relationship which remains applicable. This creates a regulatory nightmare for regulators and 
affects their ability to effectively regulate these companies in order to ensure that they do not 
undermine the sustainable development interests of those countries. 
  
6.4  CASE STUDIES 
This section presents two case studies. The first deals with stabilisation clauses 
granted to Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas Limited (‘NLNG Limited’). The second relates to 
stabilisation clauses granted in the Tanzania mining sector. Both cases help to illustrate how 
stabilisation clauses affect sustainable development in practice. In particular, they are 
intended to illustrate how the limitation placed by stabilisation clauses on fiscal and 
economic policies can affect measures directly aimed at improving social and environmental 
standards.  
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The choice of the case studies is motivated by several considerations. The 
stabilisation clauses are still in effect and the constraints that they impose are still on-going. 
Yet at the same time, enough time has passed since they were granted. They therefore 
provide an opportunity to analyse the impact of stabilisation clauses that were granted over a 
long period of time and is therefore sufficient to make a useful assessment of their effect but 
within the context of the on-going constraints that they impose. Furthermore, the laws and 
relevant documents are either publicly available or easily obtainable. Finally, the laws and 
measures that the stabilisation clauses constrain highlight the relationship between economic 
growth, social development and environmental protection and how a constraint imposed by 
stabilisation clauses on one of these areas affects the others equally.  
6.4.1. Case Study One: Stabilisation Clauses in the Nigeria LNG (Fiscal incentives, 
Guarantees and Assurances) (Amendment) Act 1993 
The Nigeria LNG (Fiscal Incentives, Guarantees and Assurances) Act 1993 was 
enacted in favour of the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Company Limited (hereafter ‘NLNG 
Limited’) with respect to the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Project in the Niger Delta region 
of Nigeria. This region is regarded as having one of the world’s most sensitive environments 
due to its large wetlands and high concentration of biodiversity.
197
 It also contains all the 
country’s oil and gas resources that contribute to the bulk of national revenue.198 As a result, 
the environment is faced with severe threats from oil and gas exploration activities, in 
addition to inadequate farming practices and deforestation.
199
 The region is therefore a good 
example of where the integration of environmental concerns into development projects is 
fundamental to sustainable development. Yet over the years, the unwillingness of successive 
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governments and oil and gas investors to carry out this integration has led to environmental 
degradation, facilitated human rights violations, created social ills and increased poverty 
among the inhabitants of the region.
200
  
As a result of the above, a 1995 World Bank report noted that the region’s 
‘tremendous potential for economic growth and sustainable development remains unfulfilled 
and its future is threatened by deteriorating economic conditions that are not being 
addressed by present policies and actions.
201
 The Bank therefore concluded that an ‘urgent 
need exists to implement mechanisms to protect the life and health of the region's inhabitants 
and its ecological systems from further deterioration’ 202  
While it was the environmental aspects of these issues that first drew international 
attention to the situation, numerous studies have found that the environmental aspects of the 
problem are not due to the lack of environmental laws to regulate oil and gas exploitation.
203
 
In particular, according to some experts interviewed in a study by Amnesty International, the 
country’s environmental laws are ‘minimally sufficient’ in terms of compliance with 
international standards in relation to oil operations.
204
 The environmental degradation thus 
occurs because of the lack of enforcement of these laws.
205
  
The consensus from these studies is that the main reason for the lack of enforcement 
of the country’s environmental laws is lack of capacity and resources.206 All the regulatory 
agencies were found to be seriously constrained by lack of basic technical, financial and 
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material resources required to carry out their duties effectively.
207
 Accordingly, a key 
recommendation made in these reports is that there should be a substantial increase in the 
resources allocated to the regulatory agencies to improve their technical capacity.
208
 
 An effective response to environmental pollution is, however, only part of the story. 
The other is to prevent the pollution from occurring in the first place. While some of these 
spills are caused by defective equipment and lack of maintenance, an increasing proportion 
is caused by sabotage by third parties.
209
 In some cases, this is caused through vandalism of 
oil infrastructure by criminal gangs. However, increasingly, it is caused by community 
members for economic reasons.
210
 Many youths and other community members damage oil 
pipes in order to steal small quantities of oil for sale or personal use.
211
 Others deliberately 
damage the pipelines as a way of extorting compensation or clean-up contracts from the 
companies.
212
  
  Based on the foregoing, dealing with the challenges in the region requires an 
integrated approach as encapsulated in the principle of sustainable development, not only to 
protect human rights and the environment, but also to promote economic growth and, in 
particular, eradicate poverty.
213
 Thus, one way in which the government responded was to 
establish, in 2000, a Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to deal with the 
challenge in a holistic manner in line with the principle of sustainable development.
214
 For 
example, the NDDC was mandated to:     
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conceive, plan and implement, in accordance with set rules and regulations, 
projects and programmes for the sustainable development of the Niger-Delta area 
in the field of transportation including roads, jetties and waterways, health, 
education, employment, industrialization, agriculture and fisheries, housing and 
urban development, water supply, electricity and telecommunications.
215
   
 
At the same time, the NDDC was also to ‘tackle ecological and environmental problems that 
arise from the exploration of oil mineral in the Niger-Delta area’ and to ‘liaise with the 
various oil mineral and gas prospecting and producing companies on all matters of pollution 
prevention and control.’216  
As is often the case in the real world, these measures require funds to be 
implemented. Thus to be effective, they needed to be underpinned by a fiscal policy that 
ensured a sustainable means of funding. Accordingly, the NDDC Act imposed an obligation 
on the national government and all oil producing and gas-processing companies operating in 
the area to make a yearly contribution to the NDDC.
217
 In particular, each oil and gas 
company operating in the region was to contribute 3 per cent of their total annual budget to 
the NDDC.
218
 
While other companies are complying with this provision, the NLNG Limited has 
been able to rely on the following stabilisation clause to not comply with the law:  
          
 Without prejudice to any other provision contained herein, neither the 
company nor its shareholders in their capacity as shareholders in the company 
shall in any way be subject to new laws, regulations, taxes duties imposts, or 
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charges of whatever nature which are not applicable generally to companies 
incorporated in Nigeria or to shareholders in the companies incorporated in 
Nigeria respectively.
219
 
 
Consequently, the NDDC commenced legal proceedings to compel NLNG Limited to 
comply with the law.
220
 In court, the NLNG Limited relied on the stabilisation clause to 
argue that the NDDC Act, being a new law, did not apply to it.
221
 The court upheld this 
argument but added that the clause is nonetheless unconstitutional as it fetters the legislative 
powers of parliament.
222
 It therefore advised that the clause ‘needs to be reviewed’ by 
parliament.
223
  
In line with the advice by the court, the country’s parliament commenced the process 
of amending the NLNG Act by removing the stabilisation clauses contained it in so as ‘to 
bring it into conformity’ with the country’s constitution.224 This was however opposed by 
the NLNG Limited and it threatened to institute international arbitration if the stabilisation 
clause was removed and it was made to comply with the NDDC Act and several other new 
laws with which it had refused to comply.
225
  
On the other hand, the NDDC in its memorandum argued against the clause and 
called for it to be abolished.
226
 According to the Commission, the clause has enabled NLNG 
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Limited to evade its obligation under the NDDC Act thereby depriving the Commission of 
significant revenue to carry out its mandate.
227
 Thus, despite the fact that NLNG Limited is 
one of the country’s most profitable companies, it has so far been able to evade its obligation 
under the NDDC Act because of the stabilisation clauses.
228
 In fact, perhaps due to its threat, 
the parliamentary process to remove the stabilisation clauses was abandoned when it could 
not be completed by the parliament that commenced it.  
Consequently, despite the 'urgent need' to implement measures to facilitate the 
sustainable development of the Niger Delta, the stabilisation clauses in the NLNG Act have 
created an 'enclave' for the company, insulating it from having to make the statutory 
contribution to NDDC. As such, the ability of the NDDC to fulfil its mandate to ‘conceive, 
plan and implement…projects and programmes for the sustainable development of the 
Niger-Delta’ is being constrained, to the extent to which NLNG Limited’s funds would have 
contributed.
229
   
Beyond the NDDC and the Niger Delta, the stabilisation clauses have also acted to 
deprive the national government and several of its agencies of revenue while also distorting 
national economic policies.
230
 For example, both the Nigeria National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) and the Ministry of Finance submitted memoranda requesting that the 
clauses be removed for the above reasons.
231
 In particular, the finance ministry in arguing 
against the clause noted that it is important for government to be able to 'suspend or revoke 
laws when faced with the need to raise taxes, or in fulfilment of international trade 
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agreements, or to bring its regimes in line with international best practices or to remain 
competitive.'
232
  
Similarly, the Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), 
which enforces the country's maritime laws, also called for the clause to be abolished as it 
constrains their ability to fulfil their mandate.
233
 It explained that NLNG Limited has relied 
on the stabilisation clauses to avoid a statutory 3 per cent levy imposed on gross freight 
earned by ship-owners operating in Nigeria, as well as other maritime international 
obligations on safety, pollution, labour and security.
234
 As a result, NLNG Limited’s 
activities ‘have no significant positive impact on the Nigerian Maritime industry. Instead, the 
activities of the company have negative impact on the environment with the attendant 
economic and political consequences on the Niger Delta region of the country.’235 
In a renewed effort to compel the NLNG to comply with these laws, the agency 
recently halted the NLNG's vessels from operating in the country.
236
 According to the 
agency, this course of action became inevitable following the 'NLNG’s disregard and 
unwillingness to abide by the country’s maritime laws, especially the section of the 
NIMASA Act that mandates payment of levies.'
237
 It remains to be seen how this latest effort 
will conclude since the stabilisation clauses are still valid. However, whatever the outcome, 
the decision by the agency further highlights the on-going constraints the stabilisation clause 
in the NLNG Act imposes.  
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6.4.2. Case Study Two: Stabilisation Clauses in Tanzania’s Mining Sector. 
Tanzania is one of the countries where pressure from the World Bank led to the 
signing of several Mineral Development Agreements (MDAs) in secret, and their terms kept 
secret as well.
238
 The secrecy fuelled a widespread perception of corruption among the 
public and that the MDAs contained ‘unnecessary tax incentives and stabilisation clauses.’239 
These sentiments were confirmed when leaked copies of several MDAs showed that they all 
contained a combination of full freezing and economic equilibrium clauses protecting the 
investors from any changes that put them in a ‘worse off situation.’240 The duration of the 
clauses were for (potentially) 50 years, with an initial 25 years and an option of renewal 
upon the same terms and conditions.
241
  
The incentives and exemptions coupled with tax evasion and aggressive tax 
avoidance by companies have ensured that the contribution of mining to the country’s 
revenue and GDP remained low.
242
 According to a recent report by the IMF, this low ‘fiscal 
impact’ of the ‘growing’ mining sector is ‘unlikely to change in the coming years, partly 
because of’ the ‘large’ tax holidays and incentives.243 It is therefore not surprising that the 
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studies on the mining sector all recommended that the fiscal regime governing the sector 
should be reviewed to increase the contribution of mining to the revenue of the government 
to enable it to finance its sustainable development objectives.
244
 Several of these studies and 
reviews went further to specifically recommend that provisions in existing MDAs, especially 
those relating to taxation, should be renegotiated.
245
   
In line with these recommendations, the government enacted a new Mining Act in 
2010. The Act removed several tax incentives and increased the rate of royalties from 3 per 
cent to 4 per cent.
246
 However, so far, only one of the major mining companies in the country 
has agreed to comply with the law, and in particular, the marginal increase in the royalty 
rate.
247
 The other major mining companies have relied on stabilisation clauses in their MDAs 
to not apply the law. Efforts by the government to make them pay have led to threats of 
international arbitration.
248
  
   For example, following the announcement of the plans, one of the major mining 
companies immediately released a statement reminding the government that their MDAs 
‘guarantee tax and fiscal stabilisation…by reference to the law in force at the effective date 
of the agreement.’249 They therefore argued that the MDAs ‘cannot be amended’ without 
their consent.
250
 The government has thus been forced to go into endless negotiations with 
these companies since 2010 to persuade them to at least comply with some of the terms of 
the new law and in particular the royalty.
251
 Although media reports suggested that the 
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companies have agreed to comply, this has been dismissed by the body representing miners 
in Tanzania as ‘inaccurate reporting.’252 Rather, they argued that discussions are still on-
going but advised the government to ‘respect the sanctity’ of the stabilisation clauses in the 
MDAs.
253
 The sustainable development of Tanzania will therefore have to wait until such a 
time, if at all, when the companies agree to voluntarily comply with the law or until the 
MDAs expire.
254
  
The difficult situation is perpetuated by the fact that the government has already been 
forced to raise revenue from other sources, including by increasing Value Added Taxes and 
Pay As You Earn, in addition to taxes paid on drinks, fuel and cigarettes.
255
 The extent of 
these increases is such that the current general consensus amongst Tanzanians is that these 
sectors are already overtaxed and any further increases will lead to a further rise in the cost 
of living, thereby increasing poverty and impeding sustainable development.
256
 
The effect of the government’s inability to alter its fiscal regime to mobilise revenue 
is particularly critical in view of the fact that a number of reports on sustainable development 
and environmental protection in Tanzania have identified lack of resources as the main 
challenge preventing Tanzania from achieving sustainable development. For example, the 
country’s 1997 Environmental Policy noted that one of the main ways to protect the 
environment is to mobilise and allocate resources towards ‘poverty–related environmental 
problems.’257 On the other hand, the IMF has also made it clear that without ‘explicit’ and 
‘in-depth reassessment of the current fiscal policy’, Tanzania will be unable to generate the 
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revenue needed to finance the social and infrastructural needs of its rising population and 
growing demand for public services.
258
 
Similarly, the country’s current Five-Year Development Plan (FYDP) contains 
several ‘strategic interventions’ to promote the sustainable development of Tanzania.259 The 
Plan notes that the ‘preservation of the rich ecological base of Tanzania and mitigating and 
adapting to the impact of climate change are of prime importance in ensuring sustainable 
growth.’260 For this reason, the plan notes that ‘environmental concerns need to be 
mainstreamed in all future policy measures and henceforth they will be given utmost priority 
in FYDP along with climate-wise economic development policies.’261 Revenue from mineral 
resources is supposed to be ‘one of the important sources of financing the FYDP.’262 As 
such, in view of the ‘relatively small’ revenue from the mineral sector at a time that mineral 
prices are increasing, the report noted that it is ‘vital’ for Tanzania to introduce ‘a super-
profit tax on the windfall earnings from the mineral sector.’263 
Furthermore, the country’s national report submitted for the Rio+20 Conference 
highlighted the status of the ‘implementation of the 1992 Rio outcomes, challenges faced, 
gaps and recommendations for future improvements’ in Tanzania.264 The report noted that 
the country has made significant progress in implementing ‘international sustainable 
development and environmental commitments as well as regional and national 
environmental agreements, policies, legislation and strategies.’265 However, it also observed 
that ‘despite the country’s commitments’, their efforts at achievements have been 
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constrained by several key factors including, ‘insufficient resources to adequately address 
environmental and sustainable development issues.’266 In particular, lack of funds was 
mentioned as the main constraint the country faces in implementing several environmental 
instruments including, the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the UN 
Convention to Combat Desertification and the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change.
267
 
The report therefore observed that Tanzania’s achievement of sustainable 
development was dependent upon several fiscal and economic measures, including measures 
that will enable it to gain access to ‘new, additional, predictable and stable funding for 
addressing sustainable development particularly new and emerging issues.’268  For this 
reason, one of the ‘priority interventions’ suggested in the report is for the government to 
increase the contribution of the mining sector to the national GDP and government’s 
revenue, in addition to improving environmental management in the mining activities.
 269
    
Based on the foregoing, it is difficult to see how Tanzania can achieve sustainable 
development when it is being constrained by stabilisation clauses from implementing vital 
fiscal measures required to promote sustainable development. In other words, for the 
government and people of Tanzania, the practical challenge posed by stabilisation clauses is 
not that they have stopped them from enacting new social and environmental laws. Rather, it 
is that they are constraining them from making the mining sector contribute more revenue to 
finance their sustainable development measures, including measures to improve social and 
environmental standards. It is therefore not surprising that, although the current Mining Act 
limits the scope of stabilisation clauses that may be granted by the government to fiscal 
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issues,
270
 there is an increasing demand that this provision be reviewed to remove the 
possibility of providing investors with fiscal stabilisation clauses.
271
  
6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
A realistic analysis of the impact of stabilisation clauses reveals that it is not the 
constraints that the clauses impose on the legislative competence of host states in the area of 
social and environmental laws that affect sustainable development. Rather, it is the 
constraints that they impose on host states’ ability to enact and implement the fiscal policies 
or the fiscal aspects of laws that underpin sustainable development. By exempting investors 
from the effects of changes in the law, stabilisation clauses reduce the policy space available 
to developing countries to alter their fiscal and economic policies in order to mobilise the 
maximum of available resources to finance their sustainable development measures. The 
way in which stabilisation clauses affect countries may vary from country to country. 
However, some of these effects may apply generally.   
  First, stabilisation clauses help to reinforce developing countries’ reliance on foreign 
aid by constraining their ability to mobilise the maximum available domestic resources. As a 
result, their ability to define and implement their sustainable development goals in light of 
their specific priorities is affected because of the conditions usually tied to development aid.  
  Second, they prevent several developing countries from altering their fiscal regime to 
capture some of the ‘windfall’ profits brought about by the largely unexpected and sustained 
high prices of mineral resources.  
  Third, for resource-rich developing countries, stabilisation clauses may impose a 
significant constraint on the ability of their governments to reform energy subsidies in order 
to promote sustainable development. This is because the reduction of their fiscal policy 
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space deprives them of ‘climate finance’ and other funds needed to implement measures to 
mitigate the impact of subsidy reform on lower incomes groups.  
  Finally, stabilisation clauses may create policy incoherence, with implications for 
sustainable development as different sets of laws may be applicable to investors even within 
the same sector. 
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CHAPTER 7  - FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has examined the rationale and on-going purpose of stabilisation clauses 
and the way in which they undermine efforts by governments of developing countries to 
promote sustainable development. The main findings of the study, its wider implications and 
recommendations are summarised in the following sections.   
7.1  SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS   
7.1.1 Validity and Legal Effect of Stabilisation Clauses  
Within the last decade, several arbitral tribunals have provided more clarity on the 
legal effect and validity of stabilisation clauses. Some of the decisions are mainly focused on 
the interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment standard in bilateral investments treaties. 
However, the arbitrators went on to make useful comments on the effect that the inclusion of 
stabilisation clauses would have had on the outcome of the cases.   
The review of the relevant cases in section 2.6 confirms that stabilisation clauses are 
legally valid and binding on host governments. A freezing clause freezes the laws and 
regulations applicable to an investment at the time the contract was concluded. It therefore 
prevents the government from enacting, amending or modifying any laws and regulations to 
the detriment of investors. An economic equilibrium clause entitles the investors to be 
compensated by the host state to the extent of any financial loss suffered as a result of 
changes in the law.  
Stabilisation clauses were previously thought to only cover changes in the formal text 
of laws. However, the tribunal in Duke Energy International Peru Investments No. 1, Ltd v 
Peru extended it to cover a change in the interpretation of the law even if the text of the law 
has not changed.
1
 According to the tribunal, the inclusion of a stabilisation clause in the 
agreement also means that a stable interpretation or application of the law, which was in 
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place at the time the agreement was signed, will not be changed to the detriment of the 
investor.
2
 Further, the stabilised law may not be interpreted or applied in a patently 
unreasonable or arbitrary manner.
3
 
The discussion in section 2.7.2 also shows that stabilisation clauses are legally 
effective in supporting claims against host states for breach of investment treaty obligations, 
especially obligations relating to the fair and equitable treatment standard. Where an investor 
benefits from a stabilisation clause, a host state is unlikely to be successful if it seeks to rely 
on the defence of ‘police powers’ to justify the regulatory changes. The investor is thus more 
likely to succeed in a treaty-based claim for indirect expropriation or a regulatory taking 
where a stabilisation clause had been granted in their favour.  
The reason for the above is because the decisions of arbitral tribunals are to the effect 
that a stabilisation clause gives an investor an almost absolute right to claim a legitimate 
expectation that the laws of the host state will not change to its detriment.
4
 Thus, under 
general customary international law, a legitimate expectation about the stability of the laws 
of the host state is usually considered against the circumstances of the changes and the effect 
of the changes on the investor. However, such an assessment may not be required where 
there is a specific promise of stability in the form of a stabilisation clause. All that the 
tribunal will be concerned with is whether the host state acted in breach of the clause. If so, 
then the investor is entitled to compensation irrespective of the circumstances, purpose and 
magnitude of the impact of the law on the investor. 
7.1.2 Stabilisation Clauses: Perceptions versus Realities 
Two presumptions prevail and are promoted by the extractive industry, by some 
international organisations, and in the legal literature. The first is that developing countries 
compete with each other to attract FDI. The second is that there are higher levels of political 
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risks in developing countries. Neither of these presumptions is true as such. Nevertheless, 
stabilisation clauses have been presented to developing countries as an ‘essential’ cure for 
these misleading presumptions. 
With regards to the presumption of the need to compete, the available evidence on 
current trends and future projections in the extractive industry, which is based largely on the 
basic economic principle of supply and demand, was analysed in section 3.2. The evidence 
did not point to a global bidding war between resource-rich developing countries to win FDI. 
On the contrary, it pointed to a more intense competition among foreign investors, backed by 
their home state governments, to gain access to natural resources in developing countries. As 
such, the idea that developing countries accept stabilisation clauses because of a need to 
compete to attract FDI is not one shared by this thesis.  
The presumption of higher political risks in developing countries was also 
examined in section 3.3. The distinction made by Daniel Wagner between ‘government 
risks’ and ‘instability risks’ proved particularly useful in this regard.5 This is because 
stabilisation clauses are drafted to deal with ‘government risks’ and not ‘instability risks.’ 
To determine whether ‘government risks’ are indeed higher in developing countries, 
thereby necessitating the use of stabilisation clauses, significant changes in fiscal terms in 
the extractive industry in resource-rich developed countries between 2002 and 2012 were 
reviewed.
6
  
The findings showed that governments of developed countries are just as likely as 
those in developing countries to alter the fiscal terms in their extractive industries. This is 
in addition to the constant regulatory changes in developed countries that are introduced to 
address environmental, and health and safety issues. This thesis therefore concluded that 
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the political risks that stabilisation clauses aim to minimise in developing countries exist, at 
least in equal measure, in the extractive industry of developed countries. Yet, developed 
countries do not offer or grant stabilisation clauses to minimise these risks but are still able 
to attract FDI into their extractive sectors. For this reason, this thesis disagrees with the 
claim that stabilisation clauses are an ‘essential’ requirement to attract FDI into developing 
countries.  
The analysis in section 3.4 supports the above position taken in this thesis. The 
analysis showed that several developing countries do not grant stabilisation clauses but 
continue to attract FDI in their extractive industries. Some countries grant the clauses only 
to certain investors, yet other investors still invest in the same sector without the clause. 
Some other countries offer investors the choice to benefit from the clause upon the fulfilment 
of certain conditions, such as being subject to a higher tax rate or paying a premium. Again, 
many investors in such countries choose not to apply for it but continue to invest.  
Furthermore, except in the instances where stabilisation clauses were granted at the 
same time the country was opening the sector to foreign investors, this study did not find any 
instance where the mere introduction of stabilisation clauses or stability agreements in a 
country led to a significant increase in FDI inflow into that country. It also did not observe 
any significant adverse effect on the inflow of FDI in many of the countries that have 
repealed, significantly undermined or reduced the scope of stabilisation clauses. The 
conclusion therefore is that while investors may request stabilisation clauses wherever 
possible, the grant or otherwise of the clause do not influence investment decisions in a 
significant way. This is particularly so in the extractive industry where the most important 
factor is, and has always been, the mineral potential of the host country.   
7.1.3 Stabilising under the World Bank’s Shadow and under a Dark Cloud  
Stabilisation clauses became popular from the late 1960s but this popularity appeared 
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to diminish substantially from the 1970s onwards. The clauses however made an 
‘unexpected comeback’ in more extensive forms from the late 1980s.7 The common reason 
suggested in the literature for the revival revolves around the two presumptions discussed in 
the last section. However, chapter 3 concluded that these presumptions diverge from reality. 
There must therefore be some other explanation as to why a significant number of 
developing countries nevertheless re-introduced, and, in some cases, continue to grant 
stabilisation clauses. The conclusion in chapter 4 is that two factors contributed significantly 
to the return of even more extensive forms of stabilisation clauses from the late 1980s. The 
first was external pressure, mainly from the World Bank, while the second factor was 
corruption and lack of transparency on the part of the governments granting the clause.   
The re-introduction of stabilisation clauses into the statute books of many developing 
countries from the late 1980s was largely influenced by pressure applied by the World Bank 
during the Bank-led reforms.
8
 The World Bank saw stabilisation clauses as an essential 
element of an attractive investment climate. It therefore made it a key component of the 
legislative reforms it proposed and facilitated in developing countries. Receiving technical 
assistance and other forms of support from the Bank became conditional upon implementing 
the reforms, including the grant of stabilisation clauses.  
The Bank’s relationship with developing countries as a major lender and as an 
executing agency for projects being financed by several external donors, left many 
developing countries with little or no choice but to accept the reforms, especially in the light 
of the economic crisis at the time. They therefore included stabilisation clauses in the 
legislation enacted and/or the contracts concluded as part of the reform programme. All of 
which was in accordance with the Bank’s requirement to continue to receive financial and 
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technical assistance from the Bank. This was despite the fact that the Bank’s position 
favouring stabilisation clauses was arrived at without a firm basis concerning the 
effectiveness of the clause in attracting FDI and its effect on the wider development 
objectives of these countries.  
Corruption and lack of transparency in the contracting process also help to explain 
why several developing countries re-introduced stabilisation clauses and continued to grant 
even more extensive forms of the clause. This remained the case whether or not the contract 
containing the clause was a direct outcome of the World Bank’s reform programme. Thus, 
regardless of whether these governments had been put under pressure from the World Bank, 
the most stringent forms of stabilisation clauses were more likely to be found in contracts or 
legislation entered into, or enacted by, regimes known to be (or widely perceived to be) 
corrupt and/or dictatorial. 
Corrupt and/or dictatorial governments were therefore more likely to grant full 
freezing clauses or full economic equilibrium clauses. They were also more likely to grant 
stabilisation clauses for long durations and to allow investors to benefit from favourable 
changes in the law. In most cases, these contracts had been negotiated under a shroud of 
secrecy, and the eventual terms kept secret as well. Their terms, including the stabilisation 
clauses, only become known when they were leaked by civil society groups, or published by 
a subsequent government.  
Conversely, increased transparency and accountability in the contracting process 
usually led to the removal or reduction in the scope of stabilisation clauses granted by a 
country. Within the past decade, an increasing number of countries have either eliminated or 
significantly reduced the scope of stabilisation clauses that they granted. This was usually 
done in the context of the rapid growth at the global level of transparency and accountability 
initiatives in the extractive industry. This suggests that while governments appear willing to 
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grant stabilisation clauses when negotiations are conducted in secret, they are unable to 
defend or justify them when they are held to account under a more transparent process. This 
may explain why, within the last decade, candidates or political parties have been elected 
into office largely by promising to review, override or undermine stabilisation clauses.
9
   
It is important to point out that this thesis does not claim that only corrupt and/or 
dictatorial governments continue to accept stabilisation clauses. There are several developing 
countries where, in relative terms, stabilisation clauses are granted openly by transparent and 
accountable governments.
10
 However, even in these countries, the claim of a link between 
stabilisation clauses and transparency holds true. The higher level of transparency is 
reflected in their stabilisation practices in terms of the scope and duration of the clause, and 
the extraction of some form of consideration from investors before they can access the 
clause.
11
  
7.1.4 Sustainable Development and the Misplaced Focus on Social and Environmental 
Laws. 
   The exact meaning and legal status of sustainable development has been a subject of 
debate. While there are those who still argue over these issues, the basic premise of the 
concept and its core element are now largely established. The historical evolution of the 
concept reviewed in section 5.2.1 showed that the basic premise of sustainable development 
is that economic growth, social development and environment protection should be 
integrated in decision-making in order to meet the needs of the present generation without 
limiting the ability of future generations to do the same. Furthermore, the usage of 
‘sustainable development’ in international legal texts and jurisprudence confirm that it is 
now a fully established objective of the international community and states are therefore 
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expected to conduct their affairs in line with this objective.  
  The discussion in section 5.2 also showed that sustainable development is not 
synonymous with environmental protection and/or human rights. It is also not a 
‘compromise term’ to refer to environmental or human rights laws in developing countries. It 
is as much about economic development as it is about environmental protection or social 
development. Yet, the literature on the impact of stabilisation clauses has been focused 
mostly on their effect on human rights and environmental laws, even when the authors claim 
to be considering their impact on sustainable development.   
  Possible reasons for the focus on human rights and environmental laws were 
examined in section 5.3.1. First, the fragmented and compartmentalised nature of institutions 
has led to analyses of the clause focusing on the narrow compartmentalised concerns of the 
institution undertaking or sponsoring the study. 
 The second is the reluctance, especially among public international law specialists, to 
engage with economics or to undertake any economic analyses. Third, the focus reflects a 
lack of practical and theoretical understanding of the situation in developing countries. This 
in turn contributes to the fourth reason, which is that the debates concerning the impact of 
stabilisation clauses have been framed along the lines of themes prioritised by Western 
sponsors or authors, rather than the priorities of developing countries where stabilisation 
clauses are used. The final reason is that this approach is reflective of a flawed understanding 
and interpretation of sustainable development – one that ignores the interdependency and 
mutually reinforcing nature of its three pillars. 
  This thesis therefore concludes that the approach whereby the impact of stabilisation 
clauses is analysed solely in terms of its impact on environmental and/or social laws is 
misguided. As a result, the analyses and the solutions arising therefrom are of little practical 
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relevance to developing countries wishing to align their stabilisation practice with 
sustainable development. 
  In the real world, economic growth, environmental protection and social growth are 
interdependent and interlocked, necessitating comprehensive approaches in pursuing them. 
For this reason, although it is possible to classify certain laws taken to implement sustainable 
development according to the constituent pillar at which they are aimed, most do not fit into 
this strict categorisation. Their purpose and effect significantly affects more than one of the 
pillars of sustainable development. These laws cannot therefore be appropriately labelled as 
environmental, social or economic laws. They are simply sustainable development laws, 
even where they are not so explicitly named. The misplaced focus on social and 
environmental laws has thus ignored these laws even though any constraints imposed on 
their effectiveness by stabilisation clauses affect sustainable development.  
  Furthermore, for developing countries, achieving sustainable development depends to 
a significant extent on the ability to alter their fiscal and economic policies to ensure that 
available resources are maximised to fund their sustainable development measures. Since the 
link between these policies and the improvement of human rights and environmental 
standards is straightforward, any limitation placed on the ability of host states to alter their 
fiscal policies affects human rights and environmental protection. It is for this reason that 
this thesis adopted the integrated approach encapsulated in the principle of sustainable 
development when assessing the impact of stabilisation clauses. 
7.1.5 How Do Stabilisation Clauses Constrain Sustainable Development? 
Contrary to the focus in the literature, it is not the constraints that stabilisation 
clauses impose on the legislative competence of host states in the area of human rights and 
environmental laws that affect sustainable development. Rather, it is the constraints that they 
impose on host states’ abilities to enact and implement fiscal and economic policies or the 
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fiscal aspects of the laws (including human rights and environmental laws) that underpin 
sustainable development. By exempting investors from the effect of changes in the law, 
stabilisation clauses reduce the policy space available to developing countries to alter their 
fiscal and economic policies in order to mobilise the maximum returns from available 
resources to finance their sustainable development measures.  
The straightforward link between the three pillars of sustainable development means 
that while the immediate effect of the constraint may be fiscal in nature, it affects the other 
pillars in a significant way. This is so because the government’s ability to enact the 
fiscal/economic policies, required to complement environmental and social laws, is 
constrained, as is its ability to generate funds to implement such laws. As a result, many 
developing countries are unable to use economic and other market-based instruments to 
protect the environment. Yet such instruments are very useful in addressing some of the 
major current environmental challenges such as climate change and unsustainable 
consumption of natural resources.
 
It also affects the ability of governments to progressively 
enact and implement human rights laws. However, contrary to the focus in the existing 
literature, this inability is not necessarily because governments have lost their legislative 
power to enact and implement human rights laws. Rather it is because they cannot afford to 
do so.  
  The reduction in fiscal policy space means that developing countries may be affected 
in various ways. Some of these effects, which could be applicable to all countries that grant 
stabilisation clauses, were examined in chapter 6. First, stabilisation clauses help to reinforce 
developing countries’ reliance on foreign aid by constraining their ability to mobilise the 
maximum available domestic resources. As exemplified by the case study of Tanzania, 
stabilisation clauses can be used by investors to undermine reforms aimed at mobilising 
domestic revenue. In some cases, foreign investors simply rely on stabilisation clauses to 
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continue to apply the previous fiscal regime. In other cases, the clauses are used as a 
bargaining tool by foreign investors to extract concessions from the government thereby 
reducing the efficacy of the law.   
  Domestic resources are a key facilitator of sustainable development because they are 
less volatile and more predictable than development aid. Furthermore, in complying with the 
conditions usually attached to foreign aid and loans, developing countries enact and 
implement policies that reflect the priorities of donor countries, rather than their own 
priorities. Thus, by reinforcing reliance on foreign aid, stabilisation clauses reduce the ability 
of developing countries to define and implement their sustainable development goals in the 
light of their country specific priorities.  
   Second, stabilisation clauses have prevented many developing countries from 
maximising the benefit of the largely unexpected and sustained high prices of mineral 
resources. This is because investors have been able to rely on stabilisation clauses to delay 
the enactment of windfall profit taxes. This is despite the fact that, as exemplified by the case 
study of Tanzania, the successful implementation of such taxes is closely linked to the 
sustainable development of these countries.  
  In instances where the governments went ahead to enact such windfall profit tax 
laws, investors were able to rely on stabilisation clauses to obtain exemption from their 
applicability or to be compensated for complying with them. Faced with the threat of 
international arbitration, such countries are forced to delay the enactment or implementation 
of the laws or to abolish them completely. Where they decide to implement them, they have 
been constrained to provide exemptions, or risk being sued and be ordered to pay damages 
by arbitrators. Whatever option taken by the government, the amount of revenue intended to 
be mobilised to fund sustainable development measures is either significantly reduced or 
altogether foregone.  
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   Third, for resource-rich developing countries, stabilisation clauses may impose a 
significant constraint on their ability to reform energy subsidies in order to promote 
sustainable development. Stabilisation clauses constrain their ability to use economic 
instruments, such as carbon taxes, to generate revenue to mitigate the immediate and long 
term impact of such reforms on the poor. They are also constrained from using such 
instruments to discourage fossil fuel consumption and provide an incentive for investment in 
low-carbon power generation. This is because as carbon taxes constitute a fiscal measure, 
they are likely to be covered by tax stabilisation clauses even if they are also aimed at 
combating complex environmental challenges such as climate change.
12
  
 Stabilisation clauses also create policy incoherence and distort economic policies, 
with implications for sustainable development. Where they are granted only to foreign 
companies, they impose a greater financial burden on domestic investors who must comply 
with all changes in the law, including tax laws. This creates unequal competition that can 
significantly curtail the ability of domestic firms to grow and to maximise the benefits of the 
spill over effect of FDI.   
Where, stabilisation clauses are granted to some foreign investors but not to others, it 
also creates an unfair playing field among foreign investors that may impede, rather than 
promote, sustainable development in the long run. Where, on the other hand, stabilisation 
clauses are made available to all investors, it still raises a question of policy coherence. This 
is because as different companies invest at different times, the stabilised laws will vary from 
investor to investor according to the time at which they made their investment. The result is 
a complex situation where different rules apply to different companies even within the same 
sector. This creates an unnecessary complication for the regulatory agencies that may result 
                                           
12
 According to the IMF, eliminating subsidies and replacing them with appropriate carbon taxes could cut 
global greenhouse-gas emissions by 13 per cent and curtail air pollution. IMF, ‘Energy Subsidy Reform: 
Lessons and Implications’ (28 January 2013) 18 – 19 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813.pdf> accessed 10 May 2013. 
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in under-regulation or no regulation at all even when the activities of the companies may 
undermine the sustainable development of these countries. 
7.2 SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT POLICY   
The findings on the impact of stabilisation clauses summarised in the previous 
sections have some implications for on-going efforts to confront tax avoidance and evasion. 
It also raises questions about the usefulness of the solutions routinely proffered in the 
literature to deal with the impact of stabilisation clauses on sustainable development. 
7.2.1 Stabilisation Clauses, Tax Avoidance and Evasion 
  As discussed in chapter 5, in recent times, the role of fiscal and tax policies in 
promoting sustainable development, including the protection of human rights and the 
environment, has taken on added significance. As a result, tax evasion and avoidance issues 
have been brought to the fore by several governments and organisations, including the G8 
where the British Prime Minister pledged ‘to drive a more serious debate on tax evasion and 
tax avoidance’ because it is an issue ‘whose time has come.’13 
    In line with his promise, the recently concluded G8 summit produced the Lough Erne 
Declaration containing certain principles to deal with tax evasion and avoidance.
14
  These 
principles are particularly useful to developing countries because a major impediment to 
domestic resource mobilisation in many resource-rich developing countries is tax evasion 
and avoidance by multinationals in the extractive industry.
15
 It is therefore not surprising that 
the declaration made specific reference to the extractive industry and the need for developing 
                                           
13
 Prime Minister David Cameron, ‘Speech to the World Economic Forum in Davos’ (24 January 2013) 
<http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/prime-minister-david-camerons-speech-to-the-world-economic-forum-in-
davos/> accessed 19 April 2013.    
14
 G8, ‘Lough Erne Declaration’ 18 June 
2013<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/207543/180613_LOUGH
_ERNE_DECLARATION.pdf> accessed 15 July 2013. 
15
 See section 6.4.2; AFDB, OECD and UNECA, Africa Economic Outlook 2010: Public Resource 
Mobilisation and Aid (AFDB and ors 2010).     
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countries to have the information and capacity to collect taxes owed to them.
16
 The question 
however is to what extent can developing countries apply the principles contained in the 
declaration where they have granted stabilisation clauses to the multinationals in the 
extractive industry?  
  Dealing with tax evasion and avoidance require governments to enact new tax laws 
or amend existing laws to close legal loopholes. It is in recognition of this that the 
Declaration enjoined countries to ‘change rules that let companies shift their profits across 
borders to avoid taxes.…’17 The findings in this thesis suggests that where stabilisation 
clauses have been granted to investors, any change in the taxation rules that increase the 
investors’ tax liability may be in breach of the stabilisation clauses. This may require the 
host country to compensate investors to the extent of the additional tax collected as a result 
of the change in the rules, thereby making the change in the rules meaningless.  
For example, in Duke Energy v. Peru, the tax authority relied on a general tax-
avoidance provision to make a new tax assessment for the claimant because it found that the 
merger involving the investor was a ‘sham’ transaction conducted to avoid tax liability.18 
This new assessment, which increased the tax liability of the claimant, was held to be in 
breach of stabilisation clauses because it changed the stable interpretation of the law.
19
 Peru 
was therefore ordered to compensate the investor to the extent of the loss suffered as a result 
of the change in the stable interpretation of the tax rules.
20
 
  As rightly noted by the Lough Erne Declaration, ‘governments have a special 
responsibility to make proper rules and promote good governance’ and ‘fair taxes, increased 
                                           
16
 G8 (n 14) paras 5 - 6. 
17
 Ibid para 2. 
18
 Duke Energy v Peru (n 1). The general tax avoidance rule is Rule VIII of the Peruvian Tax Code (as 
amended 22 September 1996) which authorises the tax authority to apply ‘all interpretation methods admitted 
by Law’ and to look into the ‘business relations, situations and acts that are actually performed, pursued or 
established by tax debtors’ when determining the ‘true nature of a taxable act’.  
19
 Ibid [227[ - [228] 
20
 Ibid [460] – [485]  
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transparency and open trade are vital drivers of this.’21 However, the arbitral jurisprudence 
on stabilisation clauses suggests that the legitimacy, purpose or fairness of changes to tax 
laws will be immaterial if the changes are implemented contrary to stabilisation clauses.
22
 
The implication is that developing countries’ governments must continue to apply stabilised 
law and must not change its interpretation or risk paying compensation to investors. This is 
so even if the laws are being used mischievously by investors to evade or avoid taxes.     
  Furthermore, there is also significant evidence that in addition to weak tax laws, 
foreign investors exploit the weak tax structures in developing countries to evade or avoid 
taxes and royalties.
23
 It is perhaps for this reason that the Lough Erne Declaration also 
pointed out the need for developing countries to have the information and capacity to collect 
taxes owed to them.
24
 To achieve this, developing countries will need to make huge 
investments in improving the size and capacity of their tax authorities to deal with the 
increasingly sophisticated tax avoidance techniques employed by multinationals. Since 
stabilisation clauses reduce the fiscal policy space available to host states, their ability to 
mobilise the additional revenue required to improve the capacity of their tax authority is 
constrained. It therefore remains to be seen how the latest efforts being spearheaded by the 
G8 to deal with tax evasion and avoidance can be applied by developing countries that have 
granted stabilisation clauses.  
  It is therefore suggested that if this latest effort by the G8 is to be relevant and 
beneficial to developing countries which have granted stabilisation clauses, any legal 
commitments or principles should go further to include provisions that restore the policy 
space lost to stabilisation clauses. Provisions should be included enabling developing 
                                           
21
 G8 (n 14) preamble. 
22
 Duke Energy v. Peru (n1) [344] – [355]; Section 2.7.2. 
23
 See, for example, OSISA, Breaking the Curse: How Transparent Taxation and Fair Taxes can Turn Africa’s 
Mineral Wealth into Development (OSISA 2009). 
24
 G8 (n 14) para 4. 
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countries to nullify any agreement or parts of such agreements that encourage or facilitate 
tax avoidance and evasion irrespective of stability guarantees.  
  In addition, G8 members are home governments to the majority of investors in the 
extractive industry of developing countries. As such, if they want their current efforts to 
combat tax evasion and avoidance to be effective, they should match their commitment with 
action when it has to do with their home companies investing in developing countries. This 
is particularly so whenever a developing country attempts to review contracts entered under 
questionable circumstances. It is common to after all, find media reports describing how 
home governments are applying pressure on the host government to not undertake the review 
in a way that adversely affects their home companies.
25
  
7.2.2 Stabilisation Clauses and Unsustainable Solutions  
The findings in this thesis also raise serious doubts about the practical usefulness of 
what has now become the default recommendation for dealing with the impact of 
stabilisation clauses. Almost all the literature on the impact of stabilisation clauses concludes 
by recommending that environmental and social laws (including human rights laws) should 
be excluded from the scope of stabilisation clauses. This recommendation is proffered even 
when the particular literature explicitly claims to focus on the impact of the clause on 
sustainable development.
26
  
However, from the findings in this study, it is hard to see how this recommendation 
can minimise the constraining effect of stabilisation clauses in any significant way. Indeed, 
the recommendation appears to be based on the flawed understanding and interpretation of 
                                           
25
 See, for example, reports of how the Canadian government applied pressure on DRC which reportedly 
contributed to DRC’s decision to settle with a Canadian company over the cancellation of illegitimate mining 
contracts. For details, see, Macho Philipovich, ‘Why is Canada Blocking Congo’s Debt Forgiveness’ The 
Dominion (11 August 2010) <http://www.dominionpaper.ca/articles/3573> accessed 12 September 2013; 
Matthew McClearn, ‘How First Quantum settled with ENRC for compensation over Congolese Mine’ 
Canadian Business (05 July 2012) <http://www.canadianbusiness.com/business-strategy/how-first-quantum-
settled-with-enrc-for-compensation-over-congolese-mine/> accessed 12 September 2013.     
26
 See, for example Audley Sheppard and Antony Crockett, ‘Are Stabilisation Clauses a Threat to Sustainable 
Development’ in Marie–Claire Cordonier Segger, Markus W Gehring and Andrew Newcombe, (eds), 
Sustainable Development in World Investment Law (Kluwer Law 2011) 329 – 350. 
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sustainable development identified in section 5.3.1.5. This is because the reasoning behind 
this recommendation is that if such laws are not covered by stabilisation clauses, the host 
state will be ‘free’ to enact and implement human rights and environmental laws thereby 
promoting sustainable development.  
  However, contrary to the above reasoning, in the real world, economic growth, social 
development and environmental protection are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. 
Indeed, the analysis in section 5.3.2 and the discussion in chapter 6 including, the case 
studies, show that laws taken to promote sustainable development are increasingly becoming 
difficult to label ‘social’, ‘environmental’ or ‘economic’ law as they significantly affect all 
three pillars and seek to integrate them.  As such, a solution that seeks to emphasis the 
individuality of each pillar rather than contribute to their integration, is not only 
impracticable but also negates, rather than promotes, sustainable development. 
Furthermore, the findings in this thesis, as exemplified by the case studies, show that 
it is not the constraints stabilisation clauses impose on the legislative competence of host 
states in the area of human rights and environmental laws that affect sustainable 
development. It is the constraints that they impose on their ability to enact and implement 
fiscal and economic policies, or the fiscal aspects of the laws that underpin sustainable 
development. Indeed, none of the literature proffering this solution contains any evidence 
from the real world of the problem it is intended to solve. This is because, as Sheppard and 
Crockett rightly admitted, there does not appear to be any.
27
  
The reason behind the absence of such evidence is that the major constraint in 
improving human rights and environmental standards in developing countries is the lack of 
financial resources, rather than lack of laws or inability to enact new laws.
28
 It is therefore 
hard to conceive of a situation where host states will enact and implement new human rights 
                                           
27
 Ibid 335. 
28
 See generally chapter 6. 
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and environmental laws if stabilisation clauses prevent them from mobilising the additional 
resources usually required to implement such laws. This is why Sheppard and Crockett did 
not find any reported case law, arbitral award, or even anecdotal evidence that demonstrates 
that stabilisation clauses affect the enactment of human rights and environmental laws.
29
 Yet, 
they concluded with the same recommendation i.e. that human rights and environmental 
laws should be excluded from the scope of stabilisation clauses as a way of dealing with the 
constraints that the clauses impose on sustainable development.
30
 In other words, they, like 
the other authors, are prescribing a drug to cure an ailment that no one, including them, has 
been able to diagnose.  
   A second, but less frequent, recommendation in the literature is that economic 
equilibrium clauses should be granted in place of freezing clauses.
31
 The reasoning behind 
this recommendation is that economic equilibrium clauses are less obstructive to the state’s 
legislative power as they do not prevent the host state from enacting new laws. Rather, they 
merely ensure that compensation is paid to investors. They are therefore seen as creating a 
‘win-win’ situation because host states can change their laws and apply them to all investors 
while the investors are protected from the adverse effect of these changes by being 
compensated.
32
   
   Again, it is difficult to conceive how this recommendation will be useful in practice 
in dealing with the actual constraints that stabilisation clauses impose. This is because in 
practice, the legal effect of an economic equilibrium clause and a freezing clause is the same. 
The main consequence of a breach of either of them is the payment of compensation to 
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 Sheppard and Crockett (n 26) 339-340 
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31
 See, for example, Herbert Smith, ‘Stabilisation Clauses - Issues and Trends’ (2010) 36 Infrastructure and 
Mining Newsletter, 1; Talal AQ Al-Emadi,  ‘Stabilization Clauses in International Joint Venture Agreements’ 
(2010) 3 International Energy Law Review 54, 57; Lorenzo Cotula, ‘Reconciling Regulatory Stability and 
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restore the investor to the same economic position as existed before the breach occurred.
33
 
The stabilisation clause in Duke v Peru was a freezing clause while that in Burlington v 
Ecuador was an economic equilibrium clause. Yet in both cases, the tribunals held the host 
states liable to pay compensation to the investors to restore them to the same financial 
position they would have been in if the changes in the law had not occurred.  
   It is therefore hard to see how the economic equilibrium clause can be a ‘win’ for 
host states when it imposes a price tag that is roughly equivalent to the price tag of a freezing 
clause on host governments’ regulatory powers. Thus, for example, where a government 
enacts a windfall profits tax law, an economic equilibrium clause will not prevent the 
government from collecting the tax from an investor with a stabilisation clause. However, it 
ensures that the government will have to return the tax to the investor, or otherwise 
compensate the investor to the extent of the tax collected. This defeats the purpose of the law 
thereby making it meaningless and a waste of the government’s time. Indeed, in the 
Burlington case, the claimant itself argued that Ecuador ignored its requests for the 
application of the economic equilibrium clause because compliance with the clauses would 
have been ‘incompatible’ with Ecuador's aim in imposing the windfall profit tax.34 The 
suggestions to developing countries to exclude human right and environmental laws or to 
grant economic equilibrium clauses as a way of reconciling stabilisation clauses with 
sustainable development is therefore ill-conceived.  
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.3.1 To Stabilise or Not to Stabilise? 
The findings in this thesis show that whatever solutions proposed to deal with the 
constraints that stabilisations clauses impose on sustainable development, should not simply 
                                           
33
 See section 2.6.3 
34
 Burlington Resources Inc v Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability of 14 December 2012 
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be focused on the scope of the stabilisation clauses to be granted. More importantly, they 
should focus on the way the clauses are granted and how they should allow for more 
flexibility. Before then, it is even more important for host states to decide whether or not to 
grant stabilisation clauses.  
A key conclusion reached in this study is that contrary to the claims of proponents, 
stabilisation clauses are not essential in attracting FDI to the extractive sector of developing 
countries. This conclusion is supported by recent empirical studies that suggest requests for 
stabilisation clauses are largely rent–seeking behaviour by investors. There is therefore 
strong justification for countries to move away from granting stabilisation clauses, at least as 
they are currently drafted.  As such, the first question a government must ask itself when 
stabilisation clauses are requested is not the scope of the clause that should be granted. 
Rather, it is whether the clause is necessary and legitimately required by the investor.  
As discussed in chapter 4, the closest economic justification for stabilisation clauses 
is the argument that investors pay higher risk premiums for investment projects in 
developing countries due to the perceived higher risks.
35
 For this reason, it is the view of 
proponents of stabilisation clauses that governments of developing countries can increase 
their share of rents by making their investment environment less risky thereby lowering risk 
premiums for foreign investors.
36
  It is thus important that when considering whether to grant 
a stabilisation clause, that the government carries out an assessment to determine whether it 
is more beneficial and sustainable to contract away potential future tax revenue or to allow 
investors to pay the higher risk premium where applicable. This is especially so because 
studies by some economists have shown that foreign investors actually receive excessive 
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 Section 4.3.3; World Bank, Strategy for African Mining (World Bank 1992) 17. 
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returns on their investment in the countries often considered as having higher political 
risks.
37
  
For example, Margaret McMillan and Andrew Waxman conducted an econometrics 
study on US multinationals operating in extractive industries abroad.
38
  They found that the 
investors were able to obtain particularly generous deals in developing countries with high 
levels of corruption and weak governance.
39
 They also made two other findings relevant to 
the present discussion.  
First, they used contracts in the Chadian oil sector, including the Chad-Cameroon 
pipeline project, as a case study. They found that these contracts were ‘extremely generous’ 
to the foreign investors.
40
 Significantly, these are also contracts identified in this thesis as 
having broad and stringent stabilisation clauses.
41
 Thus in effect, the investors were 
presumably granted stabilisation clauses to reduce their risk premiums, yet the balance of the 
contracts, in terms of profit-sharing were still tilted heavily towards the investors.  
The second finding has to do with the involvement of the World Bank. McMillan and 
Waxman found that although the World Bank was ‘extensively involved’ in the negotiations 
leading to the contracts, their involvement had not been ‘very effective’ at helping the host 
state get a better deal.
42
 This finding should be a lesson for developing countries who 
routinely seek to justify the terms of contracts simply because the World Bank was involved 
and has approved of it. So, the mere fact that the World Bank is involved or recommends 
that stabilisation clauses should be included in a contract, should not preclude governments 
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from carrying out their own assessment to determine whether or not to grant stabilisation 
clauses.  
 In carrying out the assessment, developing countries’ governments must realise that 
their mineral potential represents a major competitive advantage.
43
 This in itself is a strong 
bargaining tool, which they must begin to responsibly utilise in their favour. Governments 
must also keep in mind the level of intensity of the competition among foreign investors for 
the extractive resources in their countries. A long queue in the number of potential investors 
is the best indication that the overall balance between fiscal terms and other considerations is 
right.
44
 In such a case, stabilisation clauses may be unnecessary.  
Developing countries need to continue to seek to maintain an attractive investment 
climate. They should therefore continue to offer legal protection to foreign investors from 
arbitrary and opportunistic unilateral adjustments to the fiscal regime governing their 
investment. This is because too frequent changes to the fiscal regime may reduce the overall 
viability of FDI in a country and consequently reduce its inflow. However, such protection 
must be given in such a way that it does not unduly constrain the pursuit of their legitimate 
sustainable development goals. The evidence seen in this study is that stabilisation clauses, 
as they are currently drafted, do not achieve this balance. Rather, they give foreign investors 
an extensive bargaining power that can be used to oppose even marginal changes proposed 
by host states for perfectly legitimate reasons.  
Accordingly, while countries may wish to offer protection for investors, such 
protection must be flexible enough to allow their governments to enact and implement 
policies, including fiscal policies, required to pursue their sustainable development goals. 
                                           
43
 See section 3.2 and in particular the fact that reserves in developing countries remain, in principle, ‘large 
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One way to do this is to draft stabilisation clauses to cover only discriminatory laws. In other 
words, all new laws, including fiscal laws should apply to all investors as long as the laws 
are not discriminatory in their application. In this context, laws are not regarded as 
discriminatory merely because they apply only to companies in the same sector or in ‘similar 
circumstances’.45 Models of such clauses are already in use in the few OECD countries that 
grant stabilisation clauses.
46
  
  While it could be argued that such clauses are possible in these countries due to the 
relatively low perception of risk, such an argument is countered by the discussion on 
political risks.
47
 Even the Shemberg study was unable to explain the disparity simply on the 
basis of perception of risk.
48
 Rather, she also listed other factors including the type of clause 
offered historically to the same or other investors and the different levels of training of the 
drafters.
49
  Indeed, during discussions on the study findings, legal experts expressed surprise 
that developing countries’ governments still agree to the extensive forms of stabilisation 
clauses.
50
 In response, several developing countries’ negotiators confessed that they agree to 
such clauses because they were unaware of alternatives.
51
 This is all the more reason why 
policy-makers in developing countries wishing to grant stabilisation clauses should consider 
this limited form of the clause.  
7.3.2 Stabilisation Clause Impact Assessment 
The last section recommended that stabilisation clauses be discarded completely or 
be limited to discriminatory laws. However, since the situation and circumstances in every 
developing country is not exactly the same, the possibility that stabilisation clauses may be 
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necessary in some countries cannot be entirely ruled out. This section recommends how 
stabilisation clauses may be granted in such instances and in a way that will better align the 
clauses and FDI with the sustainable development objectives of the state.     
Where a host state decides that there is a legitimate and verifiable reason to grant 
stabilisation clauses beyond discriminatory laws, it is proposed that a Stabilisation Clause 
Impact Assessment (SCIA) be undertaken before such clauses are granted. The purpose of a 
SCIA will be to ensure that the implications of the proposed stabilisation clauses and their 
potential impact on the ability of the country to enact and implement laws in furtherance of 
their legitimate sustainable development objectives are identified, evaluated, and where 
possible mitigated.  
   The SCIA should be conducted through a process that allows for the active 
participation of all the relevant government ministries, agencies and the general public. The 
basis for the involvement of relevant government ministries and agencies is simple. The 
findings in this thesis show that the constraints that stabilisation clauses impose on the 
regulatory ability of states cut across several government ministries and agencies, that in 
many cases were not consulted before the clauses were granted.
52
 It therefore makes sense 
that to ensure that stabilisation clauses do not impose unintended limitations on the discharge 
of their functions, their views should be sought and approval obtained.  
The determination of the specific bodies to consult can be aided through the 
application of the practice in Colombia where investors must identify, in their application for 
stability agreements, the specific laws or sections or laws that they want stabilised.
53
 If this 
requirement is incorporated in a SCIA, the relevant ministries or agencies can be determined 
according to how the laws proposed to be stabilised by the investor affects the discharge of 
their functions. 
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The second key element of the proposed SCIA is public participation. It is already a 
settled position, especially at the international level, that environmental issues are best 
handled with the participation of all concerned citizens.
54
 This thesis has shown that 
stabilisation clauses not only constrain environmental protection, but also social 
development and economic growth. There is thus a strong justification for citizens to be able 
to participate in the process leading to the grant of the clause, not just to protect the 
environment but also to protect development. This is especially so because it is the citizens 
who suffer if a government is unable to mobilise the maximum available financial resources 
to pursue the country’s sustainable development goals. This is apart from the fact that they 
are also the ones directly affected by the adverse effects of investment projects. It is 
therefore important that where stabilisation clauses are to be granted to potentially insulate 
such contracts for decades and bind the hands of future governments, those affected should 
have their say on whether the clauses should be granted or not.  
Questions may be asked whether the citizens have the technical and legal capacity to 
participate effectively in the proposed SCIA. However, there is significant evidence in 
developing countries to show that citizens, acting through civil society organisations and 
religious groups, have offered both solicited and unsolicited responses to potential and actual 
stabilisation clauses.
55
 In some of these cases, their involvement helped to eliminate 
stabilisation clauses or to reduce their scope.
56
 The involvement of the public is thus likely to 
help ensure that proposed stabilisation clauses pass the test of transparency, honesty and due 
process thereby helping to prevent unnecessary or unjustifiable stabilisation clauses from 
being granted.   
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Furthermore, the involvement of the public should be an added incentive on the part 
of the government to negotiate a better deal with fairer and more balanced terms for the 
country. Indeed, most of the controversies over stabilisation clauses granted in secret did not 
arise simply because a stabilisation clause was granted. It had more to do with the fact that 
the terms that were stabilised usually appeared over-generous to the investors while 
providing little benefit for the host states. On the other hand, in several instances where 
increased transparency and accountability led to the elimination or reduction in scope of 
stabilisation clauses, the changes also included adjustments to the contracts to increase the 
benefits to the host state.
57
 
Investors also stand to benefit from the conduct of a SCIA. The analysis in chapter 4 
showed that contracts negotiated in secret and under questionable circumstances are 
inherently unstable.
58
 Such contracts fuel public perception of corruption and unfair terms 
and often lead to demands for cancellation or restructuring by citizens pushing for greater 
accountability. Ultimately, the government is forced to act or be voted out of office and 
replaced with candidates who make explicit promises to review the contracts.
59
 Thus, from 
the perspective of investors, obtaining a more durable contract is closely linked to the 
legitimacy of the process that led to the contract in the first place. A SCIA, incorporating 
public participation, is therefore useful in clothing contracts with legitimacy.    
7.3.3 Flexible and Beneficial Stabilisation Clauses 
  Where a host state decides to grant stabilisation clauses and has decided to do so 
transparently and on an accountable basis, it is recommended that it should aim to retain 
some measure of flexibility to ease the constraints that the clauses impose. In the first place, 
it is useful to exclude certain types of law from the scope of the stabilisation clauses. 
However, unlike the common recommendation in the literature, the laws to be excluded 
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58
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59
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should not be limited to human rights and environmental laws. Rather, all laws that the host 
state considers to be fundamental to their sustainable development objectives should be 
excluded. In other words, each country should decide, in accordance with their particular 
circumstances and situation, the type of laws that should be excluded. The label attached to 
such laws is immaterial.  
The stabilisation practice in Colombia is again a good example in this regard. In 
Colombia, stability agreements cannot cover laws relating to social security, taxes of a 
temporary nature decreed by the national government during periods of emergency, indirect 
taxes, moderate regulation of the financial sector, the price rate regime for public utilities 
and acts of a general character of the country’s Central Bank.60 
While the scope of stabilisation clauses granted is important, the rigidity of the clause 
also plays a significant role in constraining host states from pursuing their legitimate 
sustainable development objectives.
61
 As such, a major concern for host states when drafting 
stabilisation clauses should be to balance stability with flexibility to allow the government to 
enact and implement laws to deal with important, but unforeseen, changes. The findings in 
this thesis show that the most rigid forms of stabilisation clauses are found in Africa. Yet, 
and as further evidence of the inconsistency in the use of stabilisation clauses, some of the 
best practices in terms of incorporating flexibility into contracts with stabilisation clauses are 
also found in Africa.  
Lessons can be learnt in this regard from recent stabilisation clauses granted in the 
Liberian mining sector.
62
 Provisions are included for a periodic review of the stabilised taxes 
and duties every five years. The stabilised taxes and duties may then be adjusted if the 
review justifies it. In addition, the agreements can also be modified at any time where a 
‘Profound Change in Circumstances’ has occurred. The combination of these two provisions 
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may, for example, give governments a stronger legal basis to impose a windfall tax to 
capture some of the benefits of the recent windfall brought about by high prices of mineral 
resources. 
Aside from excluding specific types of laws and allowing for some measure of 
flexibility, it is also important that host states seek to extract as much benefit as possible 
from a stabilisation clause. To do this, governments must first do away with the idea that 
exists in most of the literature on stabilisation clauses that the inflow of FDI is the reward a 
host states gets for granting stabilisation clauses. Rather, they should start to see stabilisation 
clauses as an ‘icing on the cake’ i.e. an additional incentive or special favour to foreign 
investors. Such a view of stabilisation clauses is an important step towards the formulation 
of a stabilisation practice that seeks to extract additional benefit for the host state in return 
for granting the clause.  
In terms of regional practices, this recommendation is particularly relevant to African 
governments as it is in this region that this problem is prevalent. On the other hand, Latin 
America offers a good template of how governments can benefit from stabilisation clauses.
63
 
Thus in exchange for granting stabilisation clauses, it is wise for governments to require 
investors to furnish some form of consideration, such as the payment of a premium or 
accepting to be subjected to a higher tax rate.
64
 Again, Colombia offers a good template in 
this regard as stability guarantees are only granted subject to the payment of a premium 
which is assessed according to the risks to be assumed by Colombia if it enters into the 
proposed stability agreement.
65
 
A final good practice that other countries should learn from Colombia is the granting 
of stabilisation clauses to both foreign and local investors provided they meet certain 
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conditions.
66
 Doing so will help to eliminate the unfair competition between domestic and 
foreign investors identified in section 6.3.4. Consequently, it will strengthen the ability of 
domestic firms to maximise the benefits of the spill-over effects of FDI thereby facilitating 
the contributions of FDI to the sustainable development of the country. The fact that many 
domestic investors applied for stability agreements in Colombia is an indication that even 
domestic firms desire stability concerning the regulatory regime. There is therefore no 
reason why stabilisation clauses should not be available to them if they are available to 
foreign investors.  
7.3.4 Applying the ‘Police Powers’ Doctrine to Interpret Stabilisation Clauses.  
  The previous recommendations focused on whether stabilisation clauses should be 
granted, and if so, how? The question therefore remains as to what might be done to ease the 
constraints imposed by stabilisation clauses already granted. This question is particularly 
important because of the usually long duration of stabilisation clauses. While some of these 
issues may be eventually resolved through negotiation, many are likely to end up in 
international arbitration, as is increasingly becoming the case.
 
 
Arbitral tribunals thus have an important role in reconciling existing stabilisation 
clauses with sustainable development. This is the more so because it is the threat of 
international arbitration that in most cases discourages governments from enacting or 
implementing laws to promote sustainable development. And as some commentators have 
noted, these threats have been effective mainly because of the almost unconditional support 
given to stabilisation clauses by arbitral tribunals.
67
 It is therefore important that arbitral 
tribunals re-assess the way in which they interpret stabilisation clauses and begin to interpret 
it in a way that can accommodate host states’ legitimate pursuit of sustainable development.  
                                           
66
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  The principle of sustainable development is now an overarching objective of the 
international community and an evolving norm of customary international law.
68
 This is a 
sufficiently strong reason for tribunals to recognise the principle when giving legal effect to 
stabilisation clauses. It is admitted that the imprecise and elastic nature of sustainable 
development may pose a challenge. However, such a challenge can be overcome in most 
situations through a case-by-case approach which takes into account all the relevant factors. 
This is similar to the approach taken by arbitral tribunals in deciding whether investors’ 
legitimate expectations of stability arising from an investment treaty have been breached.  
For example, in Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v Ecuador,
 
the 
tribunal noted:  
 
To be protected, the investor’s expectations must be legitimate and reasonable 
at the time when the investor makes the investment. The assessment of the 
reasonableness or legitimacy must take into account all circumstances, 
including not only the facts surrounding the investment, but also the political, 
socioeconomic, cultural and historical conditions prevailing in the host State. In 
addition, such expectations must arise from the conditions that the State offered 
the investor and the latter must have relied upon them when deciding to 
invest.
69
 
 
Although this case dealt with a treaty obligation on the fair and equitable treatment standard, 
it is argued that this line of reasoning can, and should be applied to stabilisation clauses 
arising from contractual commitments.  
                                           
68
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A review of arbitral decisions suggests that the reason why tribunals do not apply this 
reasoning to contractual guarantees of stability is because they view such guarantees as a 
‘specific commitment’ by host states not to change their laws to the detriment of investors.70 
While this may be true, the fact that a host state gave a ‘specific commitment’ should not 
preclude a tribunal from assessing the reasonableness or legitimacy of that ‘specific 
commitment’ in the light of the political, socioeconomic, cultural and historical conditions 
prevailing in the host state when the commitment was made. 
The need for tribunals to assess the legitimacy and reasonableness of stabilisation 
clauses is further justified by the fact that many of these clauses were granted through 
opaque processes by unelected, unaccountable and/or notoriously corrupt regimes. Investors 
should not therefore be given a blanket right to a legitimate expectation of stability because 
of a ‘specific commitment’. In other words, they should not be able to rely on stabilisation 
clauses granted by corrupt dictators to challenge legitimate measures taken by subsequent 
governments to promote sustainable development. It is therefore proposed here that contrary 
to the current position being taken by arbitrators, an investor’s legitimate expectations 
should not be validated simply because of a stabilisation clause. Rather the approach 
prescribed in Duke Energy v Ecuador should be applied.  
    From an international law perspective, such an interpretation of stabilisation 
clauses will help facilitate the much needed linkage between the international investment law 
regime and law in the field of sustainable development. Investment remains a primary driver 
of sustainable development and ensuring that it contributes to sustainable development is a 
priority for developing countries in particular.
71
 However, to succeed in this regards, 
investment policies must aim to operationalise sustainable development in concrete measures 
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71
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and mechanisms.
72
 In other words, investment law regimes and sustainable development law 
regimes must be inextricably linked if FDI is to contribute to sustainable development. Yet, 
at present, especially at the international level, this is hardly the case as international 
investment law has yet to significantly reflect sustainable development law and policy.
73
   
   It is for the above reason that some commentators have argued that decisions of 
arbitrators always empower investors at the expense of states because the decisions are based 
on commercial, and not national, considerations.
74
 It is also for this reason that several Latin 
American countries have previously been indifferent or opposed to international arbitration 
and more recently have been denouncing ICSID.
75
 The current approach whereby the 
sustainable development objectives of laws are regarded as immaterial because of 
stabilisation clauses reinforces these perceptions and widens, rather than closes, the gap 
between the international investment law regime and sustainable development law and 
policy. There is therefore a pressing need for change.     
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I:  
Significant Changes in Fiscal Terms in the Extractive Industries in Selected 
Developed Countries (2002 – 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Year Type of Change Main 
Sector 
Affected 
Australia 2008 Excise tax on Condensate. Oil and Gas 
 
Australia 
(Western 
Australia) 
2011 Royalties increased. Mining 
 
 
Australia  2012  Minerals Resources Rent Tax introduced. Petroleum 
Resource Rent Tax extended to all oil and gas 
production. 
Mining/Oil 
and Gas 
 
 
Australia  2012  Minerals Resources Rent Tax introduced. Petroleum 
Resource Rent Tax extended to all oil and gas 
production. 
Mining/Oil 
and Gas 
 
 
Australia(New 
South Wales) 
2011 Royalties increased. Mining  
Canada 
(Newfoundland) 
2007 Royalties increased. Oil and Gas 
 
 
Canada (Alberta) 2007 Royalties increased (commenced in 2009). Oil and Gas 
 
Italy 2008 Tax rate increased.  Oil and Gas 
 
UK 2002 Supplementary charge (Windfall Tax) introduced.  
 
Oil and Gas 
UK 2005 Windfall profit tax increased. 
 
Oil and Gas 
UK  2011 Windfall tax profit increased.  
 
Oil and Gas 
US 2006 Royalties imposed. 
 
Oil and Gas 
US (Alaska) 2006 Higher tax rates Petroleum Profits tax introduced to 
replaced production tax 
 
Oil and Gas 
US (Alaska) 2007 Petroleum Profits Tax increased  
 
Oil and Gas 
US 2012 Mining Royalty to be introduced  
 
Mining 
US  2012 Windfall Profit Tax (currently under review in 
Congress) 
 
Oil and Gas 
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Appendix II:  
Significant Changes in Fiscal Terms in the Extractive Industries in Selected 
Developing Countries (2002 – 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Year Type of Change Main 
Sector(s) 
Scope 
Algeria  2006 Windfall Profit tax (WPT) 
introduced. 
  
Oil/Gas New and existing 
contracts 
Bolivia From 
2005 
Royalty rates 
increased/nationalisations. 
 
Oil/Gas New and existing 
contracts 
Chile 2006  New tax introduced. 
 
 
Mining All companies without 
stability contracts.  
Chile  2010 Mining tax increased. 
  
Mining As with the 2006 
changes 
Ecuador From 
2006   
WPT introduced/royalty rate 
increased/ nationalisations. 
 
Oil/Gas New and existing 
contracts 
Equatorial 
Guinea  
2006 Stabilisation Clauses abolished. 
 
 
Oil/Gas New and existing 
contracts 
Ghana From 
2011 
Tax increased/WPT introduced/ 
stability agreements under review. 
 
Mining New and existing 
contracts 
Guinea 2011 Custom duties increased/Review of 
mining contracts commenced. 
 
Mining New and existing 
contracts 
Kazakhstan 2003 Stabilisation Clauses repealed from 
31 December 2002. 
 
Most 
sectors 
All new contracts 
Kazakhstan  2008 
- 
2010 
Fiscal regime overhauled through a 
new mining code.  
 
 
Oil/Gas New and existing 
(exceptions for some 
PSCs)  
Mongolia 2006 WPT introduced   Mining New and existing 
contracts. (imposed on 
companies with 
stability agreements 
after negotiations) 
Peru 2011 WPT and ‘special contribution’ 
introduced/Royalty rate increased.   
Mining New and existing 
contracts (Companies 
with stability 
agreements to only pay 
the "special 
contribution" 
Venezuela From 
2002 
Nationalisations/WPT introduced.  Oil/gas New and existing 
contracts 
Zambia From 
2008  
 
Stabilisation clauses abolished new 
tax and royalty rate introduced. 
  
Mining New and existing 
MDAs  
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Appendix III:  
List of Jurisdictions Reviewed (Both in terms of stabilisation practices and changes 
in fiscal regimes) 
 
Developing Countries 
 
Algeria Angola Argentina Azerbaijan 
Bangladesh Bolivia Botswana Brazil 
Cameroon Chad Chile China 
Colombia Costa Rica Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Ecuador 
Egypt Equatorial Guinea Ghana Guatemala 
Guinea Bissau India Indonesia Iraq 
Ivory Coast Kazakhstan Kuwait Kyrgyzstan 
Liberia Libya Madagascar Malawi 
Mauritania Mexico Mongolia Mozambique 
Namibia Nepal Nigeria Norway 
Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru 
Puerto Rico Russia Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Saudi Arabia 
Sierra Leone South Africa Syria Timor-Leste 
Turkey Uganda Uzbekistan Venezuela 
Yemen Zambia   
 
Developed Countries 
Alaska, United States Alberta, Canada Canada Italy 
New South Wales, 
Canada 
Newfoundland, 
Canada 
UK US 
Western Australia, 
Australia 
   
 
 
 
